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ABSTRACT 
 
The Caribbean and Global Capitalism 
 
by 
 
Jeb H. Sprague 
 
As a new epoch in the history of world capitalism, global capitalism is shaping every 
region of the planet. One of these regions is the Caribbean, among the first outside of 
Europe to be integrated into world capitalism through colonialism five centuries ago. In 
recent decades, as the Caribbean’s population has become entwined with global networks of 
production and finance in extremely unequal ways, scholars have begun to document 
shifting social patterns. While Caribbean societies throughout their history have exhibited 
many differences and continuities, the sweeping changes characteristic of globalization 
compel us to examine the region’s changing political economy. 
With much of the Caribbean’s population based in the Greater Antilles island chain 
(containing Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico), this 
geographic area will be referred to most often in my research. As many studies have been 
done on contemporary Puerto Rico (as an associated part of the U.S.) and on socialist Cuba, 
the case studies of this dissertation will focus on Jamaica, Haiti, and the Dominican 
Republic. In looking at these three countries, case studies will examine how their national 
economies have fragmented and become penetrated by global chains of accumulations.  I 
will look at this specifically through the context of major global economic sectors (cruise 
  viii 
ship tourism, mining, export processing, and the role of migration and reverse flow of 
remittances). 
My introductory chapter reviews, synthesizes, and interprets existing sources and 
accounts on the development of capitalism in the Caribbean. Especially useful are a number 
of scholarly studies on the shifting modes of production in the Caribbean, from slave labor 
to wage labor and from European colonial mercantilism up to industrializing monopoly 
capitalism and into capitalist globalization albeit with the U.S. as the major hegemonic 
power in the region. Such studies are useful in helping to understand the history of social 
formation in the region. 
I also have read reports and data gathered by key political and economic forums 
active in the Caribbean and specifically with regard to some of the major global industries. 
This information is central for gaining a detailed understanding of the shifting material and 
social relations taking place in the region. In addition to the archival research, this 
dissertation’s research is backed up by a multi-sited case study of the Caribbean region 
through ethnographic observations and interviews. This dissertation has aimed more 
precisely to synthesis my theoretical approach with my research findings. Rather than be 
chained to a rigid social experiment, I have moved back and forth between the questions I 
formulate and the data I collect.  The methods I’ve outlined are not necessarily carried out in 
sequence, but rather according to the needs of the project.  This flexibility has been 
necessary for a project of this scope.  
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Chapter I  
Introduction to the Caribbean and Global Capitalism 
 
As a new epoch in the history of world capitalism, global capitalism is shaping every 
region of the planet. One of these regions is the Caribbean, among the first outside of 
Europe to be integrated into world capitalism through colonialism five centuries ago (Mann, 
2011). In recent decades, as the Caribbean’s population has become entwined with global 
networks of production and finance in extremely unequal ways (Klak, 1997; Watson, 1985), 
scholars have begun to document shifting social patterns (Gowicharn, 2006; Knight & 
Martinez-Vergne, 2005). While Caribbean societies throughout their history have exhibited 
many differences and continuities (Mintz, 1989), the sweeping changes characteristic of 
globalization compel us to examine the region’s changing political economy. 
We need analytical tools to make sense of the changes taking place through 
globalization. In this dissertation, I use the term “transnational processes” to describe a 
diverse array of structural, institutional, and organizational phenomena that link regions and 
nations more organically with global society and economy. Transnational processes should 
not be confused with national and international processes. Whereas national processes occur 
within the frontiers of the nation-state, international processes transpire across borders. 
Transnational processes, in addition to occurring across borders, take place through cross-
border functional integration. Functional integration  refers to how amalgamations of 
different components (or agents) are constituted through their joint operation.   Here, I want 
to draw our attention to the nature of this integration as something completely new in the 
history of our species. Processes that take place across frontiers in this functionally 
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integrated manner alter the very ways in which space and geography are implicated in 
material and social production. We can identify this distinction between international and 
transnational processes in relation to the world economy: “Internationalization involves the 
simple extension of economic activities across national boundaries and is essentially a 
quantitative process that leads to a more extensive geographical pattern of economic 
activity,” whereas “transnationalization differs qualitatively from internationalization 
processes, involving not merely the geographical extension of economic activity across 
national boundaries but also the functional integration of such internationally dispersed 
activities” (Robinson, 2004, p. 14).  
This dissertation focuses on the nature of this new era of world capitalism and the 
sweeping transformations that it has ushered in. It investigates the changing political 
economy in the context of the Caribbean basin. I have sought to understand how changes in 
material (economic) relations are connected with social changes, such as the relationships 
among capitalists, labor, middle strata, and social groups such as state policymakers. I argue 
that structural changes associated with the emergence of global capitalism are rooted in new 
formations and fractioning among social groups and classes. By this, I mean that certain new 
social classes, class fractions, and social groups have come into existence, rooted in the 
novel processes of global capitalism and transnational social integration. In some instances, 
earlier classes and social groups have been reconstituted or reconfigured, even while 
maintaining many of their previous dynamics and appearances. In other cases, a class 
fraction or social group might be objectively rooted in globalized chains of accumulation, 
but subjectively they may remain more locally or nationally oriented. The following 
chapters are made up of comparative case studies that specifically show how traditional 
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exports and nationally or internationally-oriented economic sectors have shifted toward 
global competitiveness and transnational integration and how these processes are 
undergirded by changing social and class relations, as well as a reorientation of the state 
apparatus. 
In chapter one, I provide an explanation of the “global capitalism school” approach 
and suggest a route for understanding the Caribbean’s political economy in the global era. I 
close with a brief historical overview of the region in light of the different phases of world 
capitalism. Chapter two looks at the formation and evolving role of export processing 
development and export processing zones (EPZs), showcasing the increasing integration of 
Caribbean manufacturing with transnational capital and the great lengths to which state 
policymakers have gone to promote export processing. Chapter three examines the 
globalization of the cruise ship industry in the region, elaborating upon how Caribbean 
nations have become globally competitive nodes for the industry.  It shows how the industry 
and labor operating through it have undergone a major restructuring over recent decades, 
coming under the consolidation of transnational capital. Chapter four looks at the 
exportation of Caribbean labor, the reverse flow of remittances, as well as the formation of a 
global remittance industry. By exploiting migrant labor, transnational capitalists have come 
to not only profit tremendously by appropriating the surplus value of super-exploitable 
migrant workers, but also through its appropriation of portions of the redistributed value (in 
the form of remittances) that emigrant laborers send abroad primarily to family members. 
Chapter five looks at mining in the Caribbean, specifically in regard to the transition from an 
international mining industry, with heavy state involvement, to a transnationally-oriented 
and privatized mining industry. The dissertation will close with some theoretical reflection 
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on the broader implications of economic restructuring and the transformation of class 
relations in the region and with suggestions for future research on the Caribbean and global 
capitalism. 
 
Global Capitalism: A New Phase in the History of World Capitalism 
How do we account for the massive changes washing over the shores of the 
Caribbean and the world as a whole? Around us are advancements unique in our species’ 
history: new technologies, bursting flows of information, and global economic integration. 
Yet these occur alongside unprecedented inequality (Holt-Gimenez & Patel, 2009; Kloby, 
2003), shifting forms of coercive and consensual domination (Harvey, 1991; Robinson, 
1996, 2014), and ecological and climactic crisis that imperil life on our planet (Klein, 2014; 
Chew, 2006; Kolbert, 2014; World Bank, 2012). The structures of human society have been 
altered dramatically over recent decades. Many changes have occurred at a faster tempo and 
in a more all-encompassing manner when compared to earlier phases of world capitalism 
(Harvey, 1991).  
Various concepts and theories have been used to make sense of the ways in which 
human social formation has developed historically. Marx’s concept of “modes of 
production” helps us to conceptualize the varied ways through which human beings have 
together produced their subsistence in order to survive. By mode of production, Marx 
referred to the combination of (1) productive forces, all those forces which are applied by 
people in the production process (body and brain, tools and techniques, materials, resources 
and equipment) and (2) relations of production, the sum total of social relationships that 
people must enter into, in order to survive, to produce and reproduce their means of life 
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(Marx, 1992). The totality of these relationships constitutes a relatively stable and long-
lasting structure. So how can we understand “globalization” in regards to the mode of 
production? To demarcate the historical process, I suggest that the era of globalization is 
best understood as the latest phase in the history of world capitalism (and therein the latest 
phase in the capitalist mode of production).  
The capitalist mode of production, as Marx conceptualized, was qualitatively and 
structurally divergent from the pre-capitalist modes of production, as it is based on systems 
of production and distribution organized around private ownership and wage labor 
(Donaldson, 2012). Capitalism has gone through different phases, through which we can 
identify particular changes among productive forces and changes to people’s social relations 
(Hobsbawm, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d). In examining these changes, we can point to 
four major phases in the history of world capitalism, generally identified as: (1) the 
emergence of capitalism in Western Europe and the initial colonial and chattel slave 
production phase that occurred from the 1500s through the 1800s, (2) the industrial 
capitalism phase that emerged in the late-1700s, with the first industrial revolution, and 
continued on until the latter part of that 1800s, (3) the international monopoly capitalism 
phase that developed in the mid- to late 1800s and continued into around the 1970’s, and 
most recently (4) the global capitalism phase which emerged in the later decades of the 20th  
century and has continued into the 21st century. 
The novelty of global capitalism, as a new phase in the history of world capitalism, 
has been shown in a number of recent works (Dicken, 2007; Harris, 2006; Robinson, 2004; 
Sklair, 2002; Sprague, 2015). Sklair observes how transnational practices have emerged in 
recent decades, operating across the global system interconnected with regional, national, 
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and local constituencies in economic, political, and culture-ideological ways. As global 
networks of production and finance that pushed through TNCs and other institutions 
redefine the scale of the world economy (Dicken, 2011), it has been argued that 
transnational social relations form within and between class fractions and social groups. 
Scholars have examined therein the role of transnational social integration and the rise of 
new social and class relations (Harris, 2006; McMichael, 1996; Robinson, 2004; 2014; 
Rodriguez, 2010; Sassen, 1991; Sklair, 2001, 2002; Van der Pijl, 1998), but have also raised 
questions for further research and substantiation (Embong, 2000). Sklair argues that 
operating outside of the global system, “is becoming increasingly more difficult as capitalist 
globalization penetrates ever more widely and deeply” (2009, p. 528).  
By looking at the Caribbean in relation to the different phases of capitalism, we get a 
deeper understanding of shifting structural patterns and how combinations of various 
circumstances (or conjunctural dynamics) lay beneath the changes taking place in the region. 
The Caribbean, the earliest region of the “New World” to be conquered by the late-Feudal 
absolutist states of Western Europe (Wolf, 2010; Anderson, 1974), has passed through all of 
the different phases of capitalism. Capitalism has flowed and congealed through Caribbean 
societies (as structures). Human beings (as agents of production, or carriers of productive 
relations) do “make their own history” (Marx, 1994), creating and constructing new and 
possibly emancipatory endeavors. Yet they operate under broader circumstances not chosen 
by them, under circumstances coiled back through the past and up to the present, through the 
collection of activities of the lives of previous and current generations. 
As many scholars have described, while Caribbean societies became centers of 
agricultural and extractivist production, they suffered from underdevelopment as peripheral 
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areas of the world market. Capitalist development took on particular forms in the region, 
which for centuries was largely dictated by the region’s frontier status in the world system. 
Capitalist accumulation in the region initially was largely based around plantation 
agriculture. As a source of exportation to the more advanced “core” capitalist markets in 
Western Europe (and, eventually, North America), such industries led to highly unequal 
class systems. Exported and refined agrarian products, such as sugar and coffee, harvested in 
its original form by slaves and poor peasant populations in the Caribbean, became in turn 
stimulants for new industrial proletariat work forces in places such as France and the British 
Isles (Richardson, 1992, p. 54). While Caribbean colonial and post-colonial societies (during 
the earlier phases of capitalism) became integrated with chains of accumulation in world 
capitalism, the nature of this integration was qualitatively distinct and different from the 
nature of today’s integration of the Caribbean with global capital.   
This is because in the earlier phases of capitalism, the mode of production was 
largely “articulated” within the production relations of various nation-states, colonies, 
empires and the inter-state frameworks that existed. What has changed is that with the rise 
of capitalist globalization, processes of material and social production within these 
territorially confined units have broken down. The national and international circuits of 
accumulation running through these areas have now begun to be functionally integrated into 
global circuits. As Robinson (2003, p. 16) writes: “there has been a progressive dismantling 
of autonomous or ‘autocentric’ national production systems and their reactivation as 
constituent elements of an integral world production system.” As part of this process, the 
world has experienced a qualitative change in mobility and time-space compression 
(Harvey, 1991).  
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The unfolding of different phases of the capitalist mode of production in the region 
can be seen not just in the new technologies and productive forces, but also through 
changing labor-capital relations. A case in point is the shift from chattel slave labor to 
private peasant production and ultimately to waged labor. Elites in the region have also 
faced changing circumstances. Colonial elites in different instances were either displaced by 
national elites or overthrown by revolutionary movements, or in other circumstances they 
themselves helped facilitate transitions to political independence for their colonial subjects. 
Whereas the colonial systems had often privileged metropole-based enterprises, the decline 
of colonialism occurred alongside the rise of industrial capital and international monopoly 
capital. The objective social and class conditions that formed we can thus understand as 
rooted in the capitalist mode of production and its altered phases and historical 
particularities.  An aim of my dissertation is to understand how the latest transition took 
place in the Caribbean: from the international to the global phase of capitalism. 
In addition to the work of the “global capitalism school,” I have also been inspired 
by earlier critical works on Caribbean political economy, many of which have been authored 
by Caribbean scholars. While there have been many past critical and radical studies on the 
political economy of the region and many of its nations, there has yet to be a study of the 
Caribbean from the perspective of the “global capitalism school”, emphasizing the novel and 
contradictory nature of the transnational processes that have developed over the last decades 
of the 20th century and into the 21st century. Similarly, while there have been many 
“globalization” era studies of the Caribbean region, there have been too few that radically 
examine the region’s structural features. As emphasized throughout my case studies, this 
dissertation focuses on (1) the underlying socio-economic structure of the Caribbean, and (2) 
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how, through globalization, many nationally and internationally oriented social and material 
processes in the region have become transnationalized. Next, I want to explain more clearly 
the theoretical approach that I take up in this dissertation and how my focus is largely driven 
by a structural analysis. 
THEORIZING SOCIAL CARTOGRAPHY & GLOBAL CAPITALISM 
To demystify the character of capitalist accumulation and capital-labor relations, we 
need to have a theoretical understanding that illuminates their structural features. From the 
naked eye, global markets appear to take on a life of their own, as a fetishized relation with 
mesmerizing flows of finance, production, and trade. In order to get beyond the view of 
capitalism as an “immense collection of commodities” (Marx, 1994, p. 125), we need to 
engage in a more in-depth analysis and get at its intrinsic characteristics. How are services 
and commodities produced and utilized? Rather than understand the production and 
consumption of goods and services as the normal function of a faceless market, we need to 
comprehend how human beings operate through economic structures. Through this 
operation, labor and capital take on specific and peculiar social characters. So how has this 
operation taken on a novel form in the global era? Here we need to understand the social 
cartography of global capitalism, what Robinson describes as the emergent “single and 
increasingly undifferentiated field of world capitalism” as it “integrates the various polities, 
cultures, and institutions of national societies into an emergent transnational or global 
society” (Robinson, 2003, p. 13). 
In considering the social cartography of globalization in the Caribbean, ethnic and 
class dimensions are particularly salient. Scholars have pointed to the social construction of 
race, where various and often amorphous ethnic groupings have been placed into 
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concretized racialized structures and hierarchies. An ethnic group, as segments of people 
whom at one time may have lived in a particular geographic area, is not a concrete fixed 
category (Reed, 2000). Through the early period of capitalism, depending on the 
circumstances, ethnic groups and various populations came to be socially constructed so as 
to appear as part of monolithic and biologically configured “races”.  
This idea of distinctly separate racial categories appears to have initially become 
widespread during the rise of early capitalist labor relations, which was a period that also 
exhibited some late-feudalistic relations. As Cox (1948) argues, new socially constructed 
racial hierarchies had their roots in chattel slavery, as European colonialists needed to 
legitimate their brute objectification and subjugation of African labor. Slave labor served as 
the most accessible and profitable means through which to operate the new colonial system, 
with its intensive forms of plantation production (Williams, 1944). In order to effectively 
exploit and repress African slave labor, European elites needed to distinguish Africans from 
other laborers. They needed to create the illusion of Africans as subhuman.  
Through historical processes, racialized relations came about justifying a brutally exploitive 
social relation (Federici, 2004; Horne, 2014; also see: Szymanski, 1983, p. 355-432). 
Racism as a structure is a material relation prior to an ideological justification: after an 
objective relationship of domination exists, ideological justifications were created (Cox, 
1948). In the colonial Caribbean, consensus formation around these ideological constructs 
thus worked to solidify the rule of members of the dominant class within the dominant 
ethnic group over laborers supplanted from another part of the world. In the Caribbean this 
took on the particular form of a dominant “white” planter class ruling over a much larger 
enslaved “black” population, with various “creole” or “mixed” intermediary strata. The 
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racialized orders thus came often to appear as one in the same with the class system.  Yet, as 
Kenan Malik (1996) argues compellingly, it is the capitalist organization of society into 
classes that led to the racial classification of humanity. The racialized forms of the class 
structures that came about through capitalism by way of European colonialism have been 
reconfigured over the years. However, the early colonial projects set into place a sort of 
bedrock, forming racialized class relations that remain deeply entrenched (and reproduced), 
passed down generations and into the current global phase of capitalism.  
Racialized class formation has occurred differently in particular locations and 
historical periods (Cox, 1948; Solomos, 1986). In the context of the Caribbean, it initially 
took shape through past imperial systems and has continued on through the phases of 
capitalism, including through the qualitative shift to capitalist globalization (Marable & 
Agard-Jones, 2008).  Whereas indigenous people on the Caribbean islands were almost 
completely wiped out during the initial period of colonialism, racialized colonial hierarchies 
between “black”, “white”, and various “mestizaje” populations (people of “mixed race”) 
were constructed and reproduced over time (Smith, 1965, p. 9). These racialized structures 
were further complicated through new immigrants (such as those originating in China and 
India), compelled, like others, into identifying themselves through socially constructed lens 
of race. Racialized class formations have taken on different shapes in various parts of the 
world, with such dynamics in the Caribbean context having been heavily studied and 
debated (to cite just a small number of these, see for example: de la Fuente, 2001; Dupuy, 
1996; Meeks, 2007; Mills, 2010; Reyes-Santos, 2015). Yet racial formation is not 
monolithic, a fact that is clearly on display when looking at other parts of the world, such as 
in East Asia, where completely different racialized dynamics have formed in distinction to 
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societies (such as in the Caribbean) where through genocide, slavery, and forms of waged 
labor distinct racialized class systems formed. 
Scholars have written on the ways racialized and cultural norms are identified 
differently and through changing formats (& du Gay, 1996). How different “racial” 
categories are defined and understood varies, melds, or persists, impacted by particular 
histories, structures and cultural practices. In the Caribbean context, reverberations remain 
of the racialized class relations formed through European colonialism, slavery, and the 
initial phase of capitalism. In this manner racialized class relations have been reproduced 
overtime, yet they are not static. Rather as a social relation they have undergone changes and 
different iterations.  For instance, we can see the reproduction of racialized class relations in 
the Caribbean where peoples with lighter skin, or with higher degrees of non-African 
ancestry, often make up the majority of the dominant social classes in the region, while 
lower income populations remain often largely made up of those with darker hues of skin 
color (more heavily representative of the descendants of the original African born slave 
populations). Yet at the same time it is true a growing number of economic and political 
leaders and new middle strata of Caribbean society exhibit darker skin pigmentations (and 
with lineages that trace back to slave ancestors). So whereas the historically persistent 
structure of racialized inequality and repression remain embedded within class relations 
(Gafar, 1998), we can also see some changes as having occurred. As alluded to earlier, 
racialized structures have become part and parcel of class relations in capitalism, continuing 
to have a real and deleterious impact on so many in global society (Allahar, 2005). Just as 
authors have linked rising levels of un- and under-employment and precarious labor to 
policing operations seeking to contain racialized surplus populations (Gilmore, 2007; Hall, 
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et al, 2013), this is a reality heavily present in today’s Caribbean. In this manner, racialized 
class relations have been reproduced in the global era (Marable and Agard-Jones, 2008), as 
is clear among the urban and rural working and popular classes that dot the region’s 
landscape. 
In connection to the social construction of our lived reality and the ways in which 
this plays out in our world, we must understand how inequality and social class have 
developed historically and contemporaneously. Whereas Homo sapiens have existed for 
more than 200,000 years, inequality only began around 12,000 years ago (Harman, 2008), 
yet whereas gendered inequality and the sexual division of labor is believed to have existed 
even earlier (Ibid). Levels of inequality do exist in non-capitalist modes of production but at 
much lower levels, as scholars have observed (Ibid). The development of capitalism 
introduced the capital-labor class structure, in which a part of society came to own the 
means of production while another was compelled to sell its labor “on pain of extinction” (as 
Marx puts it). While merchant capital had already existed for many centuries, the labor-
capitalist relation and the associated relations of production ultimately developed in part as a 
response to the crisis of feudalism (Watson, 2015, p. 384). The structural features of this 
phenomena initially congealed in the late feudal formations of western Europe during the 
16th and 17th centuries, as a process of primitive accumulation began which “divorc[ed] the 
producer from the means of production” and removed small non-capitalist producers from 
their lands and inserted them into relations of waged labor (Marx, 1994, p. 875). As 
communal small farmer and familial land holdings subsided, and monetized property 
relations spread, a heightened distinction between possessors and non-possessors occurred 
(Wood, 1998).  
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Interconnected to the transformations in Europe, racialized chattel slavery began in 
the colonial Caribbean, producing significant surplus for European planter elites and 
merchant capital (Galeano, 1997; McAuley, 2001). These changes occurring through 
capitalism also led to a new subjugation of women, both through the brutality of slavery for 
enslaved African women, and through the “patriarchy of the wage” for others. As women’s 
work in the early phases of capitalism was largely confined to unwaged labor, women faced 
a qualitatively new level of subordination within the family and society (Federici, 2004; 
Mies, 1986), relations that continue to be reproduced though having undergone changes as 
well. Capitalist and laboring classes, different ethnicities, women and men have all thus 
come to participate in racialized and gendered class systems. Divisions and forms of 
repression have in turn generated fierce resistance and emancipatory movements. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, which focuses on political economy, it is 
important here to elaborate upon the structural features of the class systems that emerged. 
By class systems I refer to the division of society into social classes made of people that are 
related in different ways to the production and distribution of wealth. Szymanski (1983, pp. 
84-119) describes, for example, the capitalist class (who own the means of production), the 
working and popular classes  (who must sell their labor), the intermediate positions in class 
structure (“middle class positions”), and a variety of others groups such as the unemployed 
and the structurally excluded. During historical eras prior to capitalism and in the initial 
periods of capitalism, we can identify other classes; such as chattel slaves who made up a 
large portion of the Caribbean population and who in many parts of the Caribbean came to 
far outnumber the European planters and colonialists (Horne, 2014). Importantly, social 
classes do not appear in isolation or as something permanent; rather they are a product of 
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social relations in which human beings seek (or are compelled) to produce and reproduce the 
material requirements of life. In regions such as the Caribbean, colonial expansion carried 
with it the early social relations of the capitalist mode of production. Yet carried within 
these new exploitive social relations grew seeds of resistance and liberation, as human 
beings by their nature will seek out freedom (James, 1980, 1989). For this reason, the new 
plantation and extractive industries of the Caribbean became cauldrons of class struggle and 
slave rebellion (Linebaugh & Rediker, 2013).  
Before continuing on, it is useful to briefly outline some concrete ways to understand 
class relations. How a class is formed depends upon a variety of subjective and objective 
factors. Here it is useful to differentiate between a “class for itself” and a “class in itself”. A 
“class for itself” (or a “class fraction for itself”) is class conscious: its individuals are aware 
of their shared interests and consider themselves as a unit that acts upon the basis of a 
common feeling in pursuing their class interests. A “class in itself” (or a “class fraction in 
itself”) by contrast, while sharing a common position in relation to production, is not class 
conscious as it neither understands its group interests, nor does it think of itself collectively 
or as a class (or class fraction). A variety of structural features have been described through 
a class analysis, such as class fractions, social groups, and strata. Whereas (1) a “class 
fraction” is a segment or portion of the whole class—who are “grouped around different 
forms of economic activity or around the place occupied within these activities” (Wright, 
1980, p. 335, quoting Freedman),i (2) a “social group” is a group of people who come 
together based on some common interest but may or may not be made-up of individuals 
from the same social class, and (3) “strata” refers to a layer of society with internally 
consistent characteristics that distinguish it from other layers. By identifying such structural 
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features in the case studies of this dissertation I seek to better elaborate the objective class 
and social conditions. Next I will briefly look at some of the important ways in which other 
works on Caribbean political economy have examined class relations.  
 
Class Analysis and the Caribbean 
During the mid- to late-20th century, prior to the end of the Cold War and before the 
flood of literature on globalization, a number of well-known scholars published radical class 
analyses, and historical materialist-influenced studies that focused on the Caribbean region 
or on specific countries in the region. The “Third Worldist” Monthly Review Press became 
one location where many such works were published. Eric Williams, for example, pointed 
out how many internal divisions existed between the ruling classes of Europe and its 
Caribbean colonies, with short sightedness among many dominant groups often occurring, 
and eventually creating major problems for them (Williams, 1944, p. 210). In another study, 
Louis A Pérez (2003) pays special attention to how much of Cuba’s local bourgeoisie during 
the 19th century did not make up a nationalist bourgeoisie, but rather advocated for 
continued Spanish rule or U.S. annexation. Also utilizing a class analysis, Mintz (inspired by 
Marx’s historical materialism as well as U.S. cultural anthropology) emphasizes the 
historically distinctive development of the Caribbean region in relation to the intense class 
conflicts that occurred.ii Mintz argued that in certain instances peasant and rural populations 
in the region served as protagonists of social conflict, but during other periods they were 
heavily beaten down or marginalized. In a different Marxian influenced work, Gordon K. 
Lewis (2004) places special significance on the continuity and hereditary nature of the class 
system, specifically in regard to Puerto Rico, explaining that while deep changes had 
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occurred during the first half of the 20th century, the same social groups have managed to 
maintain dominant positions locally throughout major political and economic changes in the 
country. He furthermore emphasizes how the massive level of U.S. investment into the 
island and increasing migration patterns helped to meld the island with the U.S., crushing 
hopes of independence. In fact, Puerto Rico during the mid-20th century (along with Ireland) 
would become an early laboratory for the export-processing model, which restructured the 
local economy to produce non-traditional exports for the international market (Ayala and 
Bernabe, 2007). 
In his study of class conflict in 1930s Jamaica, Ken Post (1978) points toward forms 
of consciousness and action in determining class. He argues that the “process of the 
determination of forms of class consciousness and action” occur on two levels: (1) “the 
generation of social actions (most importantly, but not exclusively, that of classes), 
necessarily involving some level of consciousness,” and (2) “the shaping of such action into 
particular forms of certain points in time, what have been termed . . . instances of practices” 
(Post, 1978, p. 51). Post suggests a useful way to understand class subjectivity as becoming 
more pronounced at certain times, and then receding during other periods.  This is 
interesting to think about in regards to how Clive Thomas argued that class structure in the 
periphery is more fluid, with social changes occurring at times very rapidly (Thomas, 1984, 
pp. 62-63). Important for considering the Caribbean, scholars have also observed how 
particular subjective dynamics develop in colonial and slave societies, as one is a colonial 
subject or human property of a planter elite. Contradictory sets of ideas thus developed 
through the consciousness of people going through specific historical circumstances (Bakan, 
1990, p. 15-17). 
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Considering class relations in relation to world capitalism, Clive Thomas argued that 
class structures in countries of the “periphery” were more complex and fragile than in the 
“core" (Thomas, 1984, p. 56). He argued that the working class in these regions, such as the 
Caribbean, was larger and more underdeveloped due to its lack of production, 
manufacturing, and assembly of consumer goods for urban and high-income markets. 
Writing in the early 1980s, he found that although the service sector employed a larger part 
of the labor force, most businesses were small, except for some government enterprises. 
Female labor was often relegated to households and tax haven export zones. With most 
businesses operating through only small-scale employment, working class-unionized action 
was underdeveloped. 
In regard to world capitalism and class relations, much of the oligarchy in the 
Caribbean “developed out of foreign penetration and settlement” (Thomas, 1984, p. 58). 
Thomas explained how two main fractions of the capitalist class existed across most of the 
region: “The traditional landed oligarchy, representing ‘feudalism in the countryside,’ and 
the emergent industrial bourgeoisie, representing ‘capitalist relations in the cities.’” Not 
concretely demarcated, he argued that social and class relations “may overlap in one person 
or in one family, creating a complex intertwining of feudal, other precapitalist, and capitalist 
property relations” (1984, p. 58).  
Like Lewis, Thomas also places emphasis on how local dominant groups have 
reproduced their class power through the state apparatuses (especially during the post-
colonial era), a vital component for maintaining their hegemony. Without fostering an 
industrial working force, Thomas argued that during the post-colonial era in many 
underdeveloped countries the state seizure of property could easily pervert the ability for 
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capitalistic production to expand. He viewed as an important quality of capitalism the 
emergence of a productive bourgeoisie and a working class (See Fatton, 2002). Through its 
positions within state apparatuses, Thomas argues, the petty bourgeoisie in many developing 
countries have reproduced themselves. He explains, “The emergence of this sector of the 
petty bourgeoisie constitutes the most important postcolonial development in the class 
structure of the peripheral capitalist societies. It has been variously described as the “state 
petty bourgeoisie,” the “state bourgeoisie,” or the “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” (1984, p. 60). 
One negative side effect of nationalizations and the creation of more state property, Thomas 
argued, is that with a segment of the bourgeoisie in control of the state, the new state 
enterprises (rather than used for the social good) have become an “essential element in the 
process of creating an economic base for the reproduction of the ruling class” (1984, p. 59). 
He identified how petty bourgeoisie fractions utilized the state for their own interests but 
were split between a politico-administration element and an economic-technocratic element 
(1984, p. 61). The term “petty bourgeoisie” has often been used in Marxian and political 
economy studies to describe the strata of society consisting of small-scale merchants, 
professionals, and upwardly mobile workers. Forming a sort of intermediary group between 
capitalists and workers, and some with a nationally oriented outlook, sectors of this petty 
bourgeoisie might merge (or conflate) their own interests with the interests of the state as a 
whole; this then gives them a tendency to promote types of welfarism and mixed economy 
yet without any interest in challenging larger capitalist tendencies. Even so, at certain 
historical junctures, faced with reaction and violence (Hallward, 2008), reformist political 
tendencies involving sectors of the “petty bourgeoisie” may mount the only achievable 
alternative. Yet, increasingly so in the global era, these upwardly mobile parts of society 
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have no interest in so called “national development” but rather have turned their attention 
toward the global economy. 
Since the end of the Cold War and the defeat, marginalization, implosion, or co-
optation of many popular movements and parties of the left in the region, radical studies of 
the contemporary Caribbean have waned, with few such treatises published in recent 
decades. A small number of torchbearers over recent decades have continued to produce 
studies that critically examine capitalism in the region, with the work of Watson (2013) of 
particular importance because of his focus on the novel nature of the class system at the root 
of the region’s integration with the global economy. In my view many scholarly and media 
reports on the region have come to focus almost exclusively on surface level economic or 
cultural dimensions, or on simplistic geopolitical analyses.iii While not wanting to ignore 
these factors, I have sought in this dissertation to consider the changes taking place at a 
deeper level through a political economy and class analysis lens, but one that takes into 
consideration the fundamental changes coming about as a result of globalization. Next, I will 
discuss further the role of class and social relations in the epoch of globalization. 
 
The Challenge of Understanding Social Formation in the Global Era 
Traditionally, the intestate system, with its nation-state competition as the core 
organizing principle of the world economy, has been conceptualized as the institutional 
framework in which global social forces operate (such as nationally and internationally 
oriented social classes, class fractions, and social groups). This approach is more or less 
present, for example, in the classical theories of political economy (Marx, 1994; Smith, 
2003), the historical materialist theories of international monopoly capitalism (Hilferding, 
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2006; Lenin, 1969), and the more recent New Imperialism approaches (Harvey, 2005; 
Wood, 2005). A nation’s class system, as commonly understood from these perspectives, is 
made up of nationally rooted capitalists and laborers (i.e., the American, Chinese, Mexican, 
or Jamaican capitalist class and working class). As structural features of these different class 
systems there can exist different class fractions (i.e., a financial fraction of a country’s 
capitalist class or a lumpenproleteriat fraction of a country’s working class), reflecting 
particular historic circumstances and the alignment of social forces. From this approach, 
some have argued that a fraction of a nation’s capitalist class might at times operate 
internationally and alongside an international division of labor, though remaining essentially 
rooted in the nation (Hymer, 1971, 1972, 1976, 1979; Panitch & Gindin, 2013).   
This approach of examining class systems as solidifying through the framework of 
the interstate system and nation-state competition is also taken up by dependency theorists 
or the similar  “plantation school” of thought, which is well known in Anglo-Caribbean 
academia (Beckford, 1999; Best, 1968; Best, Levitt, & Grivan, 2009; Thomas, 1968). These 
scholars essentially sought to look at the problems of underdevelopment within colonial and 
post-colonial states. Down this route, but emphasizing the context of world capitalism, 
scholars such as Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, and Samir 
Amin broke with the Marxian focus on development among the core states of the capitalist 
system by instead focusing on underdevelopment in the periphery (Brewer, 1990, p. 161).iv 
These theories argue that resources from the people or countries of the “periphery” and 
colonial or post colonial areas (regions primarily in the “global south”) flow to dominant 
groups or countries of the metropole or core—specifically the nations of Western Europe, 
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North America, and Japan—enriching the latter at the expense of the former (Arrighi, 1994; 
Wallerstein, 1979). 
While recognizing the importance of these earlier theories, especially in elaborating 
upon earlier historical phases of capitalism, I argue that these earlier approaches by 
understanding political economy through the scope of the nation state do not account for the 
fundamental changes occurring through globalization of recent decades. They do not help us 
understand the deep structural changes that capitalism has undergone. Yet many these earlier 
approaches do remain important and have influenced the approach that I have taken up in 
this dissertation from a “global capitalism school” and global political economy perspective.  
While critically appropriating ideas from many earlier perspectives, I argue we need to 
recalibrate our understanding of social formation in order to understand the global era. 
Alongside the growing transnationality of material (economic) relations, there is an 
emerging transnationality of many social and class relations (Harris, 2006; Liodakis, 2010; 
Robinson, 2004, 2013; Sklair, 2001).  
In recent decades, a functional integration of many production networks and 
financial systems has spanned multiple frontiers. Propelling this restructuring of the world 
economy is the emerging transnational capitalist class (TCC). This class, with its different 
fractions, has emerged as that segment of the world bourgeoisie that owns the leading 
worldwide means of production embodied in TNCs and the most powerful financial 
institutions. As global networks of production and finance that pushed through TNCs and 
other institutions redefine the scale of the world economy through new functionally 
integrated circuits of accumulation (Dicken, 2011), transnational relations form within and 
between various class fractions and social groups. Transnational capitalists now seek out 
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profits globally and hail from around the world, not just from the “global north” (Robinson, 
2014).   
Middle strata (such as professionals and small-scale working entrepreneurs) and 
other working and popular class fractions around the world have undergone major changes 
associated with globalization, as labor power itself has been reconfigured and incorporated 
into transnational value chains (Robinson, 2014; Struna, 2009). New pools of middle strata, 
with higher patterns of consumption, have appeared in regions such as the Caribbean. Labor, 
meanwhile, has come to fit more and more into globally competitive relations and new more 
exploitive working regimes. 
  On the other hand, this does not mean that previous forms of class relations have 
disappeared or are no longer relevant. What it suggests is that new transnationally oriented 
social relations are beginning to entwine with, and in many circumstances dominate and 
impact, earlier forms. These new social dynamics and the integrative processes of the global 
economy are bound up with contradictions. Many differences remain, as new transnational 
processes intersect and clash with regional, international, national, and local processes. The 
uneven and combined developments that occurred during earlier phases of capitalism persist 
but have become altered through new transnational processes. Even as transnational 
processes occur, long-term historic relationships and the influence of geography still play a 
role in impacting how societies develop.  We can see important instances of transnational 
material and social formation occurring through the Caribbean. 
For instance, take a TNC with a wide presence in the Caribbean region, the mobile 
telephone network provider Digicel. Founded in 2001, the company is headquartered in 
Jamaica but incorporated in Bermuda. Digicel has institutional investors from a growing 
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array of companies. These range from private equity houses, such as the London-based CDC 
Capital Partners, to government firms. Facilitating its operations in Haiti, the World Bank 
has also invested in Digicel operations. A number of Caribbean-based capitalists have also 
provided launching costs for new Digicel operations in the region, such as in Barbados 
(Telecompaper, 2003). Deepening the company’s integration with global finance, in 2007 
Digicel sold $1.4 billion (1.06 billion Euros) of high-yielding junk bonds (Beesley, 2007).  
While not yet publicly traded on the stock market, the company is majority owned by 
a transnational capitalist, Denis O’Brien. O’Brien, who is Irish by birth, officially resides in 
Malta (a country which charges no tax on worldwide assets or income brought in by 
permanent residents, and only requires a “permanent resident” to visit Malta once a year). 
With investments in a variety of businesses and stocks around the world, O’Brien is said to 
be worth close to $5 billion.v After initially entering the telecom business by promoting its 
liberalization in the early 1990s in Ireland, his company Digicel now focuses on marketing 
mobile services in small countries in the developing world such as in the Caribbean, Central 
America and Oceania.  Digicel has expanded rapidly by purchasing mobile licensing 
contracts from governments liberalizing their communications sector. The company’s 
growth strategy has relied upon the ramping up of neoliberal austerity and privatization 
policies undertaken by state elites in recent decades. Powerful state apparatuses, such as 
those of the U.S., the E.U., and supranational agencies, such as the IMF and World Bank, 
have been some of the strongest proponents of privatization of public telephone companies, 
policies that have benefited TNCs like Digicel. 
Digicel’s board of directors (including Denis O’Brien) is made up of individuals 
from Irish and British backgrounds. Through the lens of earlier “nation state centric” 
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theoretical scopes, O’Brien and the other executives of Digicel would therein be viewed as 
part of an Irish or British Isles capitalist class, possibly part of an internationally active 
fraction. Yet O’Brien’s orientation, objectively and subjectively, is transnational: from his 
investments to his role as a capitalist. He has no interest in repatriating money to Ireland, or 
economically developing the British Isles. Rather, his businesses and investments are based 
on the functional integration of capital across borders and taking advantage of the uneven 
globally competitive environment, by exercising his company’s economy of scale and 
harnessing the technological and organizational advancements of recent decades. The 
cellular and mobile systems industry through which O’Brien profits so handsomely is just 
one example of the rapid changes that have occurred through globalization. The company 
has benefited from technology that only emerged during the latter part of the 20th century. 
Furthermore, Digicel’s growth has been tied to the formation of a global consumer base of 
cell phone users. In the early 1990s, there were only a few hundred thousand subscribers to 
mobile systems worldwide, yet little more than a decade later there were approximately 1.5 
billion (Dicken, 2007, p. 89).vi Earlier theories of nation state capitalist classes and 
imperialist rivalry are too simplistic to explain the complexity of transnational capital 
formation and the novel relations it exhibits.  
 
Transnational Corporations & Transnational Chains of Accumulation 
The concept of multinational corporations has long been connected to Marxian class 
theory. Economist Stephen Hymer (1978), in a series of articles in the 1970s, pointed to the 
importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) and theorized that an internationalization of 
the division of labor was the product of the internal division of labor reproduced within 
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expanding multinational corporations (MNCs). Following this analysis, others such as 
Grazia Ietto-Gillies, have suggested that expanding MNCs have taken on a “transnationality 
of operations and globality of decisions” (1992, p. 181). In recent decades, political 
economists have differentiated between MNCs and TNCs; whereas MNCs have extensive 
international operations, they are clearly identified with a home base, the TNC business 
model is based on functional cross-border diversity in market capitalization, ownership, 
administration, production and so on. It is also widely seen as far less identifiable with one 
home country. In recent decades, the TNC model has clearly emerged as the standard form 
of top corporate organizations.    
Transnational flows of capital appear more and more as a capillary system, with 
large arteries and organs entwined with other arteries and smaller bodies. Helping us to 
consider the growing transnationality of economic relations, Dicken (2007, p. 13) points out 
the need for understanding the economy through “multiple scales,” describing as 
problematic the aggregation into “national boxes” of most “statistical data on production, 
trade, investment and the like.” To escape these boxes, we can think “in terms of production 
circuits and networks” that “cut through, and across, all geographical scales, including the 
bounded territory of the state” (Dicken, 2007, p. 13). Might we also envision social relations 
as transforming through globalization? In theorizing globalization, many scholars have 
chosen to emphasize the geographic rather than the social basis of change (Harvey, 2005).  
However, it is my argument that we understand our world best by emphasizing the role of 
social production as more determinant (of causal priority) and then, while also important, the 
role of uneven geographic development. Understanding globalization in this way presents a 
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challenge for social scientists that have long grouped social classes into separate national 
boxes according to the frontiers in which these classes were primarily affixed.  
 
Transnational Class Formation 
As global networks of production and finance pushed through TNCs and other 
institutions redefine the scale of the world economy (Dicken, 2007), it has been argued that 
widespread sociological changes are occurring as a result. A number of scholars have begun 
to look at ethnicity (Patterson, 2013), migration (Robinson & Santos, 2014), and gender 
(Coles & Fechter, 2007; Desai, 2009) in relation to globalization and transnationalism.  We 
must also look at how social classes, rooted in material (economic) production processes, are 
being reconstituted in the global era. One of these new classes, the TCC, is tied together as a 
conscious class, a class in and for itself whose material basis is in TNCs and the 
accumulation of global capital (Sklair, 2001; Robinson, 2004). However, such a class is not 
monolithic. As Harris (2015) has pointed out for instance, different fractions exist within 
this class. Theoretical approaches for understanding the TCC have differed. The TCC, as 
Robinson (2004), Harris (2006), Watson (2013), and Liodakis (2010) argue, is the dominant 
social class in this new era, an age of global capitalism. Conceptually, they utilize a 
historical materialist understanding of the division of labor into social classes on the basis of 
property ownership. They understand individual members of the TCC as those directly 
involved in global capital accumulation, while others involved in its promotion but not 
accumulation are described as transnationally oriented elites or functionaries.  
By comparison, Sklair constructs a TCC model that not only includes people directly 
involved in global capital accumulation, but also those who promote it as well, such as 
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media and state functionaries. He presents a TCC structure that includes four classifications. 
These are: (1) those who own and/or control the major TNCs and their local affiliates 
(corporate fraction), (2) globalizing bureaucrats and politicians (state fraction), (3) 
globalizing professionals (technical fraction), and (4) globalizing merchants and media 
(consumerist fraction). Sklair furthermore outlines four major propositions in regard to the 
TCC. First, it is a class that benefits from its relation to TNCs, emerging “more or less in 
control of the processes of globalization” (Sklair, 2001, p. 5). Second, it acts as a 
“transnational dominant class in some spheres.” Third, a “profit-driven culture-ideology of 
consumerism” exists as a mechanism of persuasion, solidifying the participation of 
populations in global capitalist chains of consumption. And finally, the TCC is faced with 
two global crises: class polarization and ecological crisis (Sklair, 2001, p. 6).  
The existence of transnational class relations does not mean that these class relations 
are not riven by contradictions and conflicts, impacted as they are by historic differences 
(both local and national.) For instance, specific fractions of capital hold closer ties with 
some state power blocs compared to others. As Ietto-Gillies explains, transnational oriented 
capitalists with interests across various countries “use their economic position and clout to 
strengthen their ties and claims . . . [with] specific countr(ies) and exercise influence to 
secure special treatment” (Sprague & Ietto Gillies, 2014, p. 44). We can see many examples 
of intense rivalry and competition among transnational capitalist conglomerates. Whereas 
state policies may benefit transnational capital over more locally or nationally oriented 
capitalists, this does not mean that certain state policies benefit all transnational capitalist 
groups fractions equally. Rather, state policies may most benefit certain TCC fractions and 
TNC conglomerates over others. 
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Some scholars have begun to theorize how transnational class relations are also 
emerging among the working and popular classes, with different static, diaspora and 
dynamic global proletarian fractions coming into existence, for example (Lin, 2015; 
Robinson, 2014; Struna, 2009). In addition, as some class fractions become increasingly 
transnationally oriented, others remain more nationally oriented or have not developed into a 
conscious class fraction even as they become objectively interconnected with the global 
economy. In recent decades we can also observe the growth and marginalization of lower 
income urban zones (Davis, 2007), as segments of the world population are structurally un- 
and underemployed and propelled into the new precarious labor conditions of the global 
economy. As will be discussed in this dissertation, labor faces unique and particularly 
difficult challenges in organizing against transnational capital and unresponsive political 
authorities. 
 
Transnationally Oriented Policymakers and the State Apparatus 
How can we conceptualize the role of the state—and those operating through the 
state—in the era of global capitalism? Rather than looking at the state as a monolithic or a 
static edifice, I emphasize the state as a social relation, an apparatus operated by different 
social groups. In capitalist society, as Marxian political economists have shown (Poulantzas, 
1978), the state takes on a vital managerial role for stabilizing and reproducing capitalism 
especially when dominant groups are unable to coordinate successfully among themselves. 
State apparatuses thus serve as structures through which the powers of class relations 
congeal and operate. As Poulantzas observed, rather than individuals of the capitalist class 
serving directly in the state, governing political groups normally carry out this task. As 
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“relatively autonomous,” these political groups and state elites seek to maintain legitimacy 
in the eyes of the electorate, even as they overwhelmingly operate in the “collective” 
interests of capital (Poulantzas, 1978). In turn, to stabilize and reproduce themselves in 
power, state policymakers must gain the consent of the oppressed (Gramsci, 1971), and 
often work to cement cross-class alliances to solidify the dominant order. A number of 
dynamics condition the state as a social relation, such as the prevailing socioeconomic 
circumstances, the balance and struggle of social forces, and the position or character of the 
state apparatus. 
Alongside the changes occurring through globalization in recent decades, I argue, as 
have others (Harris, 2006; Jayasuriya, 2005; Robinson, 2004, 2014), that many state elites 
and policymakers have become transnationally oriented. While it is true that many political 
conflicts (especially for instance electorally) take on national peculiarities and play out 
through local framworks, as Sklair, Robinson, and others observe: within a variety of 
national political settings and states there has arisen groups that are transnationally oriented 
(Robinson, 2003; 2014). Many state policymakers have increasingly come to depend upon 
transnational capital for their own social reproduction. They need access to capital, and 
capital is in the hands of the TCC.  However, state elites must still appeal to their home 
audiences. They must still interact with a variety of less mobile and less privileged social 
groups and classes, from the middle strata and working class to the unemployed and 
working poor. Because of this, even as ties between state policymakers and the TCC deepen, 
national rhetoric and state policies at times are in apparent contradiction with TCC interests. 
In this way, political leaders attempt to maintain national political legitimacy even while 
deepening practices of a transnational nature. Here they must navigate a crisis of legitimacy 
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as they abandon earlier nationally oriented forms of development. As these state elites 
become entangled with—and dependent upon—processes of global capital accumulation, 
they help spur a transition from national or international processes to transnational 
processes. The state itself is not disappearing, rather it is transforming in ways peculiar to 
the age of globalism; transforming into a proactive instrument for promoting the interests of 
transnational capital.   
My approach in this dissertation is influenced by (1) Robinson’s “transnationally 
oriented elite” argument regarding how groups of state functionaries are promoting a 
parallel political project connected to the TCC’s class power, and (2) the “global system” 
approach of Sklair, which argues that contemporary states face ongoing struggles between 
nationally and transnationally oriented elite fractions. While Sklair describes the 
transnationally oriented elite faction of globalizing bureaucrats and politicians as part of the 
TCC, I do not concur (Sprague, 2009). Rather, I describe them as transnationally oriented 
policymakers, functionaries, and state elites who are not necessarily a part of the TCC. I 
argue, as echoing Robinson (2004), that certain social groups, classes and their power blocs 
operating through state apparatuses have shifted from those with interests in national 
accumulation to those with an interest in transnational accumulation.  This does not mean 
that transnationally oriented elites operate in the interests of all transnational capitalists. As 
Robinson (2015, p. 264) explains “There is intense competition and rivalry among 
transnational capitalist conglomerates so that state policies may benefit some conglomerates 
over others.” 
Here, similar with other scholars of the ‘global capitalism school’, I seek to make a 
break from the “Imperialism” and “New Imperialism” schools of thought that focus on the 
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U.S. as the driving force of globalization as its elites pursue their own imperial interests. 
Instead, I aim to emphasize the integrative, expansive, and unequal nature of global 
capitalism and how social and political forces have come to entwine with these changes in 
regions such as the Caribbean in contradictory and crisis-prone ways. Although it remains 
true that the U.S. state is the dominant world and regional power, we need to consider this in 
light of the changes and shifting structural features occurring through globalization 
(Sprague, 2014). In addressing the role of the state in facilitating the Caribbean’s heightened 
integration with the global economy, this dissertation emphasizes not just the role of the 
most influential state in the region, the U.S., but also the role of states across the region. 
While policymakers operating through the U.S. state and its various apparatuses play a 
central role in the region, they also increasingly have come to promote conditions beneficial 
for circuits of global capital accumulation and in the interests of the TCC, not just 
domestically domiciled capitalists. 
Next, I will turn toward looking at shifting political dynamics in the Caribbean 
during the era of globalization. While this is not the central theme of the proceeding case 
study chapters, it is a reoccurring thread through the transitory period that is studied herein. 
It helps lay the basis for understanding the rise and role of transnationally oriented state 
elites, groups that play such an important role in facilitating the shift toward transnational 
integration and global competitiveness. 
 
Polyarchy and Political Contestation in the Global Era 
Within Caribbean nations, we can also observe how political restructuring has 
occurred alongside economic transformations in the global era. As Ankie Hoogvelt observed 
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at the start of the 21st century, dominant groups in many countries were in the process of 
“abandoning national programs of economic development and social solidarity in favour of 
international competitiveness and transnational engagement” (2001, p. 162). Together, 
leading political and economic elites have reshaped political contestation in the region, 
working to transition away from what during earlier periods were often much more divisive 
and ideologically heated electoral arenas and strong armed political struggles (with struggles 
often occurring between various nationally and internationally oriented social forces).  As 
Robinson (1996) argues: polyarchic political arrangements have been promoted in many 
parts of the world during the latter decades of the 20th century and into the 21st century, 
concomitant with the formation of the modern global economy. Transnationally oriented 
segments of local and foreign dominant groups have pushed for tightly managed electoral 
systems in which citizens are confined to choosing between palatable competing groups of 
elites, while seeking to marginalize alternatives. 
Here it is important to understand the shift away from more coercive measures 
toward more consensus measures of hegemony by dominant groups. Through the lens of 
hegemony we can see how both coercion and consent are utilized at different times, as in 
Gramsci’s discussion on their shifting roles historically (Gramsci, 1971). In the global era 
more advanced models of hegemonic consent have been developed and have been used for 
the most part, except for in those cases in which consent, for different reasons, has proven 
too difficult or incapable of being achieved. 
As a new emphasis on democracy spread around the world in the latter decades of 
the 20th century (Frezzo, 2015), U.S. policymakers and, in time, elites operating through 
other powerful state apparatuses, sought to retool their strategies toward the Americas as 
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well as other parts of the developing world (Robinson, 1996). They sought to transition from 
overt support for authoritarian regimes to backing constitutionally elected governments. This 
would help create less embarrassing conditions, while also maintaining more stability and 
responsiveness for transnational capital. Transnationally oriented elites, with contingents 
operating in and outside of developing nations, have worked to facilitate favorable political 
transitions (Robinson, 1996). Throughout the Caribbean and Latin America, U.S. and other 
policymakers have a well-documented role in “promoting democracy” and “democratic 
transitions,” which are actually subterfuges for sponsoring local transnationally oriented 
elites (who are often similarly aligned) through electoral frameworks (Herman & Brodhead, 
1984). The electoral systems of recent decades in the Caribbean have been deeply 
influenced by policymakers who rely on powerful moneyed interests, with many nations’ 
political systems influenced by the “donor” and “aid” agencies of powerful states and 
supranational agencies (Robinson, 1996). New political conflicts have been sparked as 
transnational elites, facing crises of legitimacy, have sought to insert their national states and 
institutions into global circuits of accumulation (Dominguez, 1996; Robinson, 2012). 
These transnationally oriented state elites have thus pushed economic restructuring, 
seeking deeper integration with a global economy based on the transnationalization of 
production (Dicken, 2007) and finance (CARICOM, 2005; Körner & Trautwein, 2014; 
Watson, 1985). This has benefited transnational capital, allowing it to operate with fewer 
restrictions, and through new globally competitive conditions. At various points in the 
dissertation I will refer to the rise and role of transnationally oriented state elites and 
technocrats in the Caribbean. I will give examples as to how these groups have sought to 
eschew locally driven state initiatives in favor of policies promoting global competitiveness, 
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integration with transnational capital, and heightened coordination with other transnationally 
oriented elites. Many states in the Caribbean, as Thomas (1984) observed, function as 
mechanisms through which sectors of the “petty bourgeoisie” secure their own interests, yet 
the interests of these groups have increasingly become entwined with the global economy. 
Alongside changing economic and social structures, there have been important 
political and social struggles. Transnationally oriented elites and policymakers have often 
vied for dominance with locally oriented groups, nationalists, leftists, and a variety of social 
and labor movements. In nations in and around the Caribbean where polyarchic relations 
have not been solidly secured, such as in Cuba or in Venezuela, a variety of coercive 
measures have been employed by major powers, such as the U.S. These have ranged from 
shadowy intervention attempts to various economic and political destabilization strategies 
(Golinger, 2005; Lamrani, 2013) and forms of “soft power” (Grandin, 2007).  Often a 
variety of coercive and consent based dynamics are at work, for example with regards to 
Cuba, U.S. policymakers appear to be transitioning away from the economic blockade of 
fifty years and toward economic engagement which they hope will be a more advanced 
strategy for changing the country from within. Scholars have for example discussed 
specifically how the new economic reforms and engagement with the global economy 
initiate slow shifts away from collectivist mentalities and toward individualism (Morris, 
2015). 
 Elsewhere in the Caribbean, polyarchic systems have become more solidified, with 
establishment political parties steering politics in a direction that is non-threatening for 
elites. We can identify particular political struggles and conditions in the region: for 
example, polyarchic political conditions have become deeply solidified in Jamaica’s two-
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party political system and in much of the Anglophone Caribbean. While many social 
movements and labor unions in the region continue to mobilize, some have become 
marginalized or less radical over recent decades, and many are also undergoing structural 
changes associated with capitalist globalization (Rodriguez-Garavito, 2008). In addition, a 
conservative backlash led by organized religion and growing evangelical communities has 
strengthened in parts of the region, such as in Jamaica and in Trinidad. In the Dominican 
Republic, while a significant number of progressive, liberation theology oriented, leftist and 
radical groups exist, a polyarchic political system has become relatively consolidated. 
Unified struggles in these countries are further held back by xenophobic and racist 
tendencies among some of the population that are encouraged by right-wing political forces. 
This leads to the scapegoating and targeting of Haitian migrants, historically the most 
exploited sector of the Dominican working class. In Haiti, by contrast, local and foreign 
elites have struggled to maintain a polyarchic system and engaged in various “emergency 
actions” ultimately aimed at integrating Haiti into the global economy (Sprague, 2012, 
2016). The long tradition of popular mobilization, alongside underdevelopment and 
entrenched poverty, create conditions particularly difficult for solidifying the polyarchy 
model. As Caribbean workers integrate unevenly into the global economy, elites are seeking 
new ways to reproduce racialized class relations as well as secure the super-exploitation of 
migrant workers. 
Market forces and state elites have also placed political and economic pressures 
against a range of reformist projects that have challenged to some degree the utter 
dominance of elites, including within nations of the Caribbean, such as with Manely’s 
government in Jamaica and Aristide’s government in Haiti (Stephens and Stephens, 1986; 
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Beeton, 2006). Political conditions in the region also of course need to be seen in light of the 
problems rooted in underdevelopment: with phenomena such as a lack of industrial 
productivity, high levels of unemployment, networks of patronage and corruption to political 
infighting and attempts (or failed attempts) at various kinds of endeavors. Each nation of 
course has its own specific political history and with distinct constitutions, governing 
apparatuses, and political structures. Political conditions and struggles in the region thus 
vary, interconnected with historic peculiarities and uneven development while also 
connected through combined and more general tendencies throughout their history. My 
argument though is that in the global era, (1) the novel material (economic) relations of 
globalization and (2) the new ways in which states are facilitating this, is undergirded by (3) 
shifting social and class structures. Next, prior to concluding this chapter, I provide a short 
overview of the region’s insertion into the capitalist world economy: how different political 
orders, economic restructuring and changing production relations in the region have 
reflected the shifting phases of capitalism.  
 
 
Brief historical background: Phases of world capitalism in the Caribbean 
The Crown of Castille’s conquest of the Caribbean, begun by Cristóbal Colón and 
his conquistadors in 1492, subjected the indigenous inhabitants—initially the Arawak and 
then others—to massacres, slavery, and infectious diseases (Farmer, 2005, p. 53). With the 
genocide of the original inhabitants of the Caribbean island chains, and the high cost and 
low number of European laborers willing to work in the harsh and humid environment, 
another source of labor was required by elites. The plantation system, which came to shape 
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the region’s insertion into capitalism (Curtin, 1990), could only function with a large amount 
of labor, this occurred through the intensive exploitation of african slave labor. It is believed 
that the Caribbean received approximately 47 percent of the total 10 million African slaves 
brought to the Americas. The new system of chattel slavery that formed was conducted in a 
much more intensive and extensive manner than previous slave systems such as in Ancient 
Rome and Greece (de Ste. Croix, 1981). By the 17th century other European powers—
England, France, and the Netherlands—had inserted themselves into the Caribbean, 
annexing and gaining through wars and treaties lightly populated areas of Spain’s immense 
holdings. 
Over time, planter classes came to dominate the new colonial societies, with their 
wealth built upon the blood and labor of the growing slave population. Yet, various social 
forces interacted and at times conflicted, merged, or allied with one another. As part of this 
particular local institutions came into being. For example, representing the interests of local 
colonial elites, colonialist assemblies often formed.  Europeans and Africans produced 
progeny together, which through particular socially constructed scopes came to be known as 
new “creole” populations. Overtime, complex racially constructed class hierarchies would 
form.  
Slave plantation production came to be a major structural feature of early capitalism. 
Slave production altered the very development of world capitalism, becoming its lifeblood. 
Into the 18th century the production of sugarcane was taken to new heights, exported to 
Europe where it greatly impacted the diet of Europeans. The high sugarcane yields, from 
Saint Domingue in particular, coincided with France’s rising wealth. Eric Williams explains, 
“Between 1715 and 1789 French imports from the colonies multiplied eleven times, French 
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colonial products re-exported abroad ten times” (Williams, 1944, p. 145). Meanwhile, slaves 
themselves resisted their brutal conditions, launching uprisings and constant escapes, which 
were responded to by a slew of colonial military and security apparatuses; a conflict which 
became more and more violent and costly to maintain. Slaves were dispersed across 
different plantations and facing brutal conditions, melded their own cultural practices and 
languages.  Groups of escaped and freed slaves existed in parts of the region, forming 
maroon communities. 
The new colonial markets developed as appendages of the European market where 
the vast amount of wealth was centered (Galeano, 1997, p. 29). This set into motion major 
inequalities between regions of the planet, and people living in those regions. As industrial 
and merchant capital concentrated in Europe, populations in regions such as the Caribbean 
were primarily exploited through labor intensive extraction of raw resources. These 
historical processes have had a long-term impact on underdevelopment, as only a small part 
of the surplus capital from these economic interactions remained in the colonies. In addition 
to this, within the Caribbean, the accumulation of capital was concentrated into the hands of 
a small elite strata, which spent much of its wealth on maintaining their enterprises or on 
foreign luxury goods and building up their own landed estates. 
The new wealth produced in the region, though, did serve as a valuable prize for 
which European monarchs would deploy massive armies and fleets to battle over. At some 
points, white planter assemblies split with crown and church officials, creating complex 
conflicts and contradictions, where slaves and peasants for instance might view the crown as 
a benevolent despot, as compared to the harsh immediacy of the planters. Also as European 
powers fought one another at times this occurred alongside or even help to facilitate slave 
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uprisings. CLR James (1989) has explained in depth how a complex struggle between 
different classes and strata of society occurred within the French colony of Haiti at the close 
of the 18th century.  The success of the Haitian slave revolution was particularly scarred into 
the minds of European planters and as far away as among elites in North America. In 1804 it 
became the first slave revolt in history to lead to the founding of an independent nation.  
Differences in colonial policies also reflected the interests of the differing class 
interests of the European colonial powers. Whereas many of the British, French, and Dutch 
colonies in the region excelled at agricultural expansion and trade, the Spanish colonies 
poorly sustained their own efforts at sugar-and-slave plantations in the Caribbean. In part, 
this was because of Spain’s longer-standing mercantilist policies and absence of the early 
trade liberalizing policies. By contrast the independent nation of Haiti, into the 19th century, 
maintained a large level of small-scale peasant farming, though larger plantation farms 
controlled by a new local elite began to form as well. 
Eventually, as maintaining the Caribbean colonies became more and more 
expensive, industrial and metropole capital in Europe turned against the continued 
subsidizing of the Caribbean colonies and its outdated slave system.  Mintz explains that 
“the increasing tempo of slaves revolts, high interest rates, and the wastefulness of their own 
productive arrangements” all led to a deepening of the contradictions of the colonial 
plantation system, where a tiny segment of society benefited off the extreme misery and 
suffering of the great majority (1989, p. 86). With the economic status of the Caribbean now 
in decline, the very bedrock of its social structure, built on slavery, came into question: the 
old mercantile order soon fell into collapse. Reflecting the lessening importance of the 
Caribbean plantations, Britain formally abolished slavery across most of its empire in 1833.  
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The shift away from mercantilism and slavery also echoed the rise of major liberal 
philosophies at the time. Liberal ideology, as in Adam Smith’s strong critique of the system 
of mercantilism, took the shape of campaigns against the “British West Indian monopoly of 
the British sugar market” (Williams, 1984, p. 235). The second nail in the coffin of the 
power of the slave-owning planter class came with the rise of the sugar trade with the British 
colony of India (Williams, 1984, pp. 235-236). In addition to the sugar trade, commercial 
power in Britain had strengthened among cotton manufacturers.  
Despite the abolition of slavery in some Caribbean colonies and nations, other parts 
of the Caribbean remained more backward. Slavery continued in Cuba, for example, until 
the late 19th century, even as it had been abolished throughout the region during the middle 
and early parts of the century. Over time, local elites had become “mindful of the constraints 
their social reality imposed on their ambitions,” and so stayed heavily dependent on the 
support from Spain to maintain the slave plantation system (Pérez, Jr., 2003, p. 30). The 
dependence of the island’s local elite on the long-standing slave system kept them away 
from advocating independence. “The specter of slave rebellion in Cuba dampened planters’ 
enthusiasm for an independent nation, especially one without adequate resources to suppress 
the dread slave uprising” (Pérez, Jr., 2003, p. 30).vii By contrast, in Haiti, where slaves first 
had won their freedom before 1800, cliques of military leaders, a new bourgeoisie in the 
cities, and a powerful rural land owning class solidified during the 19th century, whereas the 
vast majority of Haitians remained involved in small scale familial farm production. In the 
early 1800s, faced with constant external threats, Haitian forces liberated their slave brethren 
on the Spanish speaking eastern side of the island and attempted to unite the island as a 
single nation. Local elites, however, successfully led an insurrection and took hold of the 
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western part of the island, which would form the Dominican Republic. In those early years 
its population was much smaller in population in comparison to Haiti. By the mid-19th 
century, only Cuba and Puerto Rico remained holdings of Spain in the region. 
Following emancipation, former slaves often tried to support themselves through 
private land cultivation. They did this rather than accept subordinate, but nominally free, 
wage labor on plantations. Their private land cultivation occurred primarily as familial 
farming, which included those who squatted on previously uncultivated or abandoned 
land—with land ownership itself becoming a class conflict. Over time their also developed 
particular racialized class relations in these former slave societies. For instance as Bakan 
(1990, p. 6) observers, the “slave origins of the modern Jamaican working class led to the 
development of a general correlation between class and race in the society as a while: the 
fairer the skin colour, the higher the individual’s social status was likely to be.” This 
correlation which had been sharply maintained and institutionalized through plantation 
slavery, continued on in the post-slavery era, though moderated to a degree by the advance 
of small segments of society. 
Also with the abolition of slavery, many latifundios in the Caribbean began to turn to 
new pools of migrant labor whose desperation and instability they could exploit. European 
powers, such as the UK, backed the exportation of semi-slave labor, through what has been 
described as “coolie labor” exported from India and China to far-flung areas of the British 
Empire. As Williams described, “The Caribbean planter, Africa denied to him, was 
encouraged to turn to India and China” (1984, p. 346). Laborers from India were brought 
into many parts of the British Caribbean, such as Trinidad, British Guiana, Guadeloupe, 
Surinam, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, and Jamaica (Williams, 1984, pp. 347-360). 
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Chinese immigration also was encouraged, with many Chinese migrants ending up in Cuba. 
The same kind of tactics of playing impoverished communities off of one another continued 
(as with the conflicts between immigrant workers, people of African descent, and the 
“infinite gradations, shadings and mixtures produced by miscegenation” (Williams, 1984, p. 
350)), as dominant groups searched out new ideological mechanisms to solidify their rule 
and sought out different bases of support.viii 
During the latter half of the 19th century a new phase in world capitalism emerged, 
what has been described as “industrial capitalism.” Changing class dynamics reflected 
advancements in technology and organizational forms, quickly impacting regions across the 
world, including the Caribbean (Girvan, 1976, p. 13), for instance, the spread of steamships 
and the intensification of agrarian production. Yet at the same time Caribbean planters had 
become overall less important to the markets they had once monopolized during the era of 
slave production. The abolishment of slavery, the role of new technologies, the dropping of 
mercantile protections had lost the local rural elites much of the advantages that they had 
once enjoyed. Yet with the heightening investment of American capital toward the end of 
the 18th century, rural agricultural production in the Caribbean gained a new impetus. US 
capital and state projects would invest heavily in upgrading and solidifying rural latifundia 
production, such as in Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. As the involvement of the 
traditional European powers in the Caribbean stagnated during parts of the 19th century and 
early 20th century, U.S. capital took on a growing role, with rising levels of U.S. trade and 
interventionist policies targeted Caribbean nations. Early attempts in the 1880s by France to 
construct the Panama Canal failed, with the U.S. completing the project in the early 1900s, 
and by utilizing a great number of workers from the Caribbean (Ives, 2012).  
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 By the turn of the century the U.S. was increasingly intervening in the region, in 
large part to protect and expand U.S. capitalist interests. “The period between 1897 and 
1930 saw the enormous concentration of latifundia in the Caribbean under the stimulus of 
American capital investment,” observes Williams (1984, p. 429). Yet even with the heavy 
investment, class relations in many parts of these nations, such as in Hispaniola, remained 
underdeveloped—with petty commodity relations dominating through the early decades of 
the 20th century (Crouch, 1981, p. 18). Over time agricultural output began to increase, yet 
this focused largely on traditional exports. New property rights, road systems, and monetary 
systems were set in place, and as many Caribbean states became more tightly connected 
with U.S. interests.  
A consolidation of independent states in the region also occurred in the wake of the 
U.S. occupations and following World War II, when the region again became a site for 
foreign investment. Even still, in many parts of the region, the formation of local industrial 
working classes and productive capital remained restrained as authoritarian and 
neopatrimonial regimes subordinated national capitalist goals to the interests of an 
authoritarian clique and their immediate connections (Itzigsohn, 2000, p. 40). Just as major 
resistance movements had opposed U.S. occupations in the region in earlier times, resistance 
and movements from below opposed the new military and authoritarian regimes. As 
persistent class resistance became embedded as an ideological pattern, major social and 
political struggles ensued. Major rebellions by Jamaica’s laboring classes took place in 
1831, 1865, and 1938. Such revolts and protests occurred in other parts of the region as well. 
This eventually came to a head in Cuba in 1959 when a rebel force succeeded in overcoming 
the U.S. backed government’s security forces. This eventually led to Cuba’s socialist 
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project. In response to the Cuban revolution, the U.S. further sought to shore up allied 
regimes in the region. This included propping up the Duvalier dynasty in Haiti and 
supporting a rightist military insurrection against constitutionalist forces in the Dominican 
Republic. Other parts of the colonial Caribbean such as Jamaica were closely managed and 
monitored in their political transition toward independence. 
Yet over the years, as grassroots movements continued to demand change, 
democratic openings eventually occurred. With elite priorities shifting, elections in many 
parts of the region were allowed. In some cases this led to the election of more progressive 
governments.  Heated conflicts in some areas of the region continued, such as during the 
1980s with the Sandanista and New Jewel Movement revolutions, the former in Nicaragua 
and the latter in Grenada. By the 1970s and 1980s, elites and U.S. policymakers sought in 
particular to isolate and undermine leftist projects (as well as more moderate left-of-center 
governments). New policies were undertaken to create conditions in which electoral politics 
were confined to elite power structures. While policymakers sought to allow for the illusory 
role of democracy, as a policy of containment it created conditions palatable to investors and 
with the goal of engendering less resistance as compared to previous pro-western 
authoritarian governments in the region. 
Whereas some Caribbean states engaged in limited forms of import substitution 
during the 1960s and 1970s (Stephens and Stephens, 1986), new mining and tourism 
industries began to grow in the region with their own particular forms of exploited labor and 
power relations (Girvan, 1978; Gmelch, 2012; Merrill, 2009; Pattullo, 2005). By the 1980s, 
apparatuses of the U.S. state and powerful institutions active in the region increasingly 
sought to break down tariff restrictions and other barriers to capital, seeking to further 
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integrate the region with globalizing capital through neoliberal policies. Already by the 
1970s and into the 1980s international capitalist investors had begun to expand 
manufacturing industries in the region, taking advantage of low labor costs and the region’s 
geographic proximity to North America and Europe. Into the latter part of the 20th century, 
a number of new neoliberal structural features came about, such as devalued local currencies 
that further empowered capital, downsized government that freed up state assets for 
privatization, and domestic economies that were further opened to globalizing chains of 
production and finance. This occurred alongside a transformation of capital, from an 
international to a transnational orientation. Such developments have occurred unevenly and 
have taken deep root in some nations (such as in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica), 
while being less successful in others, such as in Cuba (de la Fuente, 2001). Still other 
locations (such as in Haiti) have moved from one emergency to another, with elites seeing 
further integration into the global economy as the main solution. Moving into the new 
century, policies of global competitiveness and transnational integration have manifested in 
contradictory ways across the region. Transnational capital has come to compete and flow 
across the globe, disrupting possibilities of nationally geared development projects in the 
region (Robinson, 2014). As state and corporate elites worldwide seek out greater 
standardization of neoliberal regulatory and state practices (Dayen, 2015), elites and 
officials of many institutions operating in the Caribbean are moving in the same direction. 
How has economic restructuring and associated social changes undergirded this unfolding 
historical process? This dissertation focuses our attention on the shift from the earlier 
international phase of world capitalism to the global phase of world capitalism, suggesting 
how this has played out in the Caribbean.  
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Notes 
i For example, in his analysis of class warfare in mid-19th century Paris, Marx 
defined fractions within the French bourgeoisie class as (1) unproductive finance capitalists 
and (2) productive industrial capitalists. Within the French working class, he identified an 
unproductive lumpenproletariat and a productive proletariat. Describing the class fractions 
and strata aligned against the Paris Commune of 1871, he listed the “aristocracy of finance, 
the industrial bourgeoisie, the middle class, the petit bourgeoisie, the army, the 
lumpenproletariat organized as the Mobile Guard, the intellectual lights, the clergy and the 
rural population” (Marx, 1994). 
ii Mintz has looked, for example, at the treatment of slaves in the Caribbean colonies, 
arguing that how they were treated was rooted in the integral factors of the colonial slave 
economy and how it was linked into the world economic system; the way in which the 
colony was governed by it’s Imperial metropolis in Europe; and the intensity and manner in 
which labor and land was exploited through capitalism (Mintz, 1989, pp. 59-91). 
iii Authors debate, for instance, the dominant role of the U.S. (Maingot & Lozano, 
2004), the role of the EU (Bernal, 2013; ECLAC, 2013), “a new cold war” (Padget, 2008), 
Cuba’s changing relationship with the U.S. and what this means for “American” businesses 
(Lee, 2015), or of the spread of Chinese enclaves and the challenges this poses to the U.S. 
(Bernal, 2014). Also in this context, a number of mainstream studies advocate for a 
deepening of neoliberal policies in the region (Palmer, 2009). One recent academic study 
utilizing Marxian ideas to understand the region’s contemporary political economy 
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(Karagiannis & Polychroniou, 2015), essentially argues that capitalism can be managed by 
Caribbean state policymakers to develop nations in the region in a stable manner. While not 
only does this argument ignore the reality of power relations in the region, the authors make 
the mistake of believing that capitalism is organized to produce national economic 
development, as opposed to private capital accumulation as an end in itself. This pushes the 
authors away from considering any alterative or radical forms of economic organization; 
those that might involve greater community and worker control, and involve coordination 
across borders. We need here to appreciate further how global capitalism is not an 
assemblage of autonomous national economies, each corresponding to its territorially based 
sovereign state.  
iv See Robinson’s (2010, 2011) critical overviews of the world systems approaches 
of Wallerstein and Arrighi. 
v Denis O’Brien also holds major investments in commercial aircraft, oil, gas, and a 
number of other industries. For more see his profile on the website of Forbes magazine: 
http://www.forbes.com/profile/denis-obrien/. 
vi In recent years the Caribbean has seen a massive increase in the number of cell 
phone users. 
vii The Haitian invasion of Santo Domingo also raised fears among Cuban elites that 
Haitians would invade the country. 
  viii Williams (1984, p. 350) entire remark is as follows: “Only four territories in the 
Caribbean in the 19th century did not participate in the vast demographic revolution which 
was in operation in the area as a whole: independent Haiti, Spanish Santo Domingo, which 
!!49!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
became independent in 1844, Spanish Puerto Rico, and British Barbados. Elsewhere the 
simple population pattern at the end of the eighteenth century - a few whites of the 
metropolitan country, some mulattoes, and a majority of Negroes - became a heterogeneous 
mixture which included Indians, Chinese, Javanese, and Portuguese, with all the infinite 
gradations, shadings and mixtures produced by miscegenation.”  
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Chapter II 
The Caribbean Cruise Ship Industry and the Emergence of a Transnational Capitalist 
Class 
 
 . . . 20 years ago, it was a North American-centric industry, and now it’s a 
global industry. So the Caribbean has to compete in a global marketplace, 
and I think that’s a challenge that’s relatively new recently. 
- Micky Arison, Chairman of Carnival Corporation (Britell, 2013) 
 
 
Global tourism—and most notably the cruise ship sector—stand out as a leading yet 
under-explored example of the transnationalization and functional integration across borders 
of leading industries. A vital part of global tourism is the cruise ship industry. Importantly, 
the Caribbean region accounts for 34.4% of cruise ship deployments worldwide. More than 
7.8 million passengers visited the Caribbean in 1990, whereas 20.5 million visited in 2004.  
The most popular destination are Cozumel on the Mexican coast, the Caymen Islands, the 
US Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, St Maarten, and Jamaica (Pattullo, 2005: 195). Tourism, the 
cruise industry, and associated commercial and financial activity have grown as a dynamic 
core of the Caribbean’s service sector (Daye, 2011) and a major spigot through which the 
region has been inserted into the globalized economy. In this chapter, I will examine the 
political economy and historical development of the cruise ship industry in the Caribbean, as 
well as the fundamental ways in which it has been transformed in the era of globalization. 
 ! 51!
Scholars need to look at tourism in the context of capitalist globalization, examining 
how recreational and leisure travel have become associated with industries rooted in 
growing cross-border integration and exploitive economic relations. One of the largest and 
fastest growing sectors within tourism has been the cruise ship industry (Pattuloo, 2005). 
Vacationers from the United States and other developed countries, as well as a growing 
number from privileged sectors from poorer nations, partake in cruise ship vacations. For 
decades, the Caribbean has been a central destination for cruise ship tourism. While a 
number of studies have examined the cruise ship industry (most notably: Klein, 2005, 2009) 
and other globalizing sectors of the tourist industry (Theobald, 2004), none yet have looked 
at these changing industries in relation to the formation of transnational capital (Harris, 
Liodakis, Robinson, Sklair). This chapter thus considers the shifting capital-labor relations 
of the globalizing cruise industry in the context of the Caribbean, and how these occur 
concomitant with material (economic) changes.  Its purpose is to illuminate the 
contradictions and nature of the shifting material and social processes that sustain the cruise 
industry. Next, after a discussion on global tourism and globalization, I look at the history of 
the cruise industry in regard to the Caribbean and outline how novel and contradictory 
developments of the global era are now at the core of the cruise industry. Lastly, to provide 
more specific details on how the local and national connect with these novel transnational 
dynamics, I will look briefly at the changing contours of the industry within some of the 
major population centers of the region—the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica—
arguing that areas of the region have essentially become globally competitive nodes for 
transnational capital. 
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Some previous studies have looked at the Caribbean cruise ship industry through the 
lens of “dependency theory.” For example, scholars have argued that no real deep structural 
change took place in the region following the Second World War, but rather that “plantation 
tourism” was developed in the region, along the lines of the old plantation agriculture and 
other exploitive economic models. With the tourist industry controlled by a coalition of 
expatriate and local elites, resorts and cruise ship destinations dominate the coasts as 
hierarchal entrenched power structures benefited inordinately (Boyce, 2003; Weaver, 2001, 
p. 166). While these dependency approaches remain useful, in this chapter, I emphasize the 
importance of the emerging transnational capitalist class (TCC) to understand the structural 
changes of recent years.  This chapter seeks to understand the fundamental shifts to the 
Caribbean cruise ship industry in relation to the rise of capitalist globalization. 
Incontrovertible changes have occurred in recent decades in production, distribution, 
consumption, and finance. Through technological and networked development, new models 
of corporate organization have emerged. Geographer Peter Dicken (2007) and others have 
shown the centrality and the activities of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the global era. 
Through functionally integrated networks of production and finance, TNCs have been able 
to “cut through, and across, all geographical scales, including the bounded territory of the 
state” (Dicken, 2007, p. 13).  
A number of scholars have begun to argue that structural changes associated with the 
emergence of global capitalism have influenced new fissures among social groups and 
classes (Harris, 2006; Liodakis, 2010; Robinson, 2004, 2014). As transnational networks of 
capitalist production and finance redefine the scale of the world economy, scholars of the 
“global capitalism school” have argued that transnational social relations have begun to 
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form among different class fractions and social groups. As discussed by Harris (2006) and 
Robinson (2004), a TCC has emerged, bound together as a conscious class whose material 
basis is imbricated in TNCs and the accumulation of global capital. This class, with its 
different fractions, has emerged as that segment of the world bourgeoisie that owns the 
leading worldwide means of production embodied in TNCs and various financial 
institutions. The owners and major investors within the cruise ship industry make up a 
microcosm of the TCC.  
In addition to the TCC, other social groups and classes are undergoing major 
changes associated with globalization. Middle strata (such as professionals and small-scale 
working entrepreneurs) and working class fractions have become implicated in processes of 
global capitalism, as labor power itself has been incorporated into transnational value chains 
(Struna, 2009; Robinson, 2014). Such scholarship urges us to question the social and 
material novelties and contradictions of the global epoch.  As part of this growing body of 
scholarly work that has critically examined the structural and conjunctural dimensions of 
global capitalism (Harris, 2006; Hoogvelt, 2001; Liodakis, 2010; Robinson, 2004, 2014; 
Sklair, 2001; Watson, 2013), I seek to understand the deep changes in a particular sector of 
the global economy—the cruise ship industry—through the shifting social and material 
relations that undergird it.  
 
Global Tourism and the Global Cruise Industry 
While a great deal of important literature has been written on leisure and tourism, in 
this chapter I aim to examine at a sector of the tourist industry in terms of global political 
economy. Rising profits and investments in tourism during the late twentieth century and 
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early twenty-first century have become a fundamental part of the globalizing economy. The 
rise of a global tourist industry has been a consequence not only of major technological and 
organizational transformations associated with global capitalism, but also, and most 
importantly, changing social and class relations. Tourism is estimated to account for 
approximately 9% of global GDP, or more than $6 trillion (World Travel & Tourism 
Council, 2012). Together, new transportation, computer, and information technologies, and 
global marketing techniques and expanding corporate networks have propelled the tourism 
industry (Lumsdon & Page, 2003; Rodrigue, 2013; Theobald, 2004). TNCs involved in 
transportation, hotels, and various tourism related activities have proliferated worldwide 
(Dowling, 2006). As in many other industries, TNCs have come to dominate tourism, with 
TCC owners and investors profiting from its worldwide chains of accumulation. This has 
been aided by well-organized lobbies of industry representatives and allies as well as 
transnationally oriented technocrats and elites operating through their state apparatuses. 
While TNCs dominate the industry, they have also formed some linkages with local upper 
classes and locally based businesses through subcontractor networks. As with other 
globalizing industries this has led to increasing transnational social integration among 
dominate groups, where as Robinson explains, “The globalization of the tourist industry 
draws in local contingents around the world in diverse ways” (2003, p. 198).   
Another key factor in the global tourism industry’s phenomenal expansion has been 
the reconfiguration and growth of middle strata worldwide with disposable income for 
leisure activities (Liechty, 2003; Rohde, 2012). While inseparably linked to rising global 
income inequality and social polarization, a growing portion of the earth’s population takes 
part in mass tourism while hundreds of millions of jobs are tied to the industry (Mowforth & 
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Munt, 2008). According to the United Nations World Tourism Organization, more than one 
billion people now take part annually in tourism outside of their home country (UNWTO, 
2012).  
 
 
 
 
Figure One 
  Overall Tourism Arrivals (millions)     
World 165.8 278.2 441 680 940 
To Developed Countries  194 296 417 498 
To Developing Countries  83 139 257 442 
Caribbean 4.2 6.9 12.8 20.3 23.1 
  *Over surface  0.7 0.4 1 1.4 
  *By Air  6 10.9 16.1 18.6 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Source: UNWTO           
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Figure Two 
  Overall Expenditures by Tourists (US$ billions)  
World 106.5 269.5 495.6 960  
Caribbean 3.5 9.8 19.9    
  1980 1990 2000 2010  
Source: UNWTO          
 
 
A sizeable part of the privileged sectors of global society engage in tourism, from 
upper classes worldwide to growing middle strata of the “global north” and “global south.” 
The Caribbean has been a major site for global tourism. In 1996, for example, $7 billion was 
spent on tourism in the Caribbean annually (Uebersax, 1996), and by 2013 this had risen to 
$28.1 billion.  Meanwhile, with a growth rate above 7% annually since 1990, the global 
market for cruising had approximately 18.3 million customers in 2010 (Rodrigue, 2013). 
Various segmented and niche markets have come into being, where upper class and middle 
class clients are channeled into different lifestyle and income groups, featuring 
entertainment and various desires and experiences. By looking at the cruise industry’s past 
and present role in the Caribbean, we can identify novel processes that have arisen during 
the epoch of global capitalism.  
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Tourism to and within developing countries has increased massively. While all 
regions have experienced growth in tourism arrivals over recent decades, the share of overall 
arrivals to developing countries has grown faster relative to the share of arrivals to 
developed countries.  As Figure 1 above shows, while only 83 million people visited 
developing economies in 1980, this reached 498 million by 2010.  By 2030, furthermore, 
more than one billion tourists will likely visit emerging economies (UNWTO, 2011, p. 15).  
Also, whereas 8% of tourists in the mid-1970s were from developed countries visiting 
developing countries, by the mid-1980s this figure had grown to 17%, reaching 20% by the 
mid-1990s, and then 25% by the new century (Robinson, 2003, p. 131). 
In turn, the development of the global cruise ship industry has occurred in the 
context of the rise of transnational production and financial systems in world economy. The 
industry underwent a transformation during the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries, as the maximization of profits and streamlining of the passenger experience 
occurred alongside a centralization of the industry’s capitalist interests. The industry has 
become heavily monopolized by Royal Caribbean and Carnival Cruise Lines, which 
together control 70% of the industry,both of which have developed significant ties with 
other companies and a wide array of subsidiaries and corporate synergies (Rodrigue, 2013). 
The two companies also own numerous subsidiaries and have purchased or driven out of 
business many of their former competitors. Meanwhile, a number of transnational capitalists 
and large global investment firms have increased their stakes in these companies. A magnet 
for investor confidence, the industry has increasingly sought to cut costs of labor, limit 
regulatory oversight, and manage the passenger experience more precisely. While only a 
small percentage of the local population gains long-term benefits from the industry and tax 
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revenues are rather small,  environmental damage caused by the industry has been 
significant and well documented. (Klein, 2009). 
The major cruise companies and their owners have come to embody “transnational 
capital”—that part of capital that traverses borders in transnational production processes, 
through finance, and among the circuits of capital accumulation.  By influencing and 
benefiting from globally oriented policy changes of national states, circumventing regulatory 
regimes and penetrating local economies, cruise companies sell “exotic” experiences to 
privileged sectors while simultaneously exploiting workers and locals. The industry’s 
expansion, furthermore, has led to a massive expansion in the amount of concentrated 
sewage sludge that it dumps into the world’s oceans and rising harmful air emissions 
(Friends of the Earth, 2014; Walker, 2010).  In addition to the contradictory nature of the 
industry’s rise, nations in the Caribbean and other regions have become more organically 
linked into the global economy. Local elites and officials seek competitive avenues through 
which to entice global investment (such as with the cruise ship industry), resources upon 
which these regional actors increasingly rely for their own social reproduction. 
Central to changes the cruise industry has undergone in the global era have been the 
sociological dynamics that undergird the industry, such as the role of laborers and 
passengers. For example, while wealthy and middle class passengers experience pleasurable 
vacations they are subsumed within a highly advanced and segmented capitalist society that 
alienates them from the reality they see and the ability to conceive of or determine the true 
character of what they temporarily interact with and inhabit (Marx, 1992, p. 163-177). So 
even while enjoying pleasurable experiences, passengers are still disconnected from 
understanding the social, economic, political and ecological nature of the phenomenon in 
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which they partake.  We can consider recent changes in the industry that guarantee 
passengers are channeled into cruise company-controlled or connected service sector zones. 
In the past, cruise ship passengers could more easily interact with local merchants, but in 
recent decades passengers have increasingly been channeled into company-controlled 
markets.  This represents an intensified social alienation, where passengers believe they are 
shopping or taking part in local markets, when in fact they are operating through chains of 
accumulation controlled by a transnational cruise ship company.  
 
The Historical Formation of the Cruise Ship Industry 
With the European imperialistic conquest of the Caribbean region and the ethnic 
cleansing of its indigenous inhabitants, poor European immigrants and African slaves 
comprised most of the earliest labor imported to the region. Beginning in the 1830s, the use 
of steamships significantly reduced the time of the journey to the Western Hemisphere, 
eliminating the reliance upon sailing vessels. By the later part of the century, a trickle of 
tourists began to visit Caribbean destinations that reflected their nationality, as English 
tourists predominantly visited the British colonies of Nevis, Barbados, and Jamaica, while 
French went to Martinique, the Dutch to Curaçao, and North Americans traveled mostly to 
Cuba and the Bahamas, islands in close proximity to South Florida (Gmelch, 2003). 
By the early twentieth century, modern oceanic liner designs debuted, which 
immediately introduced a rigid class system on board the vessels. As the luxurious first-class 
experience above decks improved, the cramped unventilated spaces below deck housed the 
rest of the ship’s passengers and crew. The blockbuster 1997 Hollywood film Titanic 
illustrates this dichotomy quite vividly. Yet, as immigration slowed, shipping liners sought 
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to provide cheap tickets to people in the United States who wanted to return to visit Europe. 
“If the westbound traffic had dried up, the thinking went, perhaps the new prosperity in the 
U.S. might give rise to a new flow in the other direction” (Garin, 2006, p. 17). 
Transatlantic merchant shipping capital went through tough times, especially as 
luxury travel and mass migration came to a halt during the First World War. As they tried to 
salvage their investments following the war and throughout the economic boom of the 
1920s, some companies began to seek new customers among the U.S. middle class by 
offering improved accommodations, or “affordable luxury.”  
During the winter months of this era, early cruises to the Caribbean became essential 
to the viability and profitability of many ship companies. Some visitors, for instance, came 
from Europe and North America to Jamaica aboard steamers of the United Fruit Company 
or Hamburg-American Line West Indian cruises (Tortello, 2006).  Yet a number of factors 
continued to impede a full-scale tourist industry, not the least of which was the particular 
geography and climate conditions of the Caribbean. 
 
The [oceanic] ships were simply not built for tropical climates; their small 
windows, their limited deck space, their recreational facilities (such as they 
were) deep in the ship had all been conceived with the wind and snow and 
waves of the North Atlantic in mind. They had no air-conditioning, and the 
dark paint on their hulls was a magnet for the tropical sun. And then there 
was the question of outlook. Rather than embracing an exciting new direction 
for their business, ship-owners saw these tropical sojourns as a distraction, a 
necessary evil. (Garin, 2006, p. 19) 
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Transatlantic passenger shipping slowly declined during the first half of the twentieth 
century and, by the 1950s, had collapsed. This decline is linked to the advent of large 
passenger jet aircraft in the decades following the Second World War, when intercontinental 
travel largely shifted from oceanic liners to planes. The antiquated and uncomfortable liners 
had been designed to maximize passenger number, with stifling cabins that often lacked 
windows. In addition, the ships suffered from high fuel consumption and had deep hulls that 
prevented them from entering shallow ports.  
Into this scene entered a capitalist entrepreneur, Frank Fraser, who sought to build 
the first year-round cruise-only business, which would operate out of Miami, Florida. 
Miami’s proximity to the warm climate and islands of the Caribbean made it an ideal choice. 
It also signaled the shift in the role of the maritime passenger ship from transatlantic 
transportation to cruise tourism.i During the 1960s, a handful of cruise businesses had 
formed in Miami, most often operating excursions into the Bahamas utilizing pre-war U.S. 
coastal passenger ships. In fact, the internationalization of the cruise ship tourist industry in 
the region grew in part due to the U.S. state's facilitation. After the Second World War, new 
U.S. government policies seeking to open up international markets helped instigate the flow 
of U.S. capital and tourists into the Caribbean. Some Caribbean elites (facilitated at times by 
U.S. policymakers) profited from new construction projects, marketing, and the 
management of modern resorts.  
Similarly, with the transition away from British colonial rule, West Indian 
governments and economies adjusted policies and practices and sought international cruise 
ship companies as an important new source of foreign capital. Some Caribbean states began 
to reduce tariffs and other barriers to travelers entering Caribbean countries, eliminating 
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taxes on arriving and departing tourists, and providing waivers for visa requirements. The 
growth of tourism, as Chase (2002) argues, also helped shift a more significant segment of 
West Indian labor into the service sector. Scholars have also argued that the expansion of the 
industry impacted the social structure of the Caribbean, such as in the English speaking 
islands, where the rising hegemony of the U.S. and new interactions associated with tourism 
impacted locals by “reinforcing or rearticulating conceptions of national, historical, racial, 
and economic difference” (Hogue, 2013). 
The first major cruise corporation was Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, which was 
owned in large part by wealthy Scandinavian shipping families, the Skaugens and 
Wilhelmsens, and operated by businessmen in Miami who had experience in the industry. 
One of these businessmen, Ted Arison, founded Carnival Cruise Lines in 1972. From a long 
established Israeli shipping family, Arison had invested in Nili, one of the Fraser family’s 
cruise ships in the mid-1960s. While a number of cruise lines began during the 1960s and 
1970s, by the latter decades of the twentieth century, the industry turned out huge profits and 
became increasingly centralized and monopolized. As cruise vacations were promoted 
throughout the later decades of the twentieth century, the fledgling industry gained 
popularity among middle class vacationers and retirees, especially in North America and 
Europe. It achieved notoriety through media, for instance, with visits by movie stars covered 
through private radio and television broadcasts. 
 
The Cruise Ship Industry and the Era of Global Capitalism 
The closing decades of the twentieth century were a period of growth for the cruise 
line industry as it became ubiquitous in popular culture. The pampered high consumption of 
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wealthy and middl-class cruise vacationers occurred alongside the intensifying “culture-
ideology of consumerism” promoted by TNCs (Sklair, 2012). The expansion of the cruise 
ship tourism occurred at a time when nations and local markets around the world became 
more deeply integrated through a globalized economy (Robinson, 2004). New transnational 
production networks and global financial systems, functionally linked across borders, 
allowed for capital to engage in more intensive and extensive operations (Dicken, 2007).  
Reflecting the emergent transnationalization of the industry, cruise ship company 
stocks became traded globally, with Carnival going public in 1987. In the 1990s and 2000s, 
the industry boomed alongside major organizational and technological advancements, as 
well as shifting capital-labor relations in the context of a globalizing economy. All the 
while, larger and larger ships were produced. “A building frenzy during the 1990s produced 
a continual flow of newer and bigger ships,” explains Klein (2005, p. 14). The Caribbean is 
where the cruise industry first got its start and the region has continued to be the most 
profitable throughout the global era, even while other regions have become integrated into 
the global cruise ship market. 
The owners and major stockholders of the cruise ship companies are also tied to 
myriad other companies and industries worldwide. As transnational capitalists, they have 
taken advantage of the scale and financial resources at their disposal to acquire or merge 
with other companies.  In 2013, major global investment managements firms controlled 
more than a third of Carnival’s stocks, such as Thornburg, BlackRock, Schroder, Legal & 
General, M&G, Artemis Investment, and global asset managers TIAA-CREF, UBS Global 
Asset, and JPMorgan (Kuehmayer, 2013, p. 16). In turn, TCC fractions from around the 
world have holdings in these investment and asset firms. Cruise companies have 
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increasingly sought out cost efficient synergies, forming relations with a variety of other 
companies (Travel Weekly, 2003; Trade Winds, 2014).  With their transnationally oriented 
investors and owners, these companies have become globally competitive at unparalleled 
levels. 
Cruise ship magnates, few in number, have become some of the wealthiest people on 
the planet, holding investments in numerous globalized industries and in transnational 
finance. In 1992, decades after founding the Carnival Cruise Lines, Ted Arison appeared on 
the Forbes list of America’s top hundred wealthiest, worth an estimated $2.8 billion (Garin, 
2006, p. 38). After stepping aside and leaving the company to his son Micky in 1990, Ted 
went on to own Israel’s largest construction company, as well as massive real estate, 
technology, and financial holdings. In 1997, he led a corporate buyout of the government of 
Israel’s largest state bank while he also turned down an offer to become Israel’s finance 
minister. At the time of his death, his holdings went to his daughter, instantly making her the 
wealthiest Israeli citizen. Micky Arison, the current chief executive of Carnival (and owner 
of the Miami Heat basketball team), was said to be the 32nd richest person in the U.S. in 
2004 and worth $5.3 billion. Furthermore, in 2009 alone he earned more than $7 million, 
which included a base salary of $880,000, a cash bonus of $2,206,116, stocks granted of 
$3,618,481, and other compensation totaling $496,513  (Forbes, 2009). As of 2013, he was 
said to be worth a total of $5.9 billion, the #211 wealthiest billionaire in the world (Forbes, 
2013). 
 
Fundamental changes to the cruise industry during the era of global capitalism 
The globalization of the cruise industry is reflected in a number of novel dynamics; 
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from organizational and technological advancements to new economic developments, the 
industry has grown tremendously in recent decades, earning massive profits for its major 
stockholders. Yet whereas transnationally oriented elite groups have benefited, many others 
have been disadvantaged or sidelined by the industry’s changing structures. Reflecting the 
inequality and dynamism of globalization: some small groups of investors and owners have 
profited tremendously; upper and middle strata passengers enthralled by global consumer 
culture achieve brief escapes from their working lives; whereas labor in the industry is 
increasingly disempowered and exploited; and as local communities at cruise destinations 
gain little and are increasingly marginalized.  
Throughout this unprecedented growth and intensification of the industry, it has 
undergone fundamental changes. These include the companies becoming highly adept at 
managing public opinion, the experience of its passengers, and the activities of its labor 
force. The cruise industry’s links with other economic sectors and the strength of its 
influence upon state officials has deepened. Its workforce has become more flexible with its 
time commoditized and managed more precisely. Like many other sectors of global tourism, 
the cruise ship industry has repatriated more and more value from passenger spending, while 
at the same time maintaining a web of local and regional alliances and relations that benefit 
from the industry. As Robinson (2003, p. 197) explains, “The major portion of tourist 
earnings is captured by transnational capital without entering the host country to begin with, 
going to the TNCs that control air travel and the tour operators and travel agents that 
organize and coordinate the global tourist traffic.” Taking these factors into account, there 
have been several fundamental changes in the cruise industry during its globalization phase:   
1) A variety of organizational and technological advancements, and new strategies 
 ! 66!
have increased profits and streamlined and heightened the exploitation of labor—increasing 
the structural power of transnational capital over labor.  Carnival cruise lines, for example, 
first developed highly focused onboard revenue strategies, where low ticket prices attracted 
customers who then became consumers at casinos, bars, stores, and spa services. Yet, as 
company profits have grown tremendously, workers’ pay has stagnated. 
New labor regimes have been established that allow transnational capital to intensify 
its appropriation of the surplus labor of workers.  Meanwhile, these workers face 
increasingly precarious and competitive relations of the global market. The productive 
activities of these workers have become geographically diffuse relative to firms and nation-
states, so much so that we can consider them as part of a global working class (Mason, 2010; 
Struna, 2009).  In 2005, the monthly minimum wage of workers on board ships—whose 
shifts often lasted 14 hours, 7 days a week, and from 10 to 12 months out of the year—was 
just $500 dollars. Even cruise ship entertainers earn depressed wages such that workers can 
be so socially alienated that they lose track of the day, entering into monotonous cycles of 
labor (Dr. R. Klein, personal communication, 2013). 
For the cruise industry, the most important of the new labor regimes, disciplining  
and controlling its global work force has been advanced through the “flags of convenience,” 
a practice that allows companies to flag their ships from countries other than the actual 
location of ownership. In other words, companies are free to employ cheap labor and avoid 
many state regulations and pressures from labor unions, as well as lower registration fees 
and taxes, all of which provides cruise companies with significant competitive advantages.  
The cruise industry has also backed successful lobbying campaigns, such as opposition to 
U.S. labor laws extending to foreign-flagged vessels operating out of U.S. ports. In regards 
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to taxes, while much of the Carnival Corporation’s infrastructure is in the U.S., it pays a 
comparatively small amount in taxes.  In 2003, the company paid $29 million in taxes out of 
$6.7 billion in revenue, or just one-half of 1%.ii 
Before and during the 1960s and 70s, cruise ships and their flags each represented a 
national line, such as the Greek Line, Italian Line, Cunard Line. As such, most workers were 
from that country, with possibly a few from a small number of others countries. However, 
today’s cruise ship companies increasingly hire from a global supply of labor where they 
face less intrusion from labor laws and regulations. This transition became most visible in 
the 1970s and 80s, coinciding with the growth of companies such as Carnival. Initially, 
some companies such as Royal Caribbean and Norwegian Cruise Line (NCL) retained some 
of their national character in terms of officers, primarily because they retained Norwegian 
flags given their ownership by Norwegians, but even that practice has diminished in recent 
years. The national and supranational juridical processes enabling this practice (which have 
been supported by the industry) have seemingly helped to usher in changes to labor 
practices. A number of small developing countries (such as Panama, Liberia, the Marshall 
Islands, and the Bahamas), with little to no enforcement measures, have come to provide 
flags to ships around the world. Some labor organizations and civil society groups have 
attempted to challenge the supranational law, such as the International Transport workers 
Federation (ITF) in their campaign against flags of convenience, and the ITF and War on 
Want's 2002 “Sweatships” campaign (ITF, 2006; War on Want and ITF 2002). However, as 
the data below shows, the share of foreign-flagged (or “flags of convenience”) ships has 
expanded massively in recent decades.  
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Figure Three 
Global share of foreign-flagged fleet (Beginning-of-year figures, percentage 
deadweight tonnage, 1989-2012) 
 
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by IHS 
Fairplay. Estimate based on available information of commercial seagoing vessels of 
1000 gross tonnage and above. 
 
A number of other areas show where the cruise industry has become more adept at 
exploiting workers and appropriating their surplus labor. One example is in the 
telecommunications industry, a sector on which cruise companies rely for booking cruise 
ship tickets. Like many other large TNCs, cruise companies utilize highly regimented 
offshore telephone center labor for its customers’ reservation calls. Royal Caribbean is 
currently in the process of moving its British call center to Guatemala (McNeil, 2013). 
Carnival, on the other hand, now has its call center labor work from home, where their 
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success can be easily surveilled by new telecommunications marketing technology (Heilman 
2012). Flexibilized labor relations are also increasingly present in servicing, supplying, 
maintaining, repairing, and in the construction of cruise ship vessels, as well as heightened 
forms of precarious labor within the promotion, commercial, and on board entertainment 
sectors of the industry (Klein, 2009). 
2) Industrial innovations have developed much larger cruise ships. For comparison, 
large ships in the 1970s weighed 20,000 to 30,000 tons; in the 1980s, 50,000 to 70,000 tons; 
in the 1990s, 100,000 to 140,000 tons; while by the first decade of the twenty-first century 
they reached 220,000 tons. This has provided further impetus to the creation of new port 
facilities able to accommodate the larger ships. Larger ship capacities (from less than 1,000 
passengers in the 1970s to more than 6,000 in the 2000s) have also meant that fewer vessels 
are required for the same number of tourists.iii This is reflected by fewer and fewer vessels 
being required for the same or rising number of tourists. The data below, for example, shows 
how 907,611 passengers visited Jamaica in 2000 onboard 504 different cruise ship visits, 
also known as “calls.” In contrast, in 2010 a similar number of passengers visited during just 
325 trips.  
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Figure Four 
Number of Passengers and Calls by Cruise Ships per Year for Dominican Republic 
(D.R.), Haiti, and Jamaica. When data on both the number of passengers and number of 
calls are available they are separated by a forward slash. 
  1998 2000 2003 2004 2005 
D.R./Calls   283,414 397,993 456,321/ 519 289,805 
Haiti/ Calls 246,221 304,516 423,693 282,192 368,021 
Jamaica/ 
Calls   907,611/ 504 
1,132,596/ 
502 
1,099,773/ 
482 
1,135,843/ 
508 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
D.R./Calls 303,489 384,878/ 380 475,206 496,729/ 411 352,539/ 264 
Haiti/Calls 449,921 482,077 n/a n/a n/a 
Jamaica/ 
Calls 
1,336,994/ 
563 
1,179,504/ 
435 
1,092,263/ 
398 922,349/ 334 909,619/ 325 
 
Sources: Caribbean Tourism Organization, Banco Central de la República Dominicana, and 
the Secretairerie d'Etat au Tourisme, Haiti.iv 
 
The above data reflects the “boom and bust” crises of capital with its periodical 
eliminations, reconfigurations, and returns. However, not illustrated in the data is the 
emerging popularity of other locations in the Caribbean. Cruise destinations such as Mexico, 
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the Bahamas, Curacao, and Aruba are all growing (Britell, 2013).  In recent years, due to 
rising fuel costs, northern areas of the Caribbean have become more advantageous for the 
industry (Ibid).   
 3) Cruise ship companies have also gained unprecedented rights and powers, 
especially in regions such as the Caribbean where states compete with one another to attract 
TNCs active in global tourism.  According to Carnival chairperson Micky Arison, 
appreciation for the impact of cruise tourism in the region is “far more so than 10 or 20 
years ago. But it varies government to government obviously, and country to country. But I 
think, generally speaking, yes, it is far more recognized today than it was 10 years ago” 
(Britell, 2013). 
To attract TNCs active in global tourism, state officials in the Caribbean have 
lowered taxes and regulations and allowed the industry to operate relatively unhindered. In 
turn, cruise ship tourism has come to provide only minimal tax income to states in the 
region, with on average $15 per passenger spent per port of call (Rodrigue, 2013).v Many 
states, whose policymakers have become oriented toward the global economy (Robinson, 
2012), also increasingly coordinate with organizations that the industry has set up to help 
facilitate its activities, such as the Florida-Caribbean Cruise Association. 
This transition in the industry’s relationship with states has accompanied moves 
away from traditional ports and their old state-run local port authorities, instead embracing 
privatized port operations with new enclaves in traditional ports or altogether new 
installations outside traditional ports. A related trend has led to an increasing number of 
company-run or highly influenced port authorities. While often leased, some ports have 
actually become the property of cruise ship companies. Carnival owns ports in the Turks and 
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Caicos, Cancun, Honduras, and has plans for a port in Belize. Royal Caribbean Cruises 
Limited owns the Roatán, a port in Belize City as well as Falmouth in Jamaica. A parallel 
phenomenon has occurred in the Mediterranean, where cruise companies own a number of 
ports. Meanwhile, there have been protest campaigns launched against cruise ship 
companies over the environmental damage caused by the construction of their new deep-
water ports, such as in Jamaica (Williams-Raynor, 2011). 
Even where the companies do not directly own ports, they have considerable 
influence over port commissions, such as through campaign contributions to local politicians 
(Dr. R. Klein, personal communication, 2013). Cruise companies also play countries and 
ports off one another, demanding better incentives and waterfront overhauls (Klein, 2005, p. 
116-117).  Presently, cruise companies are no longer at the mercy of local authorities and 
can more easily capture passenger spending at manufactured tourist sites, revenue that in the 
past would have more directly benefitted the region’s local economy. The structure of new 
company-owned ports or enclaves in older ports (with fences and gates) also keep 
passengers inside “the port,” leaving only on company-controlled bus tours or with approved 
taxi companies. This is very different from 20 or 30 years ago when cruise ship passengers 
had far less controlled experiences (Dr. R. Klein, personal communication, 2013). Klein 
describes, “Passengers traditionally wandered around towns more than they do now. 
However, when they do and spend money, the cruise line still gets its cut (commission). As 
well, many of the stores in ports are owned by offshore entities that have cozy relationships 
with the cruise lines” (Ibid). While the industry would previously receive a cut of local 
profits, today they increasingly directly or indirectly control even the “local” markets that 
passengers interact with. 
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4) A growing number of subcontractors, such as local shore excursion providers and 
taxi companies competing for business, have allowed cruise lines to maximize their profits 
by squeezing local economies. Where a local company (sometimes affiliated with the port 
agent) might coordinate the shore excursions of visiting cruise passengers, some companies 
hired by the cruise lines operate in multiple ports (usually within the same country, state, or 
province), while still other subcontractors such as concessionaires operate regionally and 
onboard the ships. Concessionaires manage operations that are less profitable or require an 
expertise (shops, casinos, photography, spa services, etc.), and these companies in turn pay 
sizable fees to the cruise ship companies.  
Another trend has been the rise of technical, commercial, and crew management 
services in the cruise ship industry, many of which are outsourced to specialized companies 
(Kuehmayer, 2013). Competition between subcontractors and companies working in the 
tourist industry helps contain costs and increase profits for cruise line owners and investors. 
Importantly, subcontractors and small businesses that link into the industry and depend on it 
economically have also advocated on its behalf, with tour excursion providers and taxi 
operators, for example, mobilizing to lobby on the industry’s behalf in the Caribbean (Dr. R. 
Klein, personal communication, 2013). 
5) Finely tuned public relations and “corporate responsibility” strategies further 
polish corporate brands throughout the cruise industry. With slogans such as "Cruising is 
remarkably safe” and the "Safety of our passengers is the cruise industry's top priority," the 
industry has become adept at public relations and managing perceptions. As Klein reflects, 
“They coin the right words and have the ‘right’ labels for what they do, even if these labels 
are at variance with what they actually do” (Dr. R. Klein, personal communication, 2013). 
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Public perception is very important in the industry. For example, widespread media 
coverage engulfed the Carnival-operated vessel that sank off the Isola del Gilio in Italy in 
2012 that cost the lives of 32 people. While the costs from the accident were likely to be 
relatively low, as the company is insured, negative media coverage catalyzed by such 
accidents was deemed a major threat to the company’s reputation. 
Amidst mounting criticism and the industry facing some legal actions and fines, 
cruise companies have, for instance, strategically sought to mitigate their environmental 
impact and risk therein. While they have put into place new waste treatment mechanisms, 
every day the industry is believed to release into the world’s oceans between 40 and 120 
tons of concentrated sewage sludge that includes beryllium, lead, mercury and other harmful 
emissions. While there are various "memoranda of understandings" between the industry 
and the U.S. state over the industry’s environmental impact, these rely only on voluntary 
compliance without monitoring. Key for the industry is managing public opinion so as not to 
understand or criticize the harmful impact the industry has on the environment (Klein, 
2009). 
6) Cruise ship companies have become entwined with global capital flows by 
opening up to stock markets and outside capital investments. One ship manufacturer 
explains that there has been a “shift in the ship financing sector” that “uncovers how fast the 
traditional financiers to the cruise shipping industry fade away” as a new globalized 
financial system takes hold (Kuehmayer, 2013, p. 2). With deep pockets and financial buffer 
in difficult times, large cruise companies dominate smaller competitors, becoming deeply 
linked with the global financial system rather than the smaller banks of the past. 
Cruise ship companies have initiated IPOs or have partnered with venture capitalists 
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and other investors in order to raise needed capital. Transnational capitalist Leon Black 
(Apollo Management) established Prestige Cruise Holding, which controls NCL, Regent 
Seven Seas, and Oceania. Industry leader Carnival went public in 1987 by offering 20% of 
its stock, which was used for new ships and expansion beyond cruises (as with Carnival 
Airlines, which took over and merged with PanAM, or into the hotel industry). By contrast, 
Royal Caribbean went public in 1993, a move that was associated with new build initiatives. 
This, alongside major technological and organizational advancements, has allowed for 
tremendous growth in the more centralized industry’s revenues: Royal Caribbean annual 
revenues of $3.4 billion in 2002 grew to nearly $7.7 billion in 2012. Carnival Cruise Lines 
revenues of $1.25 billion in 1990 swelled to nearly $15.5 billion by 2013. Far from an 
anomaly, the cruise ship industry’s integration into the global financial system continues 
unabated until today. 
 
 
Source: Company tax records obtained by the author through the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 
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Source: Company tax records obtained by the author through the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 
 
 7) The industry and its major owners and executives have become increasingly 
transnationally oriented, seeking out profits and advantages through a global web of partners 
and subsidiaries. This is not only clear in their economic activities but also in how the 
businesses are structured. For example, while the Cruise Royal Caribbean Company 
maintains its official corporate headquarters in Miami, it is officially incorporated in Liberia. 
Geared toward upper and middle class clientele, it has investors, customers, and employees 
from around the world. According to Forbes, the company is valued at $9.4 billion (Castillo-
Mussot, Sprague, & Lama Garcia, 2013). As the North American and Caribbean markets 
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became saturated, the cruise industry recently expanded to new markets in Asia (especially 
in China, Vietnam and Thailand), Australia and New Zealand, the Middle East (Dubai), and 
in parts of Africa. In a mutually beneficial relationship, the industry’s expansion and its 
globally competitive nature have developed concurrently with its finely tuned public 
relations and “corporate responsibility” strategies (Klein, 2009). 
Next, I will look at some particular cruise ship destinations in the Caribbean during 
the global era.  I focus on some of the major population and lower income areas of the 
region, showing how the industry’s development has done little to benefit local 
communities. Across the region, cruise companies get out of paying many of the land-based 
taxes and fees that other tourist and hotel companies must pay. As Pattullo (2005: 199) 
observes: “cruise ships are seen as moveable feasts which sail away into the sunset, their 
bars and casinos untaxed.” Likewise, construction labor associated with the industry is 
disconnected from the areas where they visit, unlike the hotel industry that relies much more 
on local inputs  (Ibid). The cruise liners also purchase few supplies in the region, instead 
buying through global corporate chains (Ibid: 200). 
 
The Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica 
 Cruise ships have long frequented many Caribbean islands, including some of the 
lower income population centers such as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica. In the 
1960s and 1970s, cruise ships traveled between traditional larger ports of call. In recent 
decades, we have seen rapid development of both private ports and installations in the 
traditional port cities, a practice that permits the industry to operate and exert control under 
less scrutiny by local governments. This has occurred as part of a general shift away from 
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local and traditional models of development toward a developmental model that hinges upon 
global investment and flows of capital.  As Carnival’s transnational capitalist chairman 
Micky Arison elaborates: the Caribbean region’s economic prospects and the profitability of 
cruise industry companies have come to become more broadly “related to the general 
economic situation around the world” (Britell, 2013). 
Caribbean states have meanwhile struggled to take a unified regional position 
towards the industry so that they might gain a larger share of revenue. Attempts by 
Caribbean countries to cooperate by agreeing on a common head tax in the 1990s and early 
2000s failed (Klein, 2005, p. 192). Pattullo has explained the way in which the powerful 
lobbying arm of the cruise companies defeated this attempt, illustrating how they have a 
huge sway over Caribbean policymakers (Patullo, 2005: 197-199).  
Through its highly competitive global market, the industry has engendered a race to 
the bottom for labor, local communities, and the environment. State policymakerss 
meanwhile compete with one another in the region and actually help keep the industry’s 
costs extremely low. Regionally, market shares in the industry have in recent years shifted 
as more price-competitive areas of the Spanish-speaking Caribbean outpace in growth 
English-speaking destinations. Similarly, on a global scale, other price-competitive warm 
and tropical destinations have thriving tourism markets. 
In the Dominican Republic, cruise ships have traditionally gone to the old ports of La 
Romana in the country’s south and, more importantly, Samaná in the north. In recent years, 
cruise companies have shifted towards new non-traditional private ports of call or new more 
privately controlled installations within the old ports. Costa Cruises, for example, visits Casa 
de Camp, a tropical seaside resort with golf courses in the Dominican province of La 
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Romana. Cruise ship companies that visit the Dominican Republic today include Royal 
Caribbean (RCL), Norwegian Cruise Line, Seabourn, Holland America (HAL), and 
Silversea. Not surprisingly, the Dominican state has close ties with the industry and has 
promoted its development continually over the years. Dominican President Daniel Medina, 
soon after coming into office, pledged to attract ten million tourists a year to the country and 
promptly met with executives from Royal Caribbean on one of their ships anchored in Bay 
of Samaná (Royal Caribbean, 2013). Marking the first time a Dominican president 
addressed a cruise ship operator in a press-covered event for Dominican audiences, this 
meeting showcased the importance of the industry (Royal Caribbean, 2013). 
In 2011 in the Dominican Republic, tourism generated $4.3 billion in revenues, 
while 3.7 million foreign visitors traveled through the country’s airports and 430,000 visited 
the island onboard cruise vessels (accessdr, 2012a, 2012b). Tourists visiting the country had 
grown to 4.56 million in 2012, becoming the region’s most highly visited country (Luxner, 
2013). As most visitors arrive by plane, new mega-projects look set to heavily expand the 
number of cruise visitors annually to the country (Luxner, 2013). 
By contrast, Haiti has served as a laboratory for the privatized cruise port. During the 
final stages of the Duvalier regime in 1986, Royal Caribbean International began cruises to 
Labadee, a heavily guarded and fenced off private resort installation in the north of the 
country.vi Cruise operations to Haiti have run smoothly except for some brief shut downs 
during political crises in the country. Into the 2010s, Royal Caribbean International ramped 
up its operations at the port, running a high volume of cruises (Booth, 2010).vii  Five beaches 
and a forested peninsula are leased from the Haitian government. After engaging in 
watersports, barbecues, and souvenir shopping within the premises, cruise passengers’ return 
 ! 80!
at night to sleep onboard their cruise vessel (Booth, 2010). Approximately 300 locals work 
at Labadee and a few hundred more are employed indirectly (Booth, 2010). Despite this 
idyllic and premium setting, Royal Caribbean pays the Haitian state a miserly $6 per visitor. 
Since 2009, Labadee has been able to receive Oasis class ships, the world’s largest class of 
cruise ships with a maximum passenger occupancy of 5,400.viii Including staff, this raises 
the capacity of the new vessel to 6,296 (Royal Caribbean, 2009). 
Jamaica, another major population center in the region, is one of the most highly 
visited cruise ship destinations in the Caribbean. Ocho Rios is the most active cruise port, 
hosting more than 800,000 cruise visitors annually, followed by Montego Bay, which sees 
between 300,000 and 400,000. Port Antonio boasts a much smaller but increasingly steady 
cruise presence. Traditional ports of Kingston and Port Antonio are for the most part no 
longer utilized by the industry. Whereas the traditional ports can accommodate most ships, 
new ports and installations have and continue to be developed to accommodate the newer, 
much heavier, ships. This has occurred alongside a trend of cruise lines taking over control 
of cruise terminals. Presently, cruise companies owe the Jamaican state tens of millions in 
unpaid taxes, although Jamaica’s government has not moved to collect (Dr. R. Klein, 
personal communication, 2013). 
New non-traditional private port installations have been set up in Jamaica, either as 
new enclaves within the traditional ports or as new installations outside the ports. For 
instance, allowing for its new “mega ships” to dock in the country, Royal Caribbean has 
developed Falmouth, a private terminal near Montego Bay. The cruise line has promoted the 
port as unique because of its close access to local city life, allowing passengers to have a 
“genuine” Jamaican experience. One press outlet describes, “during a Western Caribbean 
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one-week cruise, Falmouth is the only opportunity for passengers to get a look at a real 
Caribbean island port city. Royal Caribbean and Jamaica have built a modern port facility, 
with docks and some local shops. Just two blocks away is a real city where residents seem to 
live much as they did 10 or 20 years ago” (Molyneaux, 2012). The Jamaica Gleaner has 
pointed out: 
 
The majority of Jamaica's cruise ship visitors come from America although 
interest in other parts of the world, particularly Europe, is growing. In fact, 
new developments are occurring more and more. In June 2006, Royal 
Caribbean's Freedom of the Seas, the world's largest cruise ship which carries 
4,300 passengers (not including crew) will begin visiting Montego Bay. Later 
in this same year, the Queen Mary, the world's largest cruise liner and part of 
Carnival's Cunard Line, will also begin docking in Montego Bay. Today, a 
typical cruise ranges from less than US$100/night to more than 
US$1,000/night, depending on the type of vessel and services offered. For the 
past five years, Jamaica has consistently ranked within the top 10 of 
destinations worldwide in terms of passenger numbers. It continues to hold 
on to its traditional role as one of the marquee ports of the Caribbean and the 
Caribbean itself (the Western Caribbean to be more exact), remains the most 
popular cruise shipping region in the world” (Tortello,2006). 
 
Across the Caribbean, these companies have heavy influence over key contacts in 
government as well as connections with companies active across the region or in the 
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countries where the cruise companies operate. Wealth generated from the industry goes to a 
small handful of major capitalist investors and owners who in turn have allies in state 
apparatuses and among the local business community.ix Cruise ship companies, it can be 
argued, hold enormous sway in the region. State elites have become major promoters of the 
industry, with state-sponsored tourism advertisement campaigns targeting wealthy and 
middle class consumers abroad, as well as well as at home to convince locals of the 
importance of the industry. 
Despite exponential financial profits and an ever-increasing popularity as a form of 
leisure travel, the companies unleash enormous amounts of waste and trash. Caribbean states 
though have hesitated to implement or enforce stronger environmental regulations for fear of 
their destinations losing revenue by becoming less globally competitive. Despite this, cruise 
companies, as Klein concludes, “would lead us to believe that cruise ships are 
environmentally neutral. The industry projects this image through its lobbyists, public 
relations campaigns, infiltration of environmental organizations, and advertising . . .” (2005, 
p. 170). Caribbean government elites disposed toward the mass-tourism development 
projects of TNCs often point to immediate economic benefits, whereas the environmental 
damage can take a long time to accumulate and be assessed.  
 
Conclusion 
The cruise ship industry, increasingly an oligopoly controlled by groups from the 
TCC, has transitioned from its previous national and international models to a globally 
competitive model transfused with transnational capital. While providing services for many 
millions of customers and with its high profit margins expected to increase for years to 
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come, cruise companies are on an economically, socially, and environmentally unsustainable 
trajectory. They operate within the context of a global system and global capitalist economy 
that faces a dual crisis of ecology and inequality, a structural and civilizational crisis that 
ensnares the entire planet (Chew, 2006; Robinson, 2014; Sklair, 2001). The changing social 
relations and productive activities that undergird the industry have meant gains for some 
involved in the industry, especially transnational capitalists along with some top-tier 
managerial and professional groups. On the other hand, the majority of laborers and lower 
income groups connected with the industry increasingly compete and face new globalized 
labor regimes as they sell their labor power to TNCs.  
Annually, millions of tourists from privileged sectors worldwide partake in brief 
holiday escapes aboard cruise ship vessels. At the same time, the industry has become 
increasingly monopolized by a handful of large transnational companies, either driving 
smaller competitors out of business or acquiring them. Meanwhile, only small sectors of the 
populations in the areas of the Caribbean that I have examined here gained marginally from 
the industry, whereas local markets interacting with cruise passengers have increasingly 
come under direct company control or contract as the cruise companies have become 
proficient in repatriating the onshore spending of passengers.  Governments in the Caribbean 
region have largely handed over control of port authorities or reformed them so as to operate 
in tandem with the industry.  
In addition, aside from the actions of some stronger states, regional and 
environmental regulations have been stymied in recent decades as the cruise companies—
adept at public relations and lobbying and with high priced law-firms—remain largely 
unaccountable.  Reflected in the policies they have promoted, local state officials and elites 
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in the Caribbean actively encourage transnational capitalist investment, due in part to their 
social reproduction now depending upon this type of capital accumulation (Robinson, 2012; 
Sprague 2012). As nodes in a regional and global tourist market, Caribbean nations have 
come to fit within and become an integrated part of the accumulation chains of transnational 
cruise corporations. Capital and labor have both undergone novel changes through 
globalization: local economies have been inserted into global chains of finance, production, 
and distribution, whereas work has become more subcontracted, outsourced, and 
flexibilized.  We see this within the cruise ship industry, where its globalization has led not 
only to advancements for some but also to heightening exploitative and contradictory social 
relations. 
 
 
                                                
Notes 
 i. The move to Miami signaled the rise of the cruise industry, where early on North 
American tourists eagerly bought into packages of exoticism, warm climate, and 
entertainment. The move also signaled a shift away from earlier maritime industry patterns, 
as Author Kristoffer A. Garin (2006) explains,  “As long as the industry stayed in New 
York, its leaders would remain doggedly loyal to three centuries of maritime history, even as 
they watched their enterprises slowly fade away around them.”  
Generations prior, Fraser’s own family had immigrated to Jamaica from Scotland, 
eventually owning slave plantations on the island. Counting Hollywood movie star actors as 
friends, Fraser, was close with business leaders such as the Bosch family, which operated 
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the Bacardi Rum Empire in Cuba. He was also sociable with some leaders in the region, 
such as Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo. During the Second World War, as German U-
boats carried out a deadly campaign against merchant vessels sailing from Miami to the 
Caribbean, Fraser subsequently earned a small fortune by hiring out small banana boats, 
because the kriegsmarine were not willing to waste torpedoes on them. These boats kept up 
a lively trade with the Dominican Republic and others islands (Garin, 2006, p. 20). Overall, 
Fraser promptly used Miami’s untapped potential as a tourist port, even purchasing his first 
cruise ship from the Trujillo regime, named the Nuevo Dominicano. 
By the mid-1950s Fraser had purchased two larger vessels that carried 450 people 
each, tripling the capacity of earlier ships that had plied Caribbean waters. Air conditioning 
technology was also significant in that it allowed for year round business in the Caribbean 
with Miami as its epicenter.i He launched the first vessel, the Yarmouth, with ten-day 
cruises to Nassau in the Bahamas, Haiti, and Jamaica. The other ship carried out longer trips 
to Central and South America. Geared towards older clientele, the voyages exuded luxury 
and leisure (Garin, 2006, p. 23). By the early 1960s, an industry had taken shape, attracting a 
handful of international investors especially from among those capitalists who had long 
profited from earlier forms of passenger shipping. 
ii This is data from the company’s tax records obtained by the author through the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 
iii Most large ships today have capacities of between 3,000 and 4,500 passengers. 
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iv While this figure does not include some of the more highly trafficked islands in the 
region, the data does focus our attention on lower-income and major population areas of the 
Caribbean basin. 
v A port of call is any port being visited by a ship, especially to load or unload cargo 
or passengers or take on supplies. 
vi On a scandalous side note, in 1991 a journalist revealed that cruise ship passengers 
were not informed that they were visiting Haiti when spending time at the resort (Farmer 
2006: 238). 
vii Other areas on the island have been considered for cruise operations but not yet 
developed. One right-wing evangelical Christian organization, based in the United States, 
operates a group called “Cruise with a cause” which is attempting to bring cruise ships into 
Port-au-Prince. If it succeeds, this will be the first time in a quarter century that cruise ships 
have visited Haiti’s capital. (Inspiration Cruises 2012). Small yacht cruises are known to 
visit Jacmel on Haiti’s southern coast, but these bring in less than 100 passengers at a time 
and are infrequent (Cruise Complete 2013a, 2013b). Some larger ships catering to a few 
hundred upscale passengers have been known to visit Haitian ports during carnival. (Haiti 
News 2013) 
viii This is after Royal Caribbean spent US$55 million on improvements in upgrading 
the port facilities. 
ix As Klein explains: “There are a couple of winners who make out quite well and 
everyone is part of a model of exploitation” (Dr. R. Klein, personal communication, 2013). 
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Chapter III 
Migrant Remittances, Transnational Integration, and Accumulation in the Caribbean 
 
During the era of globalization there has occurred an unprecedented expansion and 
cross-border integration of capitalist relations (Dicken, 2015; Robinson, 2014). This has 
occurred as peoples in regions around the world, such as the Caribbean, have been 
compelled to export their labor abroad as migrant workers in the global economy. 
Consequently, diasporic communities have grown tremendously in recent decades and taken 
part in rising cross-border economic activities (Portes, 1996). Remittance flows (usually, the 
money sent from an emigrant to her or his family or close relations abroad) now comprise 
vital revenue for the global poor, whereas labor exportation and the increasing reliance on 
remittances also reflects desperation and struggles to survive for lower income people. This 
chapter will examine the undergirding political economy of this process: the way in which 
remittance flows and the rise of a transnational remittance industry serve as objective routes 
through which transnational social integration is occurring. As a phenomenon of the global 
era, of recent decades, and in the context of the Caribbean, I will look at how a part of 
transnational social integration occurs through emigrant labor and the reverse flow of 
remittances.  
The connection between globalization and transnational migration has been studied 
in depth by a number of scholars.  Lydia Potts (1990) for example has shown how migration 
has been generated by a confluence of instances of capitalist expansion, industrialization of 
newly integrated areas, intensive new booms in capital accumulation, and as capital at 
different points in time gains through new migrant workforces.  Others have shown how at a 
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micro level familial structures often make decisions to migrate linked to hardships in the 
wake of socioeconomic disruption (Brettell and Hollifield, 2014). Meanwhile on a marco 
level the so called "push" and "pull" factors have long been examined, but undergirding 
these is the fact that capital's destructive nature creates surplus populations, that in turn are 
compelled to seek out new means of survival, whereas a shortage of labor or workers willing 
to work for low-wages creates an incentive for capital to seek out people displaced from 
other areas.  Swept up into a process of transnational social integration, Portes' (1995, 1996) 
for examples analyses the rise of transnational migrant and migrant sending communities, 
where the socioeconomic changes that have allowed for the transnationalization of capital, 
have also allowed such groups to become objectively and subjectively transnationally 
oriented.  New flexibilized production and commerce of the global era has opened all kinds 
of new production spaces for transnational migrant communities (Faist and Fauser, 2013), 
through which capital has sought out new routes to exploit them through the appropriation 
of their labor. Robinson explains how a fundamental shift has occurred, how migration has 
become altered from the international to the global phase of capitalism 
 
 "In the past, immigrants could not hope to maintain fluid and active 
ties with the homeland. They became assimilated and set up life anew in a 
new land. But global communications, transportation networks, and the 
global economic and financial infrastructure increasingly allow immigrants to 
maintain active and ongoing exchanges between their home country and their 
country (or countries) of immigration." (Robinson, 2003: 272)    
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Emigrant labor and the reverse flow of remittances that they produce have become 
key structural features of the integrative relations of the global era, especially for lower 
income communities. Serving as the basis of a hugely profitable transnational industry, 
remittances now comprise a vital and immediate income source for families around the 
world, and especially in the Caribbean. Scholars have examined remittances as a source of 
economic development and income for Caribbean nations (Niimi and Özden, 2008; 
Martínez, et al, 2008; Fajnzylber and Lopez, 2008; Acosta, et al, 2008; Singh, 2013), and 
others have looked at remittances as a survival strategy for lower income communities and 
families (Thai, 2014; Sirkeci, et al, 2012, Nurse, 2006).  
Studies have looked at remittances in the context of the global economic crisis of recent 
years (Sirkeci, et al, 2012) and the governmental and business policy challenges all of this 
entails. In this chapter I will take a different approach, arguing that the rise of Caribbean 
migrant labor and the reverse flow of remittance has occurred interconnected with capitalist 
globalization and the rise of transnational capital. In looking at the formation of the 
transnational remittance industry and remittance flows, I will seek to illuminate their 
structural features as an important part of transnational social and material integration and its 
contradictory nature. I will explain how, through the context of the Caribbean, a globally 
competitive and dynamic remittance industry has replaced earlier more static money transfer 
systems; how transnational capital has enveloped more locally oriented business models. 
Furthermore, this chapter looks at how the transnational remittance industry has 
come to function as part and parcel of the super-exploitation (Marini, 19733) of migrant 
workers in the global era, whose labor has become highly flexibilized and precarious. By 
super-exploitation I refer to how these workers are not only exploited through the direct 
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appropriation of the surplus value they create, but also through a further appropriation of the 
value they have created connected to their migratory and ethnic status in a racialized class 
system. As I will argue, transnational capital has come to not only profit tremendously off of 
this relationship, by appropriating the surplus value of super-exploitable emigrant workers, 
but also through its appropriation of portions of the redistributed value (in the form of 
remittances and the fees involved) that emigrant laborers send abroad primarily to family 
members. These relations have formed through the emergence in recent decades of the 
transnational remittance industry, utilizing new information technology and organizational 
advancements (such as supranational agreements and new firm structures), tapping into and 
facilitating the massive increase in recent decades of cross-border money transfers 
worldwide. This phenomenon has also come to be legitimized and promoted by a wide array 
of state elites and policymakers as a central plank of development (Rodriguez, 2010). 
Reports put out by the World Bank, for instance, often portray remittances as synonymous 
with foreign aid or financial exchange, as just another new sector of the global economy 
(Fajnzylber and Lopez, 2008). Garni and Weyher (2006, p. 74) importantly observe that:  
 
…the language of ‘exporting people’ in order to ‘capture remittances’ and 
‘leverage development’ while ‘relieving’ an ‘over- burdened’ economy of 
‘surplus labor’ (Gammage, 2006,  pp. 75-76, 93) obscures the underlying 
reality that economic elites seek to legitimize the seizure of portions of 
citizens’ private income, differentiated from ordinary income in that it 
happens to flow across national borders, and that the maximization of such 
seizures is justified as a matter of economic and development policy when in 
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fact it supports elite interests at the expense of [those] wanting a life for 
themselves and their families ... 
 
So how do contradictory relations that are novel to the global era undergird 
emigration and the reverse flow of remittances? How do these general trends manifest 
themselves within a particular regional context, such as the Caribbean? Next, I will provide 
some context on the unfolding of these dynamics in the region and then look in more detail 
at the social and material relations therein. 
 
The Caribbean Context 
By looking at specific emigrant populations, such as those from the Caribbean 
region, we can see how working people are often compelled to seek out lives in other 
countries. As shown in Table 2, the inflow of remittances into the Caribbean has risen 
exponentially. In the Dominican Republic, for example, in 1970, the inflow of remittances 
amounted to 25 million USD. By 2013 it was valued at 3.706 billion USD. In Haiti, over the 
same years, remittances grew from a negligible amount to 1.715 billion. In Jamaica it grew 
also from a negligible amount to 2.259 billion. This case can be used to generalize out to 
other contexts. Worldwide remittances to developing countries increased more than thirty-
fold, from $2 billion in 1970 ($12 billion if taking into account inflation) to $414 billion in 
2013 (Robinson, 2003, p. 204; World Bank, 2013). By 2006, remittances were valued at 
more than six times that of development assistance and they were believed to have reached 
70 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the developing world (World Bank, 2007). 
They had far surpassed non-FDI flows, such as portfolio investment and bank and trade 
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related lending (Acosta et al., 2008, p. 25). Remittances did drop some during the recent 
economic crisis, but they have since rebounded (Sirkeci et al., 2012, p. 53). As shown below 
in Figure 1 remittances have continued to grow in importance. With rising out-migration, 
Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years has become a major sources of emigrant 
labor and worldwide the largest recipient site for remittances. Robinson (2003, p. 208) 
describes this as “an arrangement, most likely an emergent structural feature of the global 
system, whereby the site of labor power and its reproduction have been transnationally 
dispersed”.  
 
Figure 1: Resource flows to developing countries, 1990-2015 ($ billions) 
 
Source: World Bank’s Development Prospects Group, 2012. 
 
Whereas Table 1 below shows the huge increase in the Caribbean born population 
living today in the U.S., which is by far the largest destination for labor exportation from the 
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region. Table 2 shows how the vast majority of Caribbean emigrants living in the U.S. are 
from the islands of Hispaniola, Jamaica, and Cuba. While Puerto Ricans are not included in 
this table, they are also among the largest of the diaspora populations. Next I will explain 
more clearly how a part of the labor-power of migrant workers, and surplus populations 
more generally, has come to be appropriated through the remittance industry. I will show 
further how the remittance industry has formed through novel material and social relations 
of the global economy. Looking how this has taken shape in specific countries of the 
Caribbean region (the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica), it is my argument that the 
transformations in these particular settings need to be seen through the context of 
transnational processes.  
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Table 1: Total and Caribbean Foreign-Born Populations Living in the United 
States, 1960-2009. 
Year Total foreign born Caribbean born   
    Number Share of Total 
1960 9,738,091 193,922 2.00% 
1970 9,619,302 675,108 7.00% 
1980 14,079,906 1,258,363 8.90% 
1990 19,767,316 1,938,348 9.80% 
2000 31,107,889 2,953,066 9.50% 
2009 38,517,234 3,465,890 9.00% 
Source: Migrant Immigration Source website. Data for 2000 from the 2000 
Decennial Census; data for 2009 from the American Community Survey 2009. 
Data for earlier decades from Gibson, Campbell, and Emily Lennon, US Census 
Bureau, Working Paper No. 29, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born 
Population of the United States: 1850 to 1990, US Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC, 1999.  
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Figure 2: Share of Caribbean-born population by country of Origin in the  
United States, 2009. 
 
 Source: Migration Information Source website. The data they utilized is from the 
US Census Bureau, 2009 American Community Survey.  
 
 
“Surplus” Populations, Emigration, and the Exportation of Labor 
An important facet of global capitalism, has been its production of surplus 
populations, by which I refer to groups of people who are either structurally unemployed or 
have only precarious employment (Kalleberg, 2009; Robinson, 2014; Standing, 2011). As 
numerous studies have shown in recent decades, global inequality has intensified (Bales, 
2012; Kloby, 2003; Holt-Giménez and Patel, 2012), as large parts of the world’s population 
have been reduced to supernumeraries or excess population whose labor is not required for 
the global economy. While such processes are today occurring on a global level, they are 
rooted in changes and disruptions caused by the accumulation of capital. Under capitalism, 
as Marx explained, there was a “constant transformation of a part of the working population 
into unemployed or semi-employed ‘hands.’”  (1992, p. 786) With the upturning of rural 
populations through the “primitive accumulation” of early agrarian capitalism, there 
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occurred a growth of surplus labor in towns and cities (Wood, 2002). The existence of 
unemployed people–living in misery—serves to discipline and check the working class. 
Marx described this as a “reserve army of labor”, which creates downward pressure on 
wages and served as a threat to waged laborers, allowing for capital to further exploit labor 
and grow through the appropriation of labor power. As Robinson (2004) and others have 
argued, new waves of primitive accumulation (and the mobilization of new reserve armies 
of labor), with the disruption of rural and poor populations, have continued throughout the 
history of capitalism. 
Whereas during earlier periods of capitalism, higher volumes of workers were often 
required, in the contemporary period, the rate of constant/variable capital has required fewer 
and fewer workers (Braveman, 1998). This trend has intensified further through the era of 
globalization with highly advanced technology and new organizational forms. Mass 
unemployment and underemployement has been normalized (Standing, 2014). Through the 
closing decades of the 20th century and into the 21st century, the phenomenon of flexible 
accumulation has spread around the world. Harvey defines flexible accumulation as “new 
systems of production and marketing, characterized by the more flexible labour processes 
and markets, of geographical mobility and rapid shifts in consumption practices” (Harvey, 
1991: 124). This phenomenon has intensified as a part of the globalized economy as labor 
power itself has been reconfigured and incorporated into transnational value chains 
(Robinson, 2014; Struna, 2009) 
In today’s global era, we can see how vast new pools of surplus labor in regions 
around the world have formed, including within the Caribbean. This has occurred as people 
from every level of society have become to different degrees interconnected with the global 
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economy: even the most remote areas in the region, such as impoverished rural communities 
in Haiti, have been targeted by foreign NGO and donor projects to integrate them into more 
intensified market relations (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2012). One growing trend has been for 
governments and supranational organizations to facilitate the involvement of lower income 
populations into marketized relations, such as with remittances, but also through other 
dynamics such as with land tenure, which, as Howard (2015) points out, has resulted in 
higher rates of debt. 
For those structurally unemployed or underemployed there exists conditions of 
misery, uncertainty, constant stress, and pressure to search out other possibilities. 
Undertaking what are often very difficult or dangerous circumstances for themselves and 
their families, migrants “export” themselves, selling their labor power as a “commodity”. 
Pools of surplus labor in regions such as the Caribbean have come to be “marketed” 
worldwide as a commodity. A truly global process: from the Caribbean, to South Asia, to 
the Philippines, and Central America, elites and their functionaries are promoting the 
cheapest maquiladora workers, the lowest wage janitors, or the most dedicated and 
experienced nannies or nurses (Rodriguez, 2010). The exportation of labor has become a 
transnational process, where labor is compelled to link into the global economy. Emigration 
has thus grown tremendously in the global phase of capitalism and has become specifically 
linked to the global economy. A good deal has been written on the rise of the transnational 
migration, global diasporas, and of the transnational family, with populations dispersed 
across national borders and living through a web of connections, entailing multiple gendered 
and racialized class dimensions (Parrenas, 2005; Matthews, 2013; Osuna, 2015; Thai, 2014). 
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The ways in which poor people are compelled to export their labor must be seen in 
light of the gendered and racialized nature of class society in the global era (Marable, 2009; 
Eisenstein, 2005; Mies, 1986). Here it is important furthermore to note that the exportation 
of labor from the Caribbean has occurred at a volume higher than any other region 
worldwide, a trend now for several decades (Deere et al., 1990).  Faced often with chronic 
poverty, widespread unemployment, and underemployment, Caribbean peoples – especially 
women – have engaged in high rates of emigration (Ho, 1999, p. 48). In fact, few Caribbean 
families have not experienced the departure of friends or family members.  Scholars have 
shown that migratory patterns have varied for different strata of Caribbean society. While 
elites and upwardly mobile groups tend to migrate as entire family units and usually settle 
permanently, women from lower-income backgrounds often migrate alone and frequently 
pave the way for other family members to migrate (Ibid, p. 39). This process entails many 
contradictions, such as the undermining of traditional forms of child rearing (Ibid, p. 48) or 
as many emigrants maintain a “sense of loss, displacement, exile, and alienation resulting 
from the destabilizing effects of capitalism” (Ibid, p. 51).  
Migrants from the Caribbean region, such as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Jamaica, and Puerto Rico, make up one of the largest groups of migrants to North America 
(as Canadian government and U.S. Census Bureau data shows). As Niimi and Özden 
observe, “Even if Mexico and the Central American countries tend to top the ranking of 
migrants in absolute terms, the small Caribbean islands clearly dominate the migration 
charts when we look at migration flows in relation to each country’s population” (Niimi & 
Özden, 2008, p. 56). Large diaspora communities from the Caribbean have come to exist in 
Europe and Canada. A Canadian 2001 census, for example, found that the number of 
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Canadian residents that identified as Jamaicans numbered 211,000, with 82,000 as Haitians, 
60,000 as West Indians, 52,000 as Guyanese, and 50,000 as Trinidadians (Monzon & 
Tudakovic, 2004: 6). Over recent decades there has been an uptick in the number of intra-
Caribbean emigration and Caribbean emigration to parts of Latin America (World Bank 
Databank; Nurse, 2006). These new diaspora populations not only make return visits and 
communicate with family in their homelands, but they also take part in economic 
interactions, with remittances as the most important among these.   
 
Transnational Remittances, the Appropriation of Redistributed Value, and Time-
Space Compression 
In a literal or geographic sense, the remittance industry redistributes value as 
someone in one part of the planet sends a portion of his or her income to someone living in 
another area.  By controlling chains of the distribution of this value, capitalists then extract 
value from mostly lower income people who in turn often resist this exploitation by finding 
alternative uncontrolled or illicit routes for transferring goods and money. We can see this in 
regard to the remittance industry where TNCs charge fees or commissions to send money 
transfers to individuals in other countries, and in turn, many people attempt to find 
alternative routes, such as transferring money across borders through informal channels. 
In addition to transnational capital capturing the wealth of workers, the remittance 
industry also constitutes a separation of the site where wages are earned with the site of 
wage-generated consumption. Throughout the history of capitalism, as dominant groups 
have sought to increase the turnover time of capital accumulation, technological changes 
have been used to speed things up and reduce the friction of distance. The faster the rate of 
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movement, the faster the rate of capital flow, and the more profit that can be made. Only in 
recent decades, in the era of global capitalism, has this dynamic existed in such an intensive, 
rapid, and wide-scale manner. There has been a time-space compression, which Harvey 
(1991) argues has occurred through the speeding up of the circulation of capital alongside a 
speeding up of social life in general which together have reduced the significance of place as 
an absolute limit to social reproduction. Reducing the turnover time of capital thus becomes 
a crucially important aspect of the global era. However, we must not overemphasize the role 
of technology in these phenomena, as human agency and changes within society have 
played a central role. Also, all of this does not mean that “place” no longer matters, but 
rather that processes that take place across frontiers through new functionally integrated 
ways alter how space and geography are implicated in material and social production. 
The speeding up of material and social life, with an increasing cross-border 
functional integration of many processes, entails major impacts on how societies are 
structured and organized, and on how value is produced and distributed. For example, as 
other scholars have argued, the dependence on the distribution of remittances can fragment 
local communities and pacify struggle (Garni & Weyher, 2013). Scholars have documented 
how racial disparities exist in the flow of remittances (Cabezas, 2009, p. 80). Across rural 
communities and urban centers of the Caribbean, some of the barest essentials have often 
been purchased through the emigrant remittances sent home. Faced with high 
unemployment and lack of opportunity, many have become dependent on remittances. 
Yet as a dialectical process, this redistribution of value creates objective linkages and 
networks between people living in different areas. Does this, along with many other 
processes, create the conditions through which transnational relations among working and 
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popular classes can form (Struna, 2009)? It remains to be seen how these contradictory 
dynamics of capitalist globalization will yield new avenues of working class organization 
and solidarity, or help to build global consciousness. To understand the nature of these 
contradictory relations and their particular forms I turn now to examine their contours in 
parts of the Caribbean. 
 
Case Studies: The Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica 
 The transnational remittance market has spread worldwide, taking up what are often 
similar market strategies and patterns, though affected by numerous particularities of course. 
Caribbean nations and their societies have different profiles and background, and economic 
conditions as well as state policies at different times have greatly impacted migration. Early 
on it was the 1965 U.S. Immigration Act that began easing barriers to visas and other kinds 
of restrictions for Caribbean migrants, as well as admitting refugees and asylum seekers 
(Hernández, 2002).  
In the 1980s, Dominican emigration—and to a larger extent Haitian emigration—
accelerated due to economic crises on the island and the decline of the sugar industry, and as 
economic opportunities existed abroad and became more apparent with the rise of 
globalization and more interconnected diaspora networks. Rising internal emigration within 
the Caribbean also occurred, as with the rising number of Haitian workers migrating to the 
Dominican Republic, some of whom therein also partake in the sending remittances. 
Changing economic conditions also altered the kinds of work and conditions faced by 
migrant laborers. As one OECD report explained, this period “witnessed a reduction in the 
importance of sugar production in the Dominican economy, encouraging many Haitian 
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immigrants to m2ove to other sectors including construction, trade, manufacture and 
domestic service” (OECD Development Centre, 2009, p. 234).  
In the global era, the population of the Dominican Republic became an important 
source of emigrant labor in areas of the U.S. and Puerto Rico. Interestingly, the Dominican 
Republic has had a higher rate of female emigration as compared with some nearby 
countries (Sirkeci et al., 2012, p. 85), reflecting the deepening of gendered forms of exported 
labor within the country (Mies, 1986). A number of scholarly studies in recent years have 
looked at gendered labor and migration patterns emerging from the Caribbean (Condon, 
1998). Just as the out-migration of Dominicans and Haitians intensified, the Caribbean 
diasporic community grew in its significance, especially in terms of remittances. Seeking to 
support or remain connected with families and others in their country of origin, it has 
become common for emigrants sought to send back goods or money transfers. As we have 
seen, concurrent with this, new technology and organizations have developing that could 
facilitate and profit off of the rapid transfer these flows. 
Similar to many other countries at the time, TNCs began expanding into the 
Dominican Republic in the 1990s. By the 2000s, money transfers passing through the 
transnational remittance industry accounted for more than 7% of GDP, with an estimated 
10% of families receiving them (Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas de la República 
Dominicana, 2002). This data suggests that remittances are now fundamental to the nation, 
as its society and economy are integrated ever deeper into transnational dynamics. 
As researchers explain: for lower income populations especially, remittances have 
become vital for sustaining demand, stabilizing the economy during downturns, and 
mitigating the effects of low wage levels and weak social safety nets (Ondetti, 2012). The 
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remittance relation thus has become a key structural feature of the global society. Since 
1990, the Dominican Republic has experienced a large growth in remittance inflows 
reflecting the significant number of Dominican laborers that have moved abroad. 
Remittances increased from $0.8 billion in 1995 to $3.7 billion in 2013 (OECD 
Development Centre, 2009, p. 236). OECD researchers explain, “Following nearly three 
decades of large-scale emigration to the United States, transnational ties – including but not 
limited to remittances – have solidified an identity among the Dominicans” through new 
political, cultural, and social dimensions (OECD Development Centre, 2009, p. 236).  
In the Dominican Republic, the major transnational remittances corporations, 
Western Union and MoneyGram, largely operate through local agents (Suki, 2004). In 
addition, as Suki (2004: 17) explains, “Dominican ‘corridor’ specialists such as La Nacional, 
Quisqueyana, BHD Corp. and Cibao Express exist because of the concentration of the 
Dominican community in New York City and the tri-state area (New York, New Jersey and 
Connecticut). In many cases, the same company owns both the remitting side of the 
transaction and the distributing agent.” While these “Dominican corridor” remittance 
companies have profited from their special linkages with Dominican diaspora communities 
in New York and New Jersey, they are also interconnected with global finance and banking 
interests (Suki, 2004).  
The expansion in remittances is reflected in Dominican state policies toward 
emigrants, with policies favoring the diaspora’s investment and economic interaction in their 
homeland. Underscoring the importance that Dominican state technocrats assign to 
economic linkages with the diaspora, in 1994 a constitutional amendment recognized dual 
nationality, in 1997 the right to vote was extended to overseas Dominicans, and in 2010 the 
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Dominican constitution created overseas congressional seats.  Figure 3 below showcases the 
importance of remittances also on a local level, documenting the spending patterns of 
remittance receiving communities in the Dominican Republic (OECD Development Centre, 
2009, p. 236). 
Figure 3: Principal Use of Remittances in the Dominican Republic, 2004 (Percentage of 
total current expenditures) 
 
Source: Suki, 2004. 
While the Haitian emigrant population grew tremendously in the latter part of the 
20th century, especially in the United States, Canada, and France, it was not until the latter 
part of the 1990s that the reverse flow of remittances sent to Haiti began to grow rapidly. 
Whereas transnational remittance corporations had permeated the Caribbean region in the 
early 1990s, they lagged behind in Haiti due in part to the instability caused by the 1991 
coup d’etat. After the constitutionally elected government returned in 1995, the country’s 
economic situation improved slowly (though was soon again plunged into political tumult 
with another coup in 2004 and then hit by a massive earthquake in 2010). Even under these 
conditions the remittance market in the country began to expand, going from $108 million in 
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inflows in 1995, to around $672 million in 2001, to $1 billion in 2006, to nearly $2 billion in 
2012 (Orozco, 2006, pp. 5-6; IDB, 2012, p. 20). Compared with other important macro-
economic indicators, a large swath of the country’s population has become dependent on 
remittances for their livelihood. Consequently, newly enforced taxes on remittances are 
highly unpopular among Haitians (Haiti Support Group, 2013). 
The number of Haitian emigrants living in the Dominican Republic has also risen 
rapidly in recent decades, which by 2005 was estimated to number at least 600,000 (Orozco, 
2006). In recent years, Dominican state elites have enacted xenophobic and racist state 
policies meant to further securitize and contain Haitian emigrants as supra-exploited 
workers. It is useful here to see recent developments in the context of historical patterns of 
labor repression in the country. Past authoritarian regimes in the Dominican Republic 
decades ago developed apparatuses to repress Haitian migrants, even as Dominican 
policymakers undertook bilateral agreements (convenios) with the Haitian government to 
allow entrance to Haitian immigrants for specified times. This even occurred during periods 
when the Dominican Republic faced labor shortages for its large sugar plantations. Yet, as a 
result of long-term emigration patterns, permanent settlements called bateyes gradually 
developed.  In spite of this, in recent years new repressive state policies have meant to 
further repress these migrant workers, such as the 2013 ruling of the country’s supreme 
court that revoked the citizenship of Dominican-born children of unauthorized migrants 
dating back generations (Garcia, 2013). These new state policies have cast further repression 
upon and diminished the rights of super-exploited Haitian emigrant workers and their 
communities. 
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Scholarly studies have examined the changing networks that have emerged between 
emigrant communities and their families abroad, linked by family visits, small investments, 
organizational connections, and communication over the telephone and Internet (Orozco, 
2006; Baldassar and Merla, 2013). A variety of cultural connections and hybrid phenomena 
have come about, all of which necessarily affect class relations. The lack of economic 
opportunities at home and the lure of economic prosperity abroad, alongside periods of 
instability and destabilization, have together shaped Haitian emigration trends. Similarly, job 
opportunities abroad and the increasing communication between domestic and diasporic 
populations have both promoted emigration.  
In this atmosphere, remittances form a vital material linkage that alters social 
relations, as they objectively link populations together through the cross-border 
redistribution of income. Yet remittances separate the earning of wages from the sites of 
wage-generated consumption. As with the cases of other emigrant and emigrant sending 
communities, this brings into question: how do remittances affect the social and class 
relations of receivers and senders? Some research suggests that as high as one in five 
households in Haiti have received remittances, with the average annual amount of these 
remittances nearing $2,000 (Orozco, 2006, p. 6). Researchers found that Haitians who sent 
remittances were predominately under the age of 40 and equally divided along the basis of 
gender. Since more banks and institutions that serve as agents of the major remittance 
companies are based in Haiti’s cities, rural communities in Haiti have far less access to 
withdrawing money transfers (Orozco, 2006, p. 1). 
Competition between remittance companies in Haiti has become intense. Many 
companies, as in other parts of the Caribbean, are subsidiaries of formal financial institutions 
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such as banks and building societies and often operate as local agents for major TNCs such 
as Western Union (Todoroki, et al, 2009). 
 In contrast to migratory patterns from Haiti, out-migration from Jamaica was for 
many decades geared toward Britain, but with Jamaica’s independence, a growing number 
of Jamaican emigrants exported their labor to North American markets. As of 1990, the U.S. 
census placed the total number of documented Jamaican-Americans at 435,025. A number 
of scholarly studies have traced the history and changing patterns of Jamaican migration 
(Hahamovitch, 2013; Matthews, 2013). Prior to 1990, Jamaica’s formal remittance market 
entailed the government postal services, commercial banks, and building societies. The 
penetration of transnational remittance corporations into the country in the early 1990s 
occurred concurrently with a growing Jamaican diaspora community. For example, 
Jamaican migrants who live in the U.S. has increased from 27,000 in 1960 to 576,000 in 
2000. In turn, this scenario represented an attractive investment opportunity for TNCs such 
as Western Union and MoneyGram.  
Western Union first began to operate in the country through a local agent in late 
1990. During this time, the company came to control a significant share of the formal 
remittance market around the world. Over time, new and older money transfer operators in 
Jamaica followed suit, seeking to operate as local agents for globally active remittance 
companies. A flood of transnationally oriented companies now target the diasporic markets. 
A study by the Bank of Jamaica explains:  
 
The duopolistic dominance of the Grace Kennedy-Western Union alliance 
[GKRS-WU], resulted in existing Commercial Banks and Building Societies 
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adopting aspects of their business model. As such, these institutions resorted 
to acting as agents for the international money transfer companies. By the end 
of October 2008 there were (12) remittance companies, (2) building societies 
and (1) commercial bank acting as agents on behalf of thirty (30) 
international money transfer companies. (McLean, 2008, p. 5) 
 
By the time of the Jamaican bank study, GKRS-WU, the local agent of Western 
Union, accounted for over 70% of remittance companies’ inflows and approximately 50% of 
the entire local remittance market in Jamaica. As one study explained, “this rapid increase is 
largely attributed to Western Union’s increased economies of scale attributable to its 
worldwide expansion in the number of agent locations as well as the introduction of 
electronic money transfer system” (McLean, 2008, p. 6). 
The other major player in the remittance market in Jamaica has been JNBS, which in 
2002 had nearly 9% of the remittance market in Jamaica, but by 2008 had increased to 
nearly 14%. JNBS’s success has been rooted in the significant growth of remittances sent 
back to Jamaica from the UK-based diaspora. Both companies have historic roots in the 
country, which allows transnational capitalist appropriation of a part of migrant workers 
income to operate under a local appearance. JNBS was originally founded in 1874, just over 
three decades after the abolition of slavery on the island. As the availability and potential 
profits from small, uncultivated and abandoned lands were surpassed by the growth of the 
labor force and larger plantations (Bakan, 1990, p. 18), institutions such as JNBS were 
important in the process of reconstituting segments of the lower classes as wage dependent.  
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Regulation of remittances did not begin in Jamaica until the 21st century, following 
the events of September 11, 2001 in the U.S. and the reemphasis of “global best practice” 
requirements by the financial action task force (FATF). The Jamaican state extended these 
statutory obligations to the remittance market in 2002. With the passage of amendments to 
the Bank of Jamaica Act in February 2004, Jamaica then established a regulatory regime that 
required remittance services to initially be approved by the Minister of Finance. These 
reforms thus complied with the new standards being pushed by a variety of transnationally 
oriented elites with the aim of standardizing a part of the accumulation process in different 
nations. The regulations resulted in a few smaller companies exiting the market or merging 
their operations with larger counterparts, while the number of global remittance corporations 
that utilize local agencies increased (McLean, 2008, p. 10). By 2007, remittances were 
around 15.3% of Jamaica’s GDP (11), approximately equal to earnings from tourism. 
Remittance flows also averaged more than twice the amount of foreign direct investment 
inflows. By all accounts, remittances have come to represent a major foreign currency 
source for Jamaica, as well as for Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and other nations in the 
Caribbean. 
 
Advancement of Money Transfers: From Telegram to Telephone to Computer  
Transferring money changed significantly through Internet technology and the 
formation of TNCs. Agents around the world and instantaneous domestic and cross-border 
financial services have allowed for immediate and widespread individual access to banking 
and money transfer. Utilizing computer technology in 1989, Western Union introduced its 
quick collect system in which creditors could promptly secure transfers both inside and 
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outside of the U.S. as well. In recent decades, Western Union shifted its business model to 
become the premier global money transfer company. With declining profits and mounting 
debts, Western Union slowly began to divest itself of telecommunications-based assets 
beginning in the early 1980s. Backing deregulation in the U.S. and in other countries, 
Western Union began expanding outside of the U.S. and European markets. Reinventing 
itself as a global brand, Western Union officials set up agent operations internationally to 
become “the fastest way to send money worldwide.” By 1980, Western Union’s revenue 
from domestic money transfers exceeded telegram service revenue for the first time. Then, 
in 1989, it introduced rapid international money transfers.  Already by the late 1980s and 
into the early 1990s (at the time of a savings and loan crisis and other events in this 
conjuncture), the company was in dire economic straits, which ultimately led to a 
declaration of bankruptcy in 1994 and companywide restructuring, after which it dropped its 
telegram service and became “thoroughly revamped” and geared toward global financial 
transactions and money transfers. Whereas “The company’s message-sending business had 
become a part of U.S. culture.. its corporate roots became a thing of the past when all of its 
telecommunications businesses were divested during the reorganization. Once stripped of 
these businesses, Western Union was left to concentrate exclusively on financial services…” 
(Covell, 2003) 
In 1995, Western Union was acquired by First Data Corporation, and in 2000 it 
launched its website, providing “fast, convenient ways to send money online” worldwide. 
Over these years and into the 21st century, the company grew extraordinarily. In 2006, 
Western Union became an independent company and began trading on the New York Stock 
Exchange. Its cross-border business-to-business activities expanded greatly, such as with its 
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acquisition of Custom House in 2009 and its acquisition of Travelex Global Business 
Payments in 2011 (Western Union, 2014). Wide arrays of TNCs and global investors are 
now major stockowners in the company. For example, hedge fund magnate Warren Buffet 
owns $10 million in shares. Companies with larger shareholdings in Western Union include 
Schroders, a London-based transnational asset management company; the Los Angeles-
based Capital Research Global Investors, one of the largest global investment firms with 
around $1 trillion under management; Vanguard, which boasts of being the world’s largest 
mutual fund company; and, the U.S.-based Fidelity Investment which administers and 
manages trillions in assets (Fidelity website, 2014). The list goes on, with many of the 
largest stockowners being U.S.- and UK-based financial firms. These firms in turn have 
stockholders from around the world.   
By 2006, Western Union was managing 18% of money transfers globally. By 2013, 
Western Union was operating over the Internet, telephone, and from more than 115,000 
ATMs and over 515,000 agent locations in 200 countries and territories, with around 9,600 
employees.1 With its economy of scale stretching worldwide, Western Union has secured a 
competitive advantage in the industry. As their website states, their business model “aims to 
move money anytime, anywhere and anyway our customers choose” (Western Union, 
2014). The dynamics of Western Union have changed over the course of its history, from the 
leading U.S. telegraph company in the latter 19th century and much of the 20th century, to a 
company that repositioned and altered its business model with the emergence of 
globalization and the associated technological and organizational improvements. As the data 
below shows, Western union has gone from revenues of $399.5 million in 1970 to $5.664 
billion in 2012 (though not adjusted for inflation.) 
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Figure 4: Revenue and net income (in millions) of Western Union
 
Source: Company tax records obtained by the author through the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 
 
The largest competitor with Western Union has been MoneyGram International Inc., 
which was founded in 1940 to process money orders. By the late 1980s, MoneyGram was 
rapidly expanding its international activities. In 1988, Viad Corp, the parent company of 
Travelers Express, purchased Money Gram, only to then spin this off as a publicly traded 
company (MoneyGram, 2010). As of 2013, MoneyGram had 293,000 agent locations in 197 
countries, employing more than 2,350 people around the world. As the below data shows, 
MoneyGram’s revenues expanded rapidly throughout the final years of the 20th century and 
early years of the 21st century. Even after declining massively during the period of the global 
financial crisis less than a decade ago, MoneyGram has again begun to increase its revenues. 
Substantial restructuring in recent years has not hindered its growth, and as of 2013, the 
company maintained a strong position – cash and cash equivalents of $2.23 billion and net 
receivable of $767.7 million. MoneyGram achieved these numbers while it continued to pay 
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off large loans and even expanded into numerous other geographic areas to operate through 
“domestic” agents (MGI Analyst Report, 2014). 
 
Figure 5: Revenue and net income (in millions) of MoneyGram, 1997-2012
 
Source: Company tax records obtained by the author through the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 
 
In recent decades, a number of new tech firms have entered the remittance market. 
The most well known of these is Boom Financial Inc., which was founded in 2008, and the 
Silicon Valley-based Xoom Corp, which was founded in 2001. These major firms, along 
with other factors, have caused downward pressure on commissions in the industry (MGI-
Analyst Report, 2014). While Xoom has become active in 30 countries, Boom, has grown to 
reach 130 countries. These corporations operate mainly through local agents, who are not as 
easily accessible as Western Union or MoneyGram yet often provide lower surcharges. 
Without as many agent locations, these companies also heavily rely upon Internet 
technology. Although the revenues of these companies are small compared to Western 
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Union and MoneyGram, they have good potential to grow, as the data below shows the rise 
of Xoom’s revenues from $26.2 million in 2009 to $122.2 million in 2013. 
 
 Figure 6: Revenue and net income (in thousands) of Xoom, 2009-2013 
 
Source: Company tax records obtained by the author through the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 
 
As tax documents from these companies show, directors and executive officers of 
these transnational remittance corporations have worked for a host of other TNCs active in 
finance, remittances, resource extraction, and other major industries.2 The owners and 
managers of the transnational remittance corporations, namely Western Union and its major 
competitors, form part of a tiny capitalist elite that increasingly competes on a transnational 
level (Peetz & Murray, 2012; Robinson, 2014).  
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TNC Penetration of Caribbean Money Transfers 
Through the era of global capitalism, TNCs and financial institutions have penetrated 
national markets around the world. These transnational enterprises benefit both from 
economies of scale, which is the cost advantages they obtain due to size, throughput (the 
amount of material or items passing through a system), and from the deregulation and 
privatization of national markets by elites operating through various state apparatuses. They 
have been successful at incorporating huge populations into new market relations, including 
within the Caribbean and its diaspora, such as with the remittances services of TNCs instead 
of traditional banks. Earlier more static, less accessible, and often more state linked banking 
systems came to conflict with transnational realities. The social standpoints and immigration 
status of workers using these services also often prevents them from using conventional 
banking. The exportation of labor and the reverse flow of remittances have thus become 
fundamental to the Caribbean’s relationship to global capitalism. The cross-border money 
transfers of the remittance TNCs now surpass the money transfers conducted through bank 
branches. They are even larger than official development assistance as well as private debt 
and portfolio equity flows. Remittances represent a third of GDP for many small countries 
such as Haiti (Sirkeci et al., 2012, p. 5).  
Many state elites, meanwhile, have sought to manage the exportation of emigrant 
labor in ways that benefit transnational capital and ensure their own social reproduction in a 
manner that is linked with the global economy (Rodriguez, 2010). Often in concert with 
transnational capital, policymakers often promote remittances as vital parts of their 
economies and global integration. As Segovia (2002) has argued, remittances deposited by 
their receivers in privatized local banks have helped local state elites gain loans from 
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international financial institutions. As Ho (1999, p. 34) observes, “postcolonial Caribbean 
governments contribute to the transnational traffic by treating immigration as a safety valve 
for surplus labor and by emphasizing capital rather than human resources in their 
development plans.”  
While local businesses and banks still play a role in the remittance of money, often 
serving as a pay-out or pick-up location for the receiver or sender, they essentially serve as 
agents for the much larger TNCs that carry out the actual cross-border transfer. For instance, 
in the Caribbean the new transnational remittance industry now dominates the older bank 
money transfer systems.  This contrasts with the years prior to the 1990s, when the 
transnational remittance industry had not taken shape and traditional banks conducted 
transfers through a slow and cumbersome process. In the Dominican Republic, for example, 
only 1% of money transfers go through commercial banks, while 92% of total remittances 
pass through licensed money transfer companies.3 These licensed money transfer companies 
are either TNCs, such as Western Union and MoneyGram, or operate as the local agents of 
TNCs.    
While at first glance, local agents may appear to be locally-oriented, they are in fact 
deeply integrated with circuits of global capital accumulation. For example, the Jamaica 
National Building Society (JNBS) has operated as an agent of MoneyGram since 1991 
(JNBS, 2010). Originally founded in 1874 with deep colonial connections, JNBS still ranks 
among Jamaica’s largest financial institutions. In recent decades, the company has realigned 
itself in the globally interspersed market through various rapid money transactions. JNBS 
capitalizes on the Jamaican population in the global diaspora, serving as a valuable partner 
for MoneyGram. 
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In another example, in the Dominican Republic, the company Caribe Express is the 
local agent of XOOM. In 2013, as the author found firsthand, Caribe Express charged a 5% 
commission on remittances sent through Xoom, whereas Western Union charged 8% 
approximately. Yet the number of Caribe Express locations was far fewer than those of 
Western Union. Although Western Union usually charges a higher percentage than its 
competitors, its agents are more accessible. In addition, Western Union far surpasses its 
competitors in its name recognition and volume of remittances. 
 
 
Table 2: Migrant Remittance Inflows (US$ million), Caribbean countries, 1970 to 2013 
 
 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Barbados 4 9 9 8 38 
Dominica .. .. 9 11 14 
Dominican Republic 25 28 183 242 315 
Grenada .. .. .. .. 18 
Haiti .. 59 106** 96 .. 
Jamaica .. .. 96 146 229 
St. Kitts and Nevis .. .. 1 1 19 
St. Lucia .. .. .. .. 16 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
.. .. .. .. 16 
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Trinidad and Tobago .. 3 6 3 3 
  1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 
Barbados 61 115 94 82 86 
Dominica 13 16 22 23 23 
Dominican Republic 839 1,839 2,719 3,430 3,706 
Grenada 38 46 27 28 31 
Haiti 108* 578 986 1,474 1,715 
Jamaica 653 892 1,762 2,026 2,259 
St. Kitts and Nevis 20 27 30 47 45 
St. Lucia 23 26 27 29 30 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
17 22 22 29 31 
Trinidad and Tobago 32 38 92 91 133 
Source: World Bank staff calculation based on data from IMF Balance of Payments 
Statistics database and data releases from central banks, national statistical agencies, 
and World Bank country desks. *This data is from Orozco, 2006.  
 
The above World Bank data shows the massive increase of remittance flows in 
recent decades.4 In fact, cultural and social expectations of reciprocity among senders and 
receivers appear to make the flows resistant to “moral” risk considerations present in other 
financial flows. So much so that remittances are less volatile in relation to other foreign 
exchange earnings. World Bank researchers have thus argued they serve as an important 
cushion for local economies and communities. Sirkeci et al. explain, “At the national level, 
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remittances help offset current account deficits and shore up international reserves” (2012, 
p. xv). However, remittances can also add to the depreciation of local currency (Sirkeci et 
al., 2012, p. 5). Remittances also serve to perpetuate an increasingly unequal and 
unsustainable global system, with its own novelties and contradictions, as I discuss below in 
the conclusion. 
 
Conclusion: Emigrant Remittances and the Accumulation of Transnational Capital 
through Redistributed Value 
Through the era of globalization, alongside the major technological and 
organizational advancements and the increased movement of skilled and unskilled 
emigrants, the remittance industry and the exportation of labor have undergone unparalleled 
growth. New emigration patterns have resulted in a reverse flow of remittances that have 
become a major pillar of the global economy, especially for lower income regions. Indeed, 
the magnitude of money transfers stretches beyond the official remittance market, as official 
data collected on money transfers does not include other forms of “in-kind” remittances, 
such as goods or money shipped or brought in person to relatives abroad or by “mules” as 
people that are paid to transport goods or money.5 While a variety of survival and 
supplemental strategies have been utilized by working people in the global era, remittances 
have been among the most important. Yet this has also led to ensuring a potentially 
problematic reality, which Cabezas describes as “dependence on outside relationships to 
generate an extra cash flow for families or for household survival” (2009, p. 66). While 
occurring as a form of transnational social integration, the objective relation of remittance 
sender and remittance receiver leads to what Garni and Weyher (2013) describe as a  
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“mystified” class relationship, where there occurs a separation between the site of waged 
labor and waged generated consumption. Furthermore, it is through this relation that 
transnational capital and transnationally oriented state elites appropriate part of the 
redistributed value of emigrant labor once it is channeled through the remittance industry. 
As dominant groups profit in this uneven and ferocious cycle, they seek to “capitalize on the 
alienation of humanity and their primary response to that alienation—migration and the 
remittances it generates” (Garni & Weyher, 2013, p. 66). State elites meanwhile have come 
to depend upon such transnational processes for their own social reproduction (Rodriguez, 
2010; Sprague, 2012b). In a sense, dominant groups have been able to profit doubly, 
capitalizing on the surplus labor of emigrant workers as well as the redistributed value 
through their remittances.  
Large swaths of population, especially in regions such as the Caribbean, have 
become structurally unemployed and face a relative absence of productive relations. In turn, 
remittances serve an even more important function for individual and community survival. 
While they gain new objective relations that are transnational in nature, these communities 
develop new dependencies, which in turn can achieve a pacifying effect (Garni & Weyher, 
2013). Although some may skimp by with remittances sent from family members abroad, 
communities in poor regions such as the Caribbean still suffer from high levels of 
unemployment and under-employment. Remittance-receiving communities survive yet 
while increasingly separated from actual processes of material production. As populations 
undergo disruption brought on by restructuring associated with the global economy, 
remittance flows reduce the local social costs for adjustment and promote market relations. 
In an economic sense, states can utilize remittances to ease the state’s disengagement from 
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social investment. Remittances thus serve as “‘safety nets’ that replace governments and 
fixed employment in the provision of economic security” (Robinson, 2003, p. 208).  Not 
only does this “free up” the state from its responsibilities, remittance flows also, as Garni 
and Weyher observe, help to dissipate social tensions as they provide a small lifeline to 
struggling lower-income populations. Among other regions, the Caribbean has witnessed a 
complete transformation of the way in which money is transferred across borders. As the 
Caribbean diaspora increased exponentially over the latter part of the 20th century and into 
the 21st century, this precipitated significant increases in remittance flows back into the 
region. Transnational capital has in turn sought to profit from facilitating this phenomenon 
and appropriating a portion of the redistributed value of remittance flows from the working 
poor. The contradictory nature of this phenomenon will be undoubtedly bound up in the 
future ways in which global and Caribbean societies develop. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Notes 
1 This information is from the website: Transnatiole, available online at: 
http://www.transnationale.org/companies/western_union.php 
2 See for example Moneygram International Inc, 2012. 
3 This is according to data released by the Dominican agency ENHOGAR  (La 
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples). 
4 While remittances outflows from these countries were much smaller than inflows, 
some countries such as Jamaica, Haiti, and the Bahamas all had sizeable outflows in 2012.  
These were $232 million, $310 million, and $140 million from Haiti, Jamaica, and the 
Bahamas, respectively. 
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5 In Jamaica the term “barrel children” has come into existence, to describe children 
who “survive on barrels of goodies shipped by migrants parents chiefly from the United 
States” (Pollard, 2005: 24). 
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Chapter IV 
Export Processing and Globally Competitive Production in the Caribbean 
 
A key part of the globalization process has been the creation of demarcated zones of 
production for the global market. In the Caribbean by the 1970s and 1980s, these spaces 
began to serve as platforms for new relations of production associated with the globalizing 
economy. As one researcher elaborates, these new productive spaces “in recent decades . . . 
have been used by many developing countries to help manage a larger strategic transition 
from a highly protected, inward-oriented domestic economic policy, to a liberalized, 
globally integrated, outward-oriented domestic economy” (Lang, 2010, p. 7). These new 
productive spaces, which came to be known initially as Free Trade Zones (FTZs) but are 
now more widely known as Export Processing Zones (EPZs), were formed as specific-
locations where foreign and local industrial tenants could receive special tax and trade 
privileges so as to produce competitively for the global market. While capital came to move 
more freely through these new zones, these locations also served as sites to exploit and take 
advantage of local pools of underdeveloped labor on a major scale. By promoting low wage 
compliant labor forces as a “comparative advantage,” transnationally oriented state elites 
and capitalists have used EPZs as a mechanism to reshape and restructure productive 
relations as an integrated part of the global economy. Through such dynamics laboring 
groups around the world have become objectively linked through global chains of 
production. Horizontally integrated and geographically diffuse global production networks 
have spread rapidly through EPZs; wherein the labor power of workers is incorporated into 
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transnational value chains, which in turn are controlled by transnational corporations 
(TNCs). 
EPZs were meant initially (according to policymakers at the time) to help alleviate 
the problem of unemployment and generate foreign exchange (Lang, 2010, p. 14), but over 
the proceeding decades they have become part of a deeper developmental model that 
reshapes societies and economies, orienting them toward globally competitive markets and 
enriching a small number of capitalists and elites. As spaces within national states linked 
into global chains of production, they serve as a “form of export promotion, to liberalize and 
jumpstart their economies and as a way to enter the global economy through international 
trade” (Virgill, 2009, p. 2). The purpose of the EPZ has been thus to “invigorate economies’ 
exporting capabilities and capacity” (Virgill, 2009, p. 183), leading to increased TNC power 
sheltered from local state policies that could potentially uphold labor standads and local 
constituencies. Business operations within EPZs, for example, are extended preferential tax 
treatment, preferential duty treatment, a liberal regulatory environment, enhanced physical 
infrastructure, direct subsidies, as well as other incentives such as export promotion services, 
and streamlined administration procedures for imports and exports.i  
While some EPZs in the Caribbean have succeeded in attracting investors during 
certain periods over recent decades, others have stagnated or lost industrial tenants when 
labor costs have risen or preferential market access has diluted. According to Moberg (2014, 
p. 2), some EPZs in the region have faced difficulties such as poor infrastructure quality, bad 
locations, insufficient zone size, inadequate roads, unreliable power supplies, congestion, 
inadequate maintenance, lack of effective advertisement to entice companies into the EPZ, 
poor policy coordination, lack of tax incentives, excessive bureaucracy, and labor 
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difficulties. EPZs are the production sites of roughly 20% of global trade in recent years (SZ 
Jug, 2013). As of 1987, there were 175 EPZs in 53 countries, yet, by 1995, there were 500 
EPZs in 73 countries (Schrank, 2001, p. 223), and by 2007 there were at least 3,000 EPZs in 
135 countries (Boyenge, 2007). Similarly, employment in EPZs grew from 22.5 million 
people employed in 1997 to 43 million people in 2003 (Sargent & Matthews, 2009). As of 
2008, EPZs were believed to account for $200 billion in global exports (FIAS, 2008). Near 
the turn of the century, furthermore, Mexico and the United States had the most EPZs 
worldwide, with 107 in the former and 213 in the latter (ILO, 1998). Meanwhile, China has 
become a center of global capitalist accumulation (Harris, 2009), and is now the largest site 
of EPZ production, benefiting from its advanced infrastructure and large, disciplined, low-
wage workforce (Fu & Gao, 2007).  Whereas nearly half of worldwide EPZ production 
takes place in these three countries, other regions such as the Caribbean have also seen a 
growth in the number of zones and continued attempts to deepen the export-processing 
model. 
The importance of the industrial sector for Caribbean economies increased 
throughout the 1970s, 80s, and into the early 90s. Between 1984 and 1990, industrial exports 
from Caribbean EPZs to the U.S. market grew from 22 to 50 percent of the total Caribbean 
exports to the U.S. (Klak, 1995, p. 298). Between 1976 and 1988, the per capita U.S. dollar 
value of industrial exports for eight Caribbean countries grew fourfold. Yet, in recent 
decades, the region has faced stiff global competition. The Dominican Republic, has been 
one of the most successful in integrating with the global capitalist economy, as the value 
added by the industrial sector was 21.92% of GDP in 1965 and by 1991 had grown to 
36.36% (Kushnir, 2013). However, with the rising importance of other economic sectors 
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(such as remittances, finance, tourism, and the service sector), the overall importance of 
industrial production for the region began to decline during the 1990s and into the new 
century. In Jamaica, for instance, the value added by the industrial sector was 37.11% of 
GDP in 1993 but had shrunk to 20.82% in 2012 (Kushnir, 2013). While Dominican EPZ 
production has grown faster than in Jamaica and much of the rest of the Caribbean, it has 
undergone difficulties in recent years, with the value added by the Dominican industrial 
sector dropping from 37.42% of GDP in 1998 to 31.17% in 2012 (Kushnir, 2013). As a 
reflection of these trends, the number of workers and companies active in Caribbean EPZs 
has fluctuated over recent decades. In some nations, such as in Jamaica and Haiti, EPZ 
manufacturing has declined or stagnated in recent years, whereas in other parts of the region, 
such as in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, EPZ production has gone through up 
and downs. Despite the earlier rise and more recent shrinkage of the sector, export 
processing remains a vital part of the region’s economy and policymakers’ plans for the 
future, as evidenced by the constant initiatives to expand and renew the sector. 
Not only large foreign-based TNCs are active in the region’s EPZ production. 
Locally based capitalists have also profited by operating as contractors, local agents, or 
distributors for TNCs. This underscores the broader reshaping of class society in recent 
years as local capitalist sectors integrate into transnational production networks. Through 
such processes of capitalist class integration across borders, leading Caribbean business 
leaders have become transnational capitalists themselves with global financial portfolios 
(and often business chains that stretch across the Caribbean and into other regions as well). 
As Robinson (2009, p. 103) explains: 
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These forms of participation have opened up space for local investors and 
small-scale entrepreneurs to integrate into transnational production chains. 
The industrial activity of transnational corporations (TNCs) generates 
demand for a host of suppliers as industrial production is increasingly 
fragmented and organized through networks of outsourcing and 
subcontracting. 
 
New regional forums and agreements have been vital for these integrative relations. 
State policymakers have facilitated these new regional forums in order to allow for 
industries to take continued advantage of tax breaks and poor labor standards. Heavy 
investments from national and supranational state apparatuses have sought continuously to 
stimulate EPZ operations. Throughout the formation of new economic forums, transnational 
capital has played a decisive role in crafting legislation: lobbying for, and in turn benefiting 
from, their adoption by state apparatuses. Novel and far-reaching policies have set up 
investment provision that eliminated many restrictions, performance requirements, and 
many domestic content laws.(Cox, 2008, p. 1537). In addition to EPZs being promoted by 
capital through new regional integration policies, they have also been promoted by states. 
The formation and expansion of EPZs is not only the product of local state elites, but also 
forms a part of the policies pursued by officials from the U.S., other states, and 
supranational institutions. Different institutions within national states and other agencies 
have served to internalize transnational governance patterns, operated by elites who have 
become transnationally-oriented over recent decades (Jayasuriya, 1999). State policymakers 
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over recent decades have come more and more to see transnational capital as a foremost 
source of investment and tax revenue.  
For the Caribbean, the first of the major economic forums, meant to deepen the 
region’s integration with the globalizing economy, was the Caribbean Basin Plan (CBI). 
Launched in 1982, it was facilitated by U.S. policymakers under the Reagan administration. 
The CBI sought to stave off alternative and revolutionary tendencies in the Caribbean, while 
deepening U.S. influence and the region’s integration into the globalizing economy. The 
CBI injected dollar loans (used largely to meet payments on existing debt), “free trade” 
regimes for a limited number of Caribbean exports, and a new set of tax breaks that were 
designed to attract the investment of U.S.-based multinational corporations. Interestingly, 
Haiti was the first state to accept the CBI, as it had “no genuinely national development 
program . . . to delay or modify the adoption of the latest U.S. sponsored economic 
initiative" (Manigat, 1997, p. 87). As other Caribbean states came under pressure, they soon 
signed onto the new economic forum. 
Although a select few have benefitted immensely through capital’s reorganization in 
the region, the vast majority of workers and communities connected with industries, such as 
those operating through EPZs, face precarious and low-income conditions. Yet with high 
levels of unemployment, many working people have few options. Those benefiting 
meanwhile include major transnational conglomerates as well as local factory owners who 
contract out with TNCs and the “emerging transnational class of intermediaries running EPZ 
promotion agencies” (Neveling, 2014, p. 194). By tethering their own social reproduction to 
global production networks, some such groups directly benefit from maintaining and 
expanding the export-processing model. Meanwhile, sales and marketing companies push 
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the “culture-ideology of consumerism” (Sklair, 2012), sustaining a consumer base for 
corporate branded commodities often produced in these low-wage facilities. It is important 
to note that these consumer groups no longer exist only in so-called developed nations, but 
in developing nations as well (Robinson, 2008). All the while, these processes occur 
alongside a heightened social alienation and exploitation of labor (Robinson, 2003). Next, I 
will look at how the EPZ model of development has undergone important changes over 
recent decades and how EPZs serve as a vital mechanism and integrative space for the re-
orientation of locally based capitalists toward transnational capitalist flows. 
 
Evolution of Export Processing in the Globalizing Caribbean  
Throughout the Caribbean’s colonial era, traditional export industries specialized in 
agricultural products such as sugar and tobacco.  In turn, various entry and exit points and 
warehouses existed where goods were stored and shipped. By the mid-20th century, 
agricultural output increased thanks to the advent of new industrial technology; this involved 
the development of high-yielding hybrid crops and new pesticides, herbicides, and 
fertilizers, and railroads that connected inland hubs and major ports. The highly exploitive 
relations of the rural economies of the Caribbean during this earlier phase of capitalism (the 
international phase of capitalism) have been well documented, such as in the documentary 
Bitter Cane (Arcelin, 1983). In the post-war period early U.S. attempts to develop low wage 
manufacturing in Puerto Rico were made by the Truman administration. Facilitated by the 
U.S. government, Puerto Rico’s political establishment under the Partido Popular 
Democrático abandoned import substitution policies and instead pushed for export-oriented 
development. Capital and state policymakers closely oversaw the new initiative (Neveling, 
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2014).ii A vast new set of experimental policies developed export manufacturing on the 
island by appealing to U.S. corporations: 
 
The Puerto Rican development corporation Fomento contracted the US 
consulting firm Arthur D. Little in order to convince mainland capitalists of 
the benefits of investments in Puerto Rico. Significant investment packages 
including tax and customs holidays, low rate leases of purpose built Fomento 
factories and so forth were advertised with a full-on marketing operation 
across the US-nationwide. Already in 1947, Textron, a rising giant in the era 
of mergers after 1945, relocated spinning mills to Puerto Rico and fired 
thousands of workers in the US northeast. Other US corporations like 
General Electrics for example would soon follow. The Truman 
administration used the immediate success of Puerto Rican development 
policies to advertise its Point Four development programme globally. 
Throughout the 1950s and even more so under the Alliance for Progress that 
the Kennedy administration introduced after the failed invasion in Cuba, 
thousands of officials from Third World countries were flown to Puerto Rico 
to visit zones of “modern manufacturing“ and learn how similar progress 
could be achieved. (Neveling, 2014, pp. 8-9) 
 
During the 1960s, similar EPZ models began to develop in US-allied nations in the 
developing world, such as in Taiwan and in Northern Mexico (Neveling, 2014, p. 9). By the 
1970s, the Caribbean was an opportune location for manufacturing with its surplus of cheap 
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labor and geographic proximity to the North American consumer market. Facilitated largely 
by U.S.-based multinational corporations, manufacturing in the region began to rapidly 
expand.   
Initially, EPZs took the form of industrial estates that frequently occupied 100 
hectares or less. For the most part, other than functioning as a mechanism for exploiting 
local labor, they were highly isolated from the domestic societies where they operated, 
specifically in terms of geography, specialized regulations, and sparse linkages to local 
economies (Lang, 2010, pp. 12-13). During the 1970s and 80s, state officials closely 
controlled who could operate in the zones. Focused on industrial production, businesses in 
the EPZs engaged primarily in light manufacturing and processed apparel, textiles, and 
footwear for export to foreign markets. Lower income populations in developing nations 
were traditionally excluded from the consumption of EPZ products (Lang, 2010, pp. 12-13).  
By the early 1980s, both import substitution industrialization and traditional export 
industries underwent significant difficulties, as states in the developing world faced rising 
debts and financial pitfalls. As a response to these economic instabilities, in nations across 
the developing world there occurred a trend toward expanding non-traditional exports and 
the development of EPZs. EPZs grew as manufacturing hubs and attracted global investors, 
through their provision of “low-cost production, easy market access, and a business climate 
conducive to foreign direct investment” (Long, 1987, p. 64). Suiting both the interests of 
transnationally-oriented capitalists and transnationally-oriented state elites, EPZs have since 
become an increasingly central plank of developmental strategy. Not just in the Global 
South, EPZs are now becoming linked forward and backwards into local national markets. 
As the data below illustrates, Puerto Rico (closely integrated for more than a Century with 
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the U.S. market) is by far the most industrialized of the Caribbean islands. The Dominican 
Republic, which in recent decades has developed a robust network of EPZs, now has the 
region’s second largest industrial sector. 
 
Industrial production and ratings of industry in the Caribbean, 2013 
Countries 
Industry, billion 
dollars (total: 90.4) 
Share, of 
100%  
   Puerto Rico 50.6 56 
Dominican Republic 14.5 16 
Trinidad and Tobago 11.4 12.6 
Cuba 9.1 10.1 
Jamaica 1.7 1.9 
Haiti 0.83 0.92 
Bahamas 0.57 0.63 
Barbados 0.36 0.4 
Aruba 0.25 0.28 
Cayman Islands 0.17 0.19 
Saint Lucia 0.086 0.095 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.075 0.083 
Grenada 0.06 0.066 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 0.054 0.06 
British Virgin Islands 0.052 0.058 
Dominica 0.043 0.048 
Turks and Caicos Islands 0.042 0.046 
Anguilla 0.018 0.02 
Montserrat 0.0032 0.0035 
Source: Kushnir, 2013 
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Industry of Caribbean, billions of Dollars, 1970-2013 
 
Source: Kushnir, 2013 
 
  As low-cost platforms for companies seeking to exploit cheap labor, EPZs have also 
developed through standardized laws and practices, such as cuts in tariffs and other duties. 
Export processing has been promoted as boosting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
foreign exchange, encouraging employment, leading to the transfer of technology, the 
upgrading workforces with new skills, fostering entrepreneurial practices, and encouraging a 
“demonstration effect” wherein domestic firms learn from foreign firms.  Yet history has 
shown the EPZ model in particular and sweatshop manufacturing in general have not 
yielded the benefits that proponents have claimed. Although value added manufacturing has 
grown during certain time periods, it has occurred alongside rising inequality (Bales, 2012; 
Emersberger, 2015; Kloby, 2004).  
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The new export-processing model of the global era is vital to understand the 
transnationalization of capitalist production networks (Jequier, 1988). Businesses based in 
many different countries—and with investors from around the world—have become active 
in the Caribban region through EPZs, often setting up or contracting out operations with 
other companies both domestically and abroad. The involvement of locally or regionally 
based businesses is also important because it shows the cross-border integration of capital. A 
UN report from the mid-1990s illuminates the web of capitalist interests involving 
Caribbean EPZs: 
 
Export processing has attracted considerable local investment in the 
Dominican Republic and Jamaica . . . More than a quarter of the free zone 
companies in the Dominican Republic are owned by nationals of that 
country; they also employ approximately a quarter of the labour force. 
Jamaican entrepreneurs own nearly half the export processing establishments 
in that country, but the locally owned companies are much smaller on 
average than foreign-owned companies and therefore account for less than a 
quarter of total employment in the export processing sector. The absence of 
local ownership of export processing companies in Saint Lucia is due not to 
discrimination against native investors, but rather to a lack of interest on the 
part of local entrepreneurs . . . The United States, the main market for 
products of export processing plants in the subregion, is also the main source 
of overseas investment. The three countries have also attracted investment 
from the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong and several European countries. 
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Only the Dominican Republic is host to investment from Taiwan, province of 
China. (Willmore, 1996, p. 11) 
 
In Jamaica, EPZ reforms have been promoted in recent years; the country’s half 
dozen Free Trade Zones (FTZs) expanded in 2015 into a network of 16 Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ), with a key difference being that the new SEZs no longer have the 15% cap on 
how much of the zone’s production can be sold within the country (R. Nugent, personal 
communication, 2014). This means that the zones now seek deeper linkages between 
transnational capitalists and the local economy, a model that follows the example of other 
countries, such as the Dominican Republic, where EPZs have established a wider presence 
and become more integrated into the country’s social fabric. In Haiti’s EPZs meanwhile, 
companies operate with zero taxes and tariffs, and are facilitated by UN and U.S. state 
subsidies, including, for example, the South Korean apparel manufacturer Sae-A (IDB, 
2011; Shamsie, 2009). In recent decades, political crises and the crises caused by the 
January 2010 earthquake in Haiti have in fact been leveraged to develop new EPZs. This 
occurred, for example, in 2002 when Haiti’s hamstrung and undermined government agreed 
to develop the Ouanaminthe EPZ and, again, with the post-earthquake government in 2010 
going along with U.S. and UN’s plans to develop another zone in Caracol. 
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Table Two: Number of EPZs in Caribbean nations 
  1969 1978 1988 1995 2005 2015 
Dominican Rep. 1  N/A 7 23 46 56 
Haiti 0 0 1 1 2 3 
Jamaica 0 1 2 5 6 16 
Trinidad & Tob.  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 17 
Sources: Willmore, 1995; US Department of State, 2014; World Bank, 1992, 2003. 
 
Concurrent with the growing number of EPZs, the actual functions of EPZs have 
also changed. In Jamaica, for example, officials promote EPZs to connect TNCs with local 
companies in order to produce for global, regional, and local markets. This new trend of 
producing for local markets in the EPZs is a reverse enclave development model, which 
fosters capitalist development that both integrates with the global economy and links 
directly with local consumption. Seeing the emergence of this trend early on,  Willmore 
explained in the mid-1990s how sales to domestic consumers in the region had increased 
(Willmore, 1996, pp. 16-18). These developments exemplify the trend toward greater local-
transnational capitalist integration as the global consumer market establishes a niche among 
the Caribbean population. The evolving transnational production model has become part and 
parcel of the shifting flows of global capitalism, with its manufacturing sites (EPZs) 
representing vital spaces through which global production processes penetrate and transform 
domestic economies. Next, I will discuss this interactive process in more detail. 
 
Intensification of Local-Transnational Business Linkages 
Through the context of the transnationalization of material production and the 
changing social and class relations at its core, we can better understand how national 
economies are enmeshed with the global economy.  We can see such a relationship by 
looking at Caribbean EPZs and the capital operating through them. In this section, I will 
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look specifically at the growing interaction between TNCs and subcontractors that operate in 
Caribbean EPZs. A structural feature of export processing has been both the role of usually 
foreign based transnational companies and locally based subcontractors who are seeking 
linkages with large transnational capitalist chains of accumulation. In this way we can see 
how locally based capitalists are seeking to become transnationally oriented. Increasingly 
locally based capitalists are seeking to integrate their own class interests with the global 
economy, meaning that their own social reproduction becomes bound up with transnational 
capital. As Robinson observes, “the spread of diverse collaborative arrangements and 
interim partnerships . . . are a major mechanism of class integration across nation borders” 
(Robinson, 2004, p. 67). From a sociological and class analysis perspective, we can 
understand how capitalist formation and relations have congealed through processes of 
export processing. 
Some of the largest TNCs in the clothing industry contract out production with 
companies based in the Caribbean.  At a factory run by Genesis, S.A., which is owned by 
local Haitian industrialists and located near the Port-au-Prince airport in Haiti, operations are 
contracted out by the Canada based TNC Gildan Activewear. Since the late 1990s, Gildan 
has become the top distributor of 100% cotton T-shirts in the U.S. and many other countries 
worldwide. In 2013 Gildan Activewear had total sales of $1.9 billion annually and has been 
publicly listed on the New York Stock Exchange since 1999.  Gildan has bought up a 
number of competitors and older firms in the textile industry, and operates through an 
expanding network of contractors. In turn, some of the top investors within Gildan include 
major financial firms and hedge funds such as: Fidelity Investments (a TNC with $48.0 
billion under management); Janus Enterprise, a publicly traded “smart growth” hedge fund 
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that invests mostly in equity securities worldwide; and Vanguard Total International Stock 
Index, a hedge fund that “tracks stock markets all over the globe” and invests heavily in 
emerging and developing markets. While Gildan operates and subcontracts with production 
plants in Bangladesh, Honduras, and other impoverished countries, a growing part of its 
manufacturing takes place in Haiti and the Caribbean. Violations of workers’ rights at the 
plants where Gildan’s clothing is produced have been well documented (Porter, 2014). The 
company has tried to sideline criticism and worker’s voices by rebranding itself and 
engaging in corporate responsibility publicity campaigns.   
 As of 2012, 584 companies operated in EPZs within the Dominican Republic. 
Completely exempt from taxes, duties, charges, and fees affecting production and export 
activities in the EPZs, slightly more than 40% of the companies were domiciled in the U.S., 
with many of the other companies active in the zones based in the Netherlands, Canada, 
Puerto Rico, the United Kingdom, and Korea. Dominican exports, over half of which come 
from the nation’s EPZs, totaled $4.99 billion in 2012, compared with $4.8 billion in 2011 
(U.S. Department of State, 2014). In Haiti, by contrast, there are far fewer EPZs and a 
smaller number of active companies. Indeed, manufacturing in Haiti has declined since its 
“heyday” of the 1980s. Even during its “heyday”, with political crisis intensifying, the 
country’s socioeconomic indicators declined (Emersberger, 2014). 
In Quanaminthe, Haiti, the location of an EPZ founded in 2003, the Dominican 
domiciled company, Grupo M, employs local workers through its CODEVI factory. 
Clothing produced at the plant is sold to TNCs such as Sara Lee, Nautica, Dockers, Fruit of 
the Loom, and Levi Strauss. Among some of the largest global clothing brands, these 
companies are infused with transnational capital.  For example, in 2013, the TNC Levi 
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Strauss had annual sales of $4.68 billion among more than 110 countries. While the 
company has expanded globally through business relations with companies worldwide, its 
ownership structure is extremely centralized. 45% of the company’s stock is owned by the 
Haas family and another 250 relatives own nearly 43%. Family members’ charitable 
foundations and non-family directors and officers of Levi Strauss hold the remainder of the 
company’s stock (Forbes Staff, 2014).   
Grupo M is just one of the many contractors that Levi Strauss utilizes. Currently, 
Grupo M employs 3,600 workers in the Dominican Republic and 7,000 workers in Haiti. As 
of 2004, its workers were paid at a minimum $12 for a six-day, 48-hour work week (Regan, 
2004). The main owner of Grupo M, Dominican citizen Fernando Capellán, has explained 
how the company has undergone fundamental changes over the past three decades and 
become linked with hi-tech and transnational networks of production: 
 
[His company’s] concerns transcend borders, being the first Dominican 
investor who settled in the Republic of Haiti, installing the CODEVI 
industrial park for the operation of manufacturing companies. Over the years 
it has also ventured into other sectors like real estate, besides being part of the 
board of the Metropolitan Hospital of Santiago and the Cibao International 
Airport, among other companies. He is also a member of the executive 
committee of the National Council of Private Enterprise (CONEP) and leads 
the Association of Industries of the Dominican Republic (AIRD) . . . In his 
almost 30 years, the business management model has changed: "We started 
with factories that, solely, were assemblies. Then we moved to modular 
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systems, giving way today to technology with more sophisticated 
management systems and planning programs" . . . [He] highlights the 
importance of lean manufacturing, a production model focused on creating 
flow to deliver maximum value to clients, using minimal resources . . . 
"Moreover, as technology progresses, we have to adapt to these models and 
we have to do things that would never have crossed my mind. For example, 
until recently our volume we could produce was based on long runs, which 
increasingly has become shorter [runs]… more repetitions of the orders are 
made. Before we would charge orders six months in advance, [now] we do 
not know what we will produce in the next three months."iii (Forbes Staff, 
2014) 
 
 With new infrastructure and no taxes, EPZs also provide benefits for local Haitian 
companies, most importantly through the increased access to global investors. At one EPZ, 
the Caracol Industrial Park, founded after the 2010 earthquake, the U.S. government, UN, 
and Haitian state have worked to entice potential tenants to set up business operations 
(CEPR, 2012). So far, these include a Korea based garment company (S&H Global), a 
Haitian paint manufacturer (Peinture Caraibe), and a number of Dominican and Haitian 
based textile, candle, door, and construction material companies.  
While the textile industry has been less successful in Jamaica, a host of other types 
of companies are active in Jamaican EPZs, many of which utilize the population’s cultural 
capital with a large pool of capable, low-wage, English speaking workers. According to a 
Senior Advisor in Jamaica’s Ministry of Industry, current businesses operating in Jamaica’s 
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EPZs are in “knowledge oriented businesses, back office, legal, contract, call center, and 
assembling component parts of printers” (R. Nugent, personal communication, 2014).  
Leading transnational capitalists from the region operate factories throughout the 
EPZs. For example, take one of the most well known TNCs based in Jamaica, 
GraceKennedy Limited. Grace Kennedy’s EPZ operations comprise only a small portion of 
its business portfolio. Reflecting the interwoven nature of finance and production capital in 
the global era, the company is active in banking, remittances, insurance, manufacturing, 
retail, and distribution.iv GraceKennedy’s main role in Jamaica’s EPZs has been through the 
packaging of foodstuffs, such as fruit juices, packaged soups, instant porridges, hams, 
sausages, and a variety of yogurts and cheeses.v In addition to some investors from outside 
the Caribbean, many of the company’s CEOs and investors have come from the Anglophone 
Caribbean’s wing of the transnational capitalist class, including some of the wealthiest 
Jamaican, Trinidadian, and Barbadian families (Gordon, 2006). Many of these elites have 
transitioned from nationally- and internationally-oriented capitalists to transnationally-
oriented capitalists, adapting to changing market conditions as their businesses have become 
rooted in flows of capital operating functionally across borders. 
With a long history in Jamaica, GraceKennedy has transitioned from a small trading 
establishment to an international importer, and now to a major Caribbean-based TNC. 
Leading regionally-based transnational capitalists, such as the owners of GraceKennedy, are 
not interested in operating solely as local agents for foreign-based TNCs. Rather, they are 
expanding their own operations and intertwining with transnational capital, seeking out new 
synergies and profits worldwide. In 1995, GraceKennedy developed its “2020 Vision” plan 
that aimed to “transform the company from a Jamaican trading company to a global 
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consumer group by 2020” (Jackson, 2014). The company that had been listed on the stock 
exchanges of Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean is now eyeing the NY 
Stock Exchange and has more than 60 subsidiaries and divisions in the Caribbean, North 
America, Central America, and the UK. In 2008, the company advanced into mainland 
Europe, becoming a “serious player in Europe’s specialist juice market” when it bought the 
Dutch juice and smoothie manufacturer, Hoogesteger Fresh Specialist BV (Gordon, 2008). 
In recent years, the company has looked toward expansion into Eastern Europe and Africa. 
The company has profited greatly through its expansion phase; its market value of $183 
million in 2005 had increased by 1500% from its value ten years prior (GraceKennedy 
Annual Report, 2005). As of 2014, the company continued to grow, achieving an annual 
revenue of $375 million in Jamaica, $97 million in Europe, $78.5 million in North America, 
$34 million from other areas of the Caribbean, and $700,000 in Africa (Jackson, 2014).vi   
 In addition to those major transnational capitalists with domestic backgrounds who 
operate in EPZs and the TNCs contracting out operations in the EPZs, a number of smaller 
businesses operate through these settings as well and are attempting to deepen their ties with 
global capital. This is especially true in the technology and telecommunications sectors. 
During research in both Kingston and Santo Domingo, I met with some foreign and local 
businessmen operating such start-ups in the EPZs. New telecommunication technologies 
have allowed for instant real time communication and coordination. In turn, EPZs connect 
with new tech-oriented industries, which are often linked to large North American and 
European markets, such as data entry and processing, data conversion, software 
programming and development, geographic information services, image processing, 
indexing, automated mapping, electronic publishing, medical transcription, and video 
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conferencing (Dunn, 2010, p. 603). The IT sector has taken root in EPZs in the Caribbean, 
but has also heavily fluctuated over the years, with both foreign based TNCs and smaller 
contractors operating in Caribbean EPZs; groups that are easily able to relocate their 
business operations to various locations (depending on labor and market conditions). This 
trend reflects the expansion of EPZs beyond the traditional light manufacturing sectors 
(Engman & Farole, 2012; Kaplinsky, 1993). As scholars have documented, many EPZs have 
come to host “high technology industries, electronics and chemicals companies, financial 
services firms, IT and software services companies – as well as a range of commercial 
operators providing services of all kinds to these companies and their employees” (Lang, 
2010, pp. 12-13).  
Investors in Caribbean EPZ production face the main difficulty that production costs 
in other parts of the world are often more competitive, with more disciplined labor regimes 
and/or highly developed production, transportation, and trade infrastructure (such as in 
China, Mexico, and Vietnam). Yet with large reserve pools of labor, geographic proximity 
to the North American consumer market, and continued attempts to construct supranational 
policies that encourage transnational economic integration with the region, the Caribbean 
will continue to be a site for global capitalist production.  
 
Transnationally-Oriented Elites, Supranational Economic Forums, and State 
Apparatuses: Promoting Export Processing Led-Development  
The role of the state in EPZs has shifted over recent decades, from being primarily 
government-run and -funded operations to zones increasingly directly run by private sector 
management or highly influenced by transnational capital. As nodes meant to smoothly 
!!144!
facilitate the production and movement of goods, transnationally-oriented policymakers 
have sought to facilitate “tax holidays, unrestricted repatriation of profits, duty-free imports 
and exports, special low-cost infrastructure, good communications facilities and access to 
sea or air ports,” and, in addition, promote “an abundant supply of low-cost” labor that is 
either non-unionized or represented by compliant union bureaucracies (Dunn, 2010, pp. 601-
602). At the same time, faced with intense unemployment and other problems of 
underdevelopment, many policymakers see EPZs as one of the few tools at their disposal. 
This result exemplifies how transnational capital has become an internalized logic of 
Caribbean policymakers aiming to map out the best – and seemingly only – route for 
economic development. 
Furthermore, emphasis on economic development through incorporation with global 
capital is a strategy that many state elites have pursued to transfer state resources from 
“program oriented ministries (social services, education, labor, etc.) to central banks, 
treasuries and finance and economic ministries, and the foreign ministry” (Robinson, 2001, 
p. 186). Sharing in this overarching project, many state elites have promoted policies in the 
interest of transnational capital. To entice global investment, especially into regions of the 
developing world such as the Caribbean, transnationally oriented state technocrats and elites 
have promoted new integrative economic policies.  
The policymakers of major powers, especially the U.S., have played a key role in 
facilitating regional economic initiatives and frameworks and bilateral agreements (that in 
turn facilitate EPZ production). For many years, state elites operating through apparatuses of 
the U.S. have played a vital role pressuring and facilitating institutional support for such 
measures, leading to shifts in Caribbean production strategies away from traditional exports 
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and domestic production and instead toward export oriented manufacturing and non-
traditional agriculture and other exports. This can be seen in the negotiations and ratification 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Dominican Republic-
Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR–CAFTA), as economic forums crystallizing 
through the activities of a “transnational interest bloc” of state and business leaders, with 
U.S. policymakers playing a major role (Cox, 2008, p. 1528). Regulatory frameworks 
established in one forum often have been integrated into later agreements, for example, with 
provisions in NAFTA incorporated into rules establishing the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) (Cox, 2008). 
In the Caribbean, during the 1980s, it was the CBI that marked a significant ramping 
up of the EPZ model for the region. In the Dominican Republic, the CBI achieved the 
“desired effect of stimulating manufactured exports and reducing dependence on primary 
commodities (for example, by 1990 agricultural exports accounted for less than 20% of 
Dominican exports by value),” while it catapulted apparel manufacturing to become the 
dominant business model for the region (Werner & Bair, 2009, p. 7). Supranational forums 
thus serve the purpose of further opening up national economies and propelling state 
apparatuses into line with neoliberal policy prescriptions and a constant enhancement of 
global competitiveness. Such forums, however, provide neither long-term solutions nor any 
attempt to deal with the deep problems facing so many poor societies. Even so, 
policymakers across the region continue to promote EPZs as a central plank of economic 
development. Although they might be successful in stimulating investment in the EPZs in 
the short or medium-term, the global spread of the apparel industry has shifted through 
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different market and regulatory conditions, with Caribbean producers losing their 
competitive edge as East Asian, Mexican, and Central American production has intensified.  
Since the establishment of the CBI, the U.S., Canada, and the European Union have 
facilitated new and expanding economic forums in the region, a requirement for the region 
to be globally competitive. Whereas temporary and limited free trade agreements began in 
the 1980s, into the 21st century policymakers have put in place what are increasingly all-
inclusive trade agreements (and which are treaties that in fact expand beyond trade, such as 
in regard to copy right law).  This has been the case with, for example, the Dominican 
Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), which eliminates tariffs 
and reduces barriers to services. The nations of DR-CAFTA have since become increasingly 
interconnected with the U.S. market and the global economy, with TCC fractions profiting 
tremendously. As the Office of the United States Trade Representative (2014) explains: 
“Total two-way goods trade between the U.S. and our six CAFTA-DR partners has 
increased over 71% . . . from $35 billion in 2005 to $60 billion in 2013. In 2013, U.S. 
exports to the DR-CAFTA countries totaled $30 billion; imports totaled $30 billion.” As the 
only Caribbean basin nation within the agreement, the Dominican Republic has become the 
leading site of foreign investment among all of the Caribbean islands. 
These new forums encouraging cross-border investment and production are not just 
promoted by government officials, but also lobbied for by capital. For example, leading 
Dominican “business groups supporting DR–CAFTA are located in the fast-growing export 
processing zones, which have seen a tenfold growth in employment over two decades” (Cox, 
2008: 1537). These included transnationally-oriented Dominican firms, such as Grupo M, 
Interamerican Products, and D’Clase Corporation, all closely connected with North 
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American-based corporations as both importers of capital and suppliers of apparel. 
Transnational banks, financial services, and telecommunications industries utilizing the 
advantages they have gained through new forums have deepened their penetration of the 
Caribbean basin’s markets. For instance, banks and insurance firms that are highly active in 
global finance have actually gained full rights to establish subsidiaries, joint ventures, and 
branches through forums and new agreements. Long-standing barriers are in the process of 
being broken down, ranging from limitations on foreign insurance companies, to the 
regulatory licensing of foreign professionals, to local partner requirements in sectors such as 
financial services, to many other restrictions and requirements (Cox, 2008, p. 1538). While 
many small and nationally-oriented businesses have been driven under by the trend toward 
monopolization, centralization, and transnationalization of capital, some small entrepreneurs 
from upper class and middle strata backgrounds have been able to tap into niche markets, 
seeking to tether their business operations to transnational circuits of accumulation. In the 
Dominican city of Santiago, for instance, I interviewed proprietors of small home business, 
where a limited number of locals worked behind sewing machines producing specialized 
clothing for a local firm.  In turn, this firm sells the clothing to a transnational conglomerate 
that then offloads the textiles in nearby Puerto Rico. 
Many pharmaceutical TNCs based in the U.S. have also lobbied through 
supranational forums to strengthen intellectual property rights provisions in order to 
potentially gain huge profits. In the Caribbean, expanding upon the rights already gained 
through WTO frameworks, new forums have shielded Big Pharma from many safety tests 
and other forms of regulatory oversight (Cox, 2008, pp. 1537-1538). Another sector to 
benefit from new supranational forums and treaties has been the global agribusiness industry 
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and commodity producers from across the region and in the U.S.  As Cox argues, “ . . . the 
rise of non-traditional agro-exports has been a trend that has integrated US-based TNCs with 
suppliers in the region” (2008, p. 1539). The textile industry, also active in lobbying for 
these treaties and forums, has worked to maintain vital conditions (such as preferential tax 
and duty treatments) that keep the Caribbean a competitive site for export processing 
production. With coalitions of large business associations involved in lobbying, TNC 
representatives have directly crafted legislation of economic forums and trade agreements 
(Cox, 2008, pp. 1539-1540).vii The final protocols and legislation of these forums, as Cox 
observes, make up “a hodgepodge of investment guarantees reflecting the particular interests 
of those investors closest to the process of negotiation and ratification” (2008, p. 1542).  
The interest groups crafting and helping to propel these forums and treaties has 
privileged the dominant fractions of transnational capital. In the case of DR-CAFTA, for 
example, TNCs based in the U.S. played a leading role, yet were “complemented by the 
growth and expansion of transnational firms in Mexico, Central America and the Dominican 
Republic.” These firms, Cox adds, “have developed extensive ties to the U.S. market and 
have in turn developed transnational lobbying networks that are part of the transnational 
blocs that mobilized politically for NAFTA and DR– CAFTA” (2008, p. 1541). A number 
of other corporate interest groups are active in the Caribbean, linked to other states and 
power blocs, such as from the European Union, Mercosur, China, and Taiwan, all of which 
have sought special legislation and investment privileges for fractions of the TCC in recent 
years. Cox explains how this reflects how globalization has entailed transnational integration 
and conflict: 
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. . . Intensified competition among transnational interest blocs to better 
position themselves within regional markets in ways that give them an often 
temporary edge over their global competitors. Within this framework sectors 
of the most competitive transnational capital work with both the USA and the 
EU to advance their interests in penetrating Latin American markets, and 
where possible to forge alliances with complementary networks of producers 
in Latin America. In opposition are often domestic interests and competing 
fractions of capital, as well as a broad array of civil society groups, whose 
interests would be harmed by the specific provisions included in these 
investment agreements. Narrowly economic and narrowly political accounts 
of this process obfuscate the deep interconnectedness between the power of 
transnational capital and the process of globalisation, as well as the 
increasingly contested terrain that has emerged over the terms of 
globalisation. (2008, pp. 1541-1542) 
 
Often, new legislation and policies intended to foster EPZ manufacturing have not 
been enough to actually overcome global competition (Werner & Bair, 2009, p. 9), at other 
times they have been vital for maintaining or expanding EPZ production. Job losses have 
occurred in countries, sometimes after a certain period of job growth or after the elapsing of 
certain treaty conditions. Creating a viscous cycle, in turn, business interests have threatened 
factory flight, and advocated for currency devaluation or reductions in labor protection 
(Werner & Bair, 2009, pp. 9-10).  
The very geographic essence of the EPZ is changing, including its spatial dynamic as 
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a demarcated special area within a country, as the special benefits and regulations applied to 
EPZs spread to ever larger areas and factories not within walls and fences of EPZs.  As Lang 
elaborates, “the notion of an EPZ as a physically limited space has been challenged by the 
development of ‘single factory EPZs’ which provide incentives to individual companies 
regardless of location, as well as by the establishment of EPZs which cover very large 
geographical areas” (2010, pp. 12-13). Another scholar explains that where “EPZ legislation 
enables companies to operate within these production enclaves, there is a growing trend for 
governments to extend these incentives to companies which produce for export but operate 
outside the designated zones” (Dunn, 2010, p. 601). As Willmore (1996, p. 23) earlier 
observed: “Fenced EPZs inevitably become less important once governments provide 
incentives for companies located outside special export enclaves.” Increasingly the 
phenomenon of the EPZ is becoming a generalizable phenomenon across Caribbean nations, 
where the EPZs have “gradually become indistinguishable from the rest of the country – 
which is, after all, their final (implicit or explicit) goal” (UNCTC, 1991, p. 332). The 
prediction made by Sklair (1989) that a general transformation would take place of the 
developing world into a vast export processing plant. 
 
Labor and Caribbean Export Processing Zones 
In a race to the bottom for labor, companies control labor costs by employing large numbers 
of workers in those areas with corporate-friendly regulatory environments. For example, 
companies with production lines composed of light equipment can easily move to other 
locations with more exploitive labor conditions that benefit capital. 
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The labor-capital relationship has undergone novel changes in the age of 
globalization. As labor power has become inserted into transnational value chains, this 
creates the objective conditions for globally-oriented proletarian fractions (Lin, 2015; Stuna, 
2009). As an important part of this process, capital operating through EPZs have more and 
more brought labor under the umbrella of ever more flexibilized labor regimes and 
intensified relations of global competitiveness. Many have examined the specific ways in 
which abstracted human labor has been objectified through manufacturing and sweatshop 
factories (Neveling, 2015). Rather than manufacturing goods from start to finish, production 
processes have also become increasingly divided into multiple parts and different stages, 
many of which are dispersed geographically. This has heavily impacted labor. Tasks 
performed by labor have increasingly become broken up and dispersed over geographic 
areas, so that, for example, a clothing item might have its fabric sewn, its separate parts 
attached, and embroidering done in different locations and by workers with different 
backgrounds and cultures. Scholars have shown how this has led to more precarious 
conditions and situations where workers are more easily replaced and disciplined (Dunn, 
2010, p. 604).  
Some studies have also begun to look at how these transnational chains create new 
opportunities for workers to organize and even change the ways in which they interpret the 
world. New complex and dispersed business networks create difficulties as well as 
opportunities for labor. While creating the objective conditions for labor to struggle 
transnationally (Struna, 2009), social alienation deepens as workers become less able to 
closely interact with and understand the labor process of which they are agents. It remains to 
be seen how the subjective conditions and institutional structures will form for workers to 
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successfully organize on a transnational level. Scholars have begun to consider the different 
structural features of how labor interconnects transnationally with the global capitalist 
economy, as Struna observes: “To be clear, the fractional determination of workers in the 
global system is dependent on two primary factors: first, on workers’ physical mobility 
relative to nation- states and regions, i.e. whether the worker moves to the point of 
production, or remains fixed relative to a point of production; and second, on the geographic 
scope of workers’ labor-power expenditure relative to the circuits in which they are 
engaged, i.e. whether the products move successively to the worker (as in transnational 
production chains), or the products remain geographically fixed (as with local production 
chains)” (Ibid). 
A number of reports have been published examining the general dynamics of labor in 
the Caribbean (ILO, 2014). In recent years, the number of companies active in the region’s 
EPZs has grown. New production technologies though have also often allowed for the 
reduction of the number of workers required for certain tasks. Governments across the 
region have carried out rounds of market-oriented “reforms,” as elites seek to improve the 
global competitiveness of their EPZs (a constant mantra of policymakers). This has resulted 
in a race to the bottom for labor, as the real wages of workers have declined or stagnated in 
most sectors. Trinidad and Tobago, a nation considered one of the most globally competitive 
in the region, recognized early on the importance of the race to the bottom in terms of EPZ 
labor protections. Indeed, in the 1980s, Trinidad and Tobago eagerly launched “a process 
that included a wage freeze and accelerated depreciation on equipment imported duty-free 
for export production” (Gomes, 2013). Research shows how state elites in other Caribbean 
nations have also worked to keep wages artificially low (Regan, 2013). 
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As the data below shows, the number of laborers in Caribbean EPZs varies by 
country, with some boasting more EPZs and larger manufacturing sectors than others. In 
Jamaica, for instance, overall employment tripled between 1975 and the late 1980s, while 
during this time in the Dominican Republic employment grew from 6,500 to 112,000 jobs 
(Schopfle & Perez-Lopez, 1992, p. 142). Yet, at other times, the number of jobs has fallen. 
Policymakers and business groups have sought to amend labor laws to compete with the 
repressive conditions that workers face in other locations. The social basis of these chains of 
production thus revolve around a heightened extraction of surplus labor from workers in the 
EPZs, where the more debased the condition of labor, the more profitable for transnational 
capital. 
 
Table Three: Number of workers and firms active in EPZs in 2007 
Country Workers Firms 
Dominican Rep. 154,781 556 
Haiti 10,000 90 
Jamaica 20,000  N/A 
Puerto Rico 340,000 2,800 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 19,350 N/A  
Source: Boyenge, 2007 
 
 
These difficult conditions, as well as the successes of organized labor in Caribbean 
EPZs, have been documented in recent years (Caribbean Newslink, 2014). A number of 
reports have covered labor protests and ongoing grassroots and union organizing in the 
region and in the EPZs specifically.viii With a large base of unemployed and underemployed 
workers, forming a “reserve army of labor” (Marx, 1990), those with formal employment 
face numerous difficulties and pressures. Challenges also include the bureaucratization of 
labor unions, the low percentage of organized workers in the region in general, patriarchy 
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and the harassment of female workers, an overall lack of resources, sectarian divisions, a 
dependence on foreign donors, the constant sacking and repression of militant workers, and 
the lack of cooperation between labor with popular and leftist political currents. Caribbean 
states also play a role in disciplining labor in the EPZs, mobilizing police and security forces 
to surround or suppress labor strikes. 
Another problem is the trend toward business unionism promoted by the state, 
capital, and important regional and global institutions and forums. This is reflected in the 
lack of cross-sector solidarity and the lacking connection to broader political projects to 
challenge structures of class power. Many unions have also become involved in particular 
and insular agendas, disconnected from broader political and social movements. In my view, 
this has often functioned to de-radicalize labor or marginalize it from community and 
working class oriented struggles.  While there has been some cross-border organizing among 
some labor unions in the region (Frundt, 1999) as well as examples of joint community and 
labor mobilization, as in many sectors and parts of the world, business unionism has become 
dominant. International labor federations and bodies active in the Caribbean tend to focus on 
combating the most egregious human rights problems, such as child labor. Yet cross-sector 
and cross-border organizing remains underdeveloped. Furthermore, states and corporations 
have sought to promote compliant labor union bosses and support non-threatening labor 
organizing. Here it is important to recognize, as Scipes (2011) shows, labor agencies 
connected with the U.S., Canada, the EU (whose overseas projects depend largely on 
funding from these state apparatuses) often privilege unions and union officials that are 
unthreatening to the political agenda of transnational elites. A general tendency in many 
parts of the world has been the rise of more pro-market labor tendencies winning out over 
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more populist and left-wing labor, a history with its roots going back to the Cold War. This 
process played out violently in the Caribbean, such as with the crushing of leftist labor 
organizing in Jamaica (Post, 1978), the Duvalierist state attack on organized labor in Haiti, 
or the Trujillo and Balaguer government assaults on militant labor movements in the 
Dominican Republic. 
Managerial developments put into place in the EPZs in recent decades have meant to 
further regiment and disempower labor. As scholars have documented (Jones, Shrivastava, 
Selvarajah, & Van Gramberg, 2015), new managerial techniques and processes have 
promoted more tightly disciplined and monitored labor regimes for workers in the global 
era. A goal of these new labor regimes has been for capitalists to avoid the responsibilities 
related to direct employment, while also helping to create labor environments that are more 
precarious and insecure. While in earlier eras it was common for “local supervisors, 
technicians and plant managers” (Willmore, 1996, p. 22) to operate plants (and they still do 
often), a recent trend has been outsourcing to production management companies that 
specialize in EPZ factories. These companies and their professionals move between different 
locations both the Caribbean and beyond. This has facilitated more standardized labor 
regimes and practices for globalized production management (Jones et al., 2015). In this 
stringent system, the only workers that remain as employed are those that remain uninjured, 
continually achieve cost, time, and production targets, and display themselves as compliant 
and loyal to management (Jones et al., 2015). 
 The exploitation of Caribbean labor, and, for that matter, “third world” labor in 
general, is also rooted in gendered and racialized dynamics (Ortiz, 1996). The harshest labor 
conditions of export processing overwhelmingly impact non-European ethnic groups, 
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spanning areas from the developing and formerly colonized world into the so-called 
developed world where supra-exploited workers, often migrants, are used for sweatshop 
labor and manufacturing. Often women—workers in these settings often operate under 
miserable conditions. A heightened feminization of waged labor in the EPZs has been 
observed for decades (Gray, 1986). By this I refer to the trend in which women have 
comprised a growing segment of the labor force within EPZs and are channeled into 
particular jobs. Research has focused in on Caribbean female workers and the gendered 
division of labor in Caribbean EPZs (Freeman, 2000; Safa, 2002; Thorin, 2001). 
Disempowered and channeled into low paying and exploitive work, women workers are 
constantly victims of patriarchal and abusive relations in the workplace. 
Downplaying the poor working conditions and the history of popular organizing in 
the region, policymakers have placed much effort promoting EPZs to both investors and 
local populations in a positive light. To do so, promotional and advertisement campaigns 
have been well honed over the years. During visits (sometimes supervised visits) to EPZs in 
the region, the author was provided numerous advertisement and promotional pamphlets 
highlighting the advantages of EPZ production. Scholars have shown in fact how advertising 
campaigns have reframed countries as platforms for global capital, with the EPZ 
representing a major part of this branding (Tornhill, 2010, pp. 74-75).  These efforts aim  not 
only to attract global investors but also to provide a degree of local legitimacy for a 
developmental strategy in which the main profiteers are transnational capitalists.  
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Conclusion: Enmeshed in a Dynamic Transnational System of Production, Trade, and 
Capital Accumulation, Rooted in Inequality and Exploitation 
Capitalists seeking to escape the barrier of national frontiers and thus shape a new 
material, or economic, reality, have come to utilize new spaces for manufacturing and other 
forms of material production. Likewise state policymakers have supported the creation of 
these special economic zones, so as to further integrate their local economies with the global 
economy. Here, new non-traditional export-oriented industries could operate unhindered by 
local pressures.ix Expected to expand and diversify industrial production, EPZs continue 
down this path “designed to facilitate the insertion of a country into the global trading 
system” (Lang , 2010, p. 15). Many changes are on the horizon that may impact the 
businesses operating in Caribbean EPZs, such as the new deep-water ports planned or under 
development in Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. In both scope and scale, 
this will allow Caribbean economies to further integrate with the global trade system. The 
very spatial nature and role of the EPZs is becoming more pliable, as a wider range of 
companies become active in EPZs and TNCs seek new consumer markets from among 
upwardly mobile and middle strata in the region.  
The successes and failures of the EPZ model have varied. In some parts of the 
region, the model has failed or stagnated, but in others areas they have been maintained or 
expanded production. Attempts to renew and expand the export processing developmental 
model have remained constant. State policymakers and a host of elites active in the region 
have come to depend upon the expansion of transnational capitalist networks for their own 
social reproduction. Trade and investment agreements between Caribbean governments and 
other states—most importantly, the U.S.—have advanced a host of bilateral as well as 
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regional economic forums. Different economic forums and state negotiations have thus 
reflected the power of a “hodgepodge” of powerful interests, from transnationally-oriented 
elites operating through different state apparatuses to fractions of transnational capital. They 
have sought to override “outdated laws” that protected certain industries and workforces, 
which therein hindered cross border investment and synergies between local and offshore 
companies (Willmore, 1996, p. 2). The future of the EPZ-centered developmental model in 
the region, while continually promoted by elites, remains unclear as it underlays an 
unsustainable and crisis prone system. 
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Notes 
i Sometimes incentives are provided unconditionally, while at other times they are 
conditionally provided based upon criteria such as export-performance, technology transfer 
requirements, local employment, or local content requirements.   
ii EPZs were also initially formed in Ireland in the post-war period (Virgill, 2009, p. 
2). 
iii This is the authors translation of excerpts from an article that appeared in the 
Español version of Forbes magazine. 
iv Companies, divisions, and subsidiaries within the GraceKennedy group include in 
banking (First Global Bank Limited, First Global Financial Services Limited, FG Funds 
Management Limited, First Global Trinidad & Tobago Limited, Signia Financial Group 
Incorporated); in remittances (with divisions located in Jamaica, the United States, Trinidad 
& Tobago, and Guyana); in life and general insurance (Allied Insurance Brokers Limited, 
EC Global Insurance Company Limited, First Global Insurance Brokers Limited, Jamaica 
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International Insurance Company Limited, Trident Insurance Company Limited); and in 
manufacturing, retail, and distribution (Dairy Industries (Jamaica) Limited, Grace Foods and 
Services Company GraceKennedy (Belize) Limited, Grace Food Processors Limited, Grace 
Food Processors (Canning) Limited, Grace Kennedy (United States) Incorporated, Grace 
Foods International Limited, National Processors Division, World Brands Services Limited, 
Hi-Lo Food Stores (Jamaica), GK Foods (UK), GraceKennedy (Ontario) Incorporated, 
Hardware & Lumber Limited). 
v See the GraceKennedy website: http://www.gracekennedy.com 
vi I converted these numbers (provided by Jackson (2014)) that were originally in 
Jamaican dollars to the US dollar. I utilized the currency exchange rate of April, 7, 2015 
which was 1 USD for 114.390 JMD. 
vii As Cox writes, in regards to CAFTA-DR, through the “top tier lobbying network 
for transnational firms in the textile industry, representing more than $100 billion in annual 
textile production and sales” the “final agreement gave US firms a competitive advantage 
over their Chinese competitors in the exportation of textiles, cotton, fibre, machinery, 
carpets and rugs, and fabrics to Central America and the Dominican Republic” (2008, p. 
1539). 
viii See for example the excellent website of Caribbean Labor Solidarity, available at: 
http://cls-uk.org.uk/ 
ix Different terminology has been used to name (or emphasize) specific kinds of 
zones that have been spaces through which production has been geared toward the global 
economy. Though often serving similar roles, these zones have been termed at different 
points: free trade zones, free zones, free customs zones, international commerce zones, free 
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ports, free warehouses, export processing zones, special economic zones, industrial free 
zones, and others.  For this chapter I have preferred to use the term “export processing 
zone,” emphasizing the outward orientation of the zones. 
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Chapter V  
From International to Transnational Mining in the Caribbean 
 
Since the emergence of capitalist globalization, industrial mining has undergone 
significant changes in many parts of the world (Moody, 2007). The Caribbean is one such 
region, where transnational corporations (TNCs) have reaped extraordinary profits for their 
owners and stakeholders by harnessing new technologies and organizational advancements. 
In contrast, mining companies earlier in the Twentieth Century operated through circuits of 
international production and were heavily impacted by the internationally and domestically 
geared policies of state officials. This earlier form of production took place within and 
sometimes across national frontiers, and within colonies or countries where state elites often 
closely aligned themselves with the company’s domicile state.  Through the context of the 
Caribbean, this paper examines the historical trajectory through which industrial mining has 
shifted from nationally and internationally oriented models toward transnational practices. 
Important studies have emphasized the transnationality of material (economic) relations in 
the globalist phase of world capitalism (Dicken, 2011), as well as the rising transnationality 
of many social and class relations (Harris, 2006; Liodakis, 2010; Robinson, 2003, 2004, 
2008, 2014; Sprague, 2015a, 2015b). In this paper, I contend that globally competitive 
mining corporations, entwined with transnational capital and promoted by transnationally 
oriented state elites, have supplanted earlier international corporate models and statist 
developmental policies.  Whereas workers in the industry have been brought under new 
more flexible and globalized labor regimes, at the same time, subcontractors seek out inputs 
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into the globalized industry.  These developments occur alongside continued environmental 
costs and often shrinking benefits for Caribbean states and local communities. 
Large-scale industrial mining in the Caribbean began in Suriname and Guyana in the 
early twentieth century (Jong and Boersema, 2006), with the industry’s early formation in 
the region dependent upon British capital. Over time, monopolizing capitalists in North 
America provided the impetus for growth in export-oriented mining and some domestic 
manufacturing. By the 1950s, North American capital had ramped up mining operations in 
Jamaica, geared toward the extraction of bauxite, a dry mineral that is converted into 
aluminum through electrolysis. During the post-war period, U.S. policymakers supported 
national mining policies in order to build up resources for the U.S. military industrial 
complex, through which the bauxite industry in the Caribbean would come to supply “nine-
tenths of the raw-material needs of the aluminum industry of North America, which in turn 
produces 50 per cent of world aluminum output” (Girvan, 1967: 1). Resource extraction 
became a central pillar of development for former British colonies in the region. Whereas 
labor in the mines came primarily from local communities, there was a heavy reliance on 
European and North American specialists and engineers. In other areas of the Caribbean, 
such as the Dominican Republic and Cuba, mining developed at a slower pace during the 
latter half of the twentieth century but would eventually receive significant foreign capital 
investment. Despite this growth, local inputs in mining consisted primarily of low wage jobs. 
Caribbean policymakers wrestled over how to engage with the industry. 
By the mid-twentieth century, in many areas of the world, corporate policies 
developed alongside the national and international policies of state policymakers, often 
strongest within the nations in which they were domiciled. Powerful states, such as the U.S., 
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helped facilitate the international operations of associated capitalists (Panitch and Gindin, 
2013). Yet state officials, especially in many “developing nations”, sought at times to 
manage or control (at least partially) industries operating in their nation. In developing 
regions such as the Caribbean, many state managers (often pressured by movements from 
below or influenced by different political currents) began promoting policies meant to 
incubate domestic production, albeit through limited forms of import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) and partial state ownership of some industrial sectors, such as mining.  
As capital began to transnationalize (Robinson, 2004) during the closing decades of 
the twentieth century, it sought to break free from national restraints and regulations 
(Harvey, 1991, 2005). As Robinson (1996) observes, during this period, new political 
arrangements of polyarchy came about: as segments of local and foreign dominant groups 
pushed for tightly managed electoral systems in which political contestation was narrowly 
confined to competing elites.  This helped solidify the rise of transnationally oriented state 
managers and technocrats (Dominguez, 1996; Robinson, 2012). These groups, emerging as a 
sort of “global power bloc”, have promoted development through the fragmentation of 
national economies and insertion into global circuits of accumulation. This has been a 
contradictory process, as transnationally oriented elites attempt to maintain national political 
legitimacy. As they abandon national forms of development, this leads to crises of 
legitimacy. Neoliberal restructuring, for example, through privatization and austerity 
measures, has opened further space for global networks of production (Dicken, 2011) and 
finance (CARICOM, 2005; Körner & Trautwein, 2014; Watson, 1985). To guarantee their 
own social reproduction, state managers have promoted deeper integration with the global 
economy. Meanwhile, transnational capitalists in many industries, including mining, have 
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developed by operating under new globally competitive conditions. This has been a 
historical process replete with conflict and crisis, as changing phases of capitalism 
eventually develop economic crises and stagnation or upsurges from working people and 
other oppressed communities (as can be seen in the many struggles against mining 
corporations by labor, activists, and local communities in the Caribbean and worldwide).  
 Yet consistent with many other global industries, mining has been reorganized along 
increasingly flexible lines. Capitalist production has become more attuned to fluctuating 
markets, reflected in the rise of operational intervals, where mines shutter and then reopen at 
a faster pace. A variety of capitalistic advancements have strengthened the hand of 
management and created new pressures on state policymakers, labor, and local communities. 
Major technological and organizational innovations, for example, have allowed capital to 
lessen labor costs, while at the same time gain new leverage over states (Moody, 2007). 
Through capitalist globalization, the very labor power of workers has become incorporated 
into transnational value chains (Struna, 2009), including within industries such as mining. 
My point here is that while residues of the previous national and international arrangements 
remain, we need to understand the political economy of mining in light of the changes 
associated with the cross-border functional integration of global capitalism, and in the 
context of particular regions. 
 
Industrial Mining in the Epoch of Global Capitalism 
The history of mining is a history of human displacement, hard labor, and the 
appropriation of land, from slave labor to the labor-intensive mining of the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century. Since the minerals extracted from mining operations are 
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vital to an array of goods, mining has long been a socially determined process in which 
landed property is economically realized (Marx 1981: 756). With the collaboration of 
powerful states and comprador elites, international monopolies dominated the mining 
industry during much of the twentieth century (Nwoke 1987; Fine, 1994), including many 
areas in the so-called developing world. Yet, in the era of globalization, the political 
economy of mining is increasingly contingent on chains of transnational capitalist 
accumulation and globally competitive markets.  
TNC mining operations are developed through a series of phases. First, transnational 
mining firms or smaller globally active exploration companies locate and assess mineral 
deposits. When positive results are obtained, a larger transnational mining conglomerate 
usually takes over, often buying out or gaining a controlling position over smaller 
exploratory firms. Once political and contractual guarantees have been secured, the second 
phase begins—the development and operation of the mine. During this phase, TNCs develop 
the site by relying on numerous contractors and subcontractors, as explained by Nicomedes 
Acevedo with the Department of Communication and Pueblo Viejo Dominicana 
Corporation in the Dominican Republic (personal communication, 2013). In comparison to 
the world of 20 or 30 years ago, a many more exploratory projects are now underway, 
including in the Caribbean. 
With the rise of capitalist globalization, new waves of mining projects have been 
spurred for a number of reasons: (1) technological advancements, (2) organizational 
innovations, (3) the growing concentration of global capital through corporate mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As), (4) the rise of successful smaller mining exploratory companies, (5) 
the rising value of mineral ores as a finite resource (at times offset by new technologies), 
!! 166!
and (6) the role of transnationally oriented state elites and technocrats in promoting policies 
of global competitiveness and investor confidence to entice new mining projects. Together 
these factors, in conjunction with various specific local conditions, have resulted in the 
renewal of old mining sites, the upgrading of existing locations, and the launching of new 
operations. 
 
 Earnings in the billions (USD) before 
Global Indices (rise in value of stocks) interests, taxes, depreciation and 
of mining companies, 1989-2011.   amortization  (EBITDA) of global 
 mining industry, 2002-2010. 
 
Sources: Bloomberg and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP Analysis (Xie, 2012) 
 
 
The volume of cross-border corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the 
mining industry has increased at unprecedented levels in recent decades, raising capital for 
new megadeals to smaller buyouts (Ernst & Young, 2012). Cross-border financial 
integration and the industry’s growing global orientation has led to new “synergies, bolt-on 
growth and acquisitions that enabled companies to utilize competitive advantages” (Ibid).  
As the industry transforms into a globally competitive battleground for oligopolies, it is 
infused with transnational finance capital. Similarly, the role of smaller exploratory 
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companies and subcontractors in the industry has grown, many becoming increasingly active 
around the world, filling niches and providing specialized services. Mining expert Dr. 
Vladimir Pacheco, who has worked as an adjunct research fellow at the University of 
Queensland's Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining (CSRM) and previously conducted 
research for One mining expert explains: 
 
Over the recent decades [mining companies] have had a trend toward cross-
border investment and monopoly. In gold, for example, just around half a 
dozen companies now process the vast majority of gold. The amount of 
capital is just huge, but in many ways it’s like other global industries. They 
don’t want to get caught up with local peculiarities and problems, so 
everything is standardized and tightly managed as compared to the past, such 
as the agreements with states, the operations, the construction. It’s a turnkey, 
finely tuned process, with lots of subcontractors, hundreds. Some 
subcontractors are active globally, others regionally, and others only operate 
locally (Dr. Vladimir Pacheco, personal communication, 2013). 
 
Transnational mining corporations, highly attuned to cyclical processes in the market, 
are competing over new markets and economies of scale in production. “Economies of scale” 
refers to the cost advantages that a corporation obtains through expansion. As diversified 
large companies continue to ramp up mining production through acquisitions and expansion, 
smaller start-up companies fill a niche by pioneering new deposits. Focused on “frontier” 
locations, “companies that have traditionally been national champions are globalizing, using 
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their domestic scale and often privileged access to capital” (Accenture, 2011). As identified 
in the graph, the industry’s global orientation has occurred through rising values in stocks 
and earnings, an attractive investment for transnational finance capital. While exhibiting 
caution after the global economic crisis of the early twenty first century, TNCs are 
benefiting from new sources of capital, spanning sovereign wealth funds to strategic 
partnerships and private wealth (Ernst & Young, 2012).
Investment in production and exploration has also expanded into locations with 
fragile local economies or with only a marginal history of mining.i With rising mineral 
prices, capital has an incentive to expand or renew mining ventures in the developing world, 
reassessing areas previously viewed as unprofitable or too risky. Between 2002 and 2012, 
GDP tripled in the mining industry in Latin America, the industry gaining importance in 
most of the countries of the region (Bamrud, 2012). Many areas of the Caribbean, such as 
Hispaniola, are viewed as ripe for growth. Yet at the same time, the industry’s operations in 
the Caribbean present a stark example of how the modern mining industry exists within the 
extremely unequal dynamics of the global economy and in a manner disconnected from 
locally geared development. 
While mining companies have shifted toward an ever greater reliance on private 
contractors, many contractors themselves have become active on a larger scale and 
integrated with global financial systems. Large amounts of credit and loans are required for 
contractors, especially when active regionally or globally.  Newer mining operations (such 
as Barrick Gold’s Pueblo Viejo mine in the Dominican Republic) appear to involve a higher 
number of contractors than the mining operations of past decades. This increasing trend is 
important because contractors and diverse economic arrangements serve as important spaces 
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for local capital and small-scale entrepreneurs to integrate into transnational production 
chains, which are mechanisms of class integration across national borders. 
To varying degrees of success, in recent decades state policymakers in the Caribbean 
have sought to craft conditions that promote transnational investment, including in the 
mining industry. Regional and supranational bodies, such as institutions of the United 
Nations and the World Bank (Moody, 2007: 16-42), or CARICOM and CARIFORUM in 
the Caribbean specifically, have pushed for heightened transnational standards and policy 
regimes to create conducive climates for investment. As Pacheco (2015) observes, there has 
been an increasing reliance by “national governments and private companies on 
transnational mining policy regimes in order to secure legitimacy” and “to demonstrate they 
are globally competitive.” Transnational juridical frameworks and standards, as other 
scholars have examined, have deepened structural disparities where an “increasing 
technicisation of decision-making processes” sideline and depoliticize local input (Campbell, 
2012: 140).  
Transnationally oriented policy makers advocating neoliberal restructuring have 
lowered levies on mining companies and abandoned many of the previous statist policy 
initiatives. World Bank studies have advocated these neoliberal reforms, a fact that explains 
how such policies have been “successful in generating substantial interest in attracting 
exploration to the region which, for the first time in 1994 and 1995, was ranked as the first 
region in the world in terms of mining exploration expenditures” (World Bank, 1996: viii). 
With heavy capital and technological investment involved in mining operations, many 
governments in the region have recently changed laws, lowering taxes and levies, and in 
general promoted conditions enabling TNC investment. This has resulted in a period of 
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rapid expansion in mining, as one World Bank publication explains: “Between 1990 and 
1997, while global exploration investment went up 90%, it increased fourfold in Latin 
America” (McMahon & Remy, 2001: 2). In regards to regulation and controls, “the recently 
diminished role of the state in the mining industry” (ibid) has had far reaching effects, such 
as in how environmental regulations and negotiations with local communities now feature 
TNCs in a more central role.ii 
In regards to labor, transnational corporate mining has required fewer and fewer 
labor inputs. In 1990, there were nearly 25 million workers in the mining industry 
worldwide, but as organizational advancements and mechanization has intensified, there 
were only 5.5 million working in the industry by 2000 (Moody, 2007: 69). The number of 
employees in Caribbean mining operations, such as in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, 
reflects the global decline of labor inputs into the industry. Although labor unions have 
traditionally been strong in the region, their power has declined as the industry became 
increasingly less tethered from state enterprises. Roger Moody explains, “the proportion of 
ill-paid, disempowered, subcontracted mineworkers has significantly increased” over recent 
years (Ibid). Thirty years ago, Caribbean miners were often paid directly through state 
owned enterprises, even when a multinational corporation managed operations. This is 
almost unheard of today. Contemporary mining workers are paid directly by TNCs or 
through contractors/subcontractors, forming a more flexibilized labor regime where work is 
more tightly managed, standardized, and monitored.iii 
Below, I examine the historical trajectory and political economy of earlier 
international models of industrial mining and the role of the state. I consider the recent 
transnationalization of the industry and the increasingly facilitative role of state elites in this 
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process.  I will discuss how this complex process played out in my case studies, Jamaica, the 
Dominican Republic, and Haiti. 
 
Jamaica: From International to Transnational Mining 
Bound up with specific conditions and historical legacies, industrial mining in the 
British colonies and ex-colonies developed at a more rapid pace than elsewhere in the 
Caribbean. With the allied nations during the World War and Post-War periods requiring 
resources for their military industries, new state-guided investments emerged with a focus in 
resource extraction industries. The commercial discovery of Bauxite in Jamaica occurred in 
the early 1940s, and soon thereafter North American investors purchased and leased large 
areas of land containing deposits of ore (Hughes, 1973: 3).  With the defeat of Jamaica’s 
militant labor and leftwing political forces in 1938, dominant groups solidified their relative 
hegemony (Post, 1978). In turn, the island’s independence in the mid-twentieth century 
opened further opportunities for international investment. Jamaica’s situation and experience 
with a relatively late independence, after a period of political tutelage, contrasted greatly 
with the historical context of other nearby islands. 
Motivated in part by U.S. Cold War policies in the 1950s, North American capital 
invested heavily in developing bauxite mining in Jamaica (Hughes, 1973: 1). Between 1950 
and 1966, the vast majority of foreign capital flowed into bauxite mining, a magnet of 
economic growth that served as the single largest source of tax revenue for the country. By 
the beginning of the Korean War, the U.S. sought to double its capacity in aluminum 
through the auspices of national security. The U.S. Defense Production Act of 1950 
provided generous financial support for the program (Ibid). U.S. international corporations, 
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such as Kaiser and Reynolds, acquired deposits in Jamaica and received a majority of the 
Act’s money allocated for the U.S. metal capacity (Ibid): 
 
The United States Government had a particular interest in introducing the 
Jamaican deposits as the chief source of incremental supplies. In the first 
place, the large size of the reserves made large-scale production over time 
feasible; secondly, the proximity of Jamaica to the Gulf Coast ports made the 
strategic route easier to defend. (Girvan, 1971) 
 
Initially it was the strategic requirements of the U.S. government (building up its National 
Strategic Stockpile) that prompted the creation of the bauxite industry in Jamaica. At the 
time it was considered by U.S. policymakers that “The development of the West Indies 
deposits is important as a security measure” (Ibid). By the 1960s the burden of financing the 
operations had switched to the private sector. Jamaica’s bauxite was near the surface, so it 
could be mined with conventional mining equipment (Ibid: 26). Low extraction costs, local 
accessibility, and importantly, the proximity to the U.S., were important features of the 
endeavor (Ibid: 21).   U.S. reliance on Jamaican bauxite grew tremendously during this 
period; In 1951 imported bauxite from Jamaica supplied 61% of U.S. needs, yet by 1965 the 
U.S. imported 86% of its bauxite from Jamaica (Ibid: 30). 
Growing production in the 1960s included the advent of local mining subsidiary 
companies. Owned largely by foreign corporations, these subsidiaries allowed for taxation, 
regulation, and liability benefits for international capital. Their emergence reflected the 
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growing international-orientation and organizational capacity of mining corporations and 
their capitalist owners and investors (Ibid: 15). 
Similarly, Jamaica’s national independence in 1962, with the conservative Jamaican 
Labor Party (JLP) first coming to power, signaled a turning point in economic development. 
Social and political tensions heightened during the 1960s, especially as the popular classes 
faced increasing hardship while major economic sectors, such as mining, continued to reap 
extraordinary profits. Jamaica’s independence and the onrushing of North American capital 
led to shifts within Jamaica’s class structure, with business interests and state elites turning 
outward toward international financial markets. British finance capital and London’s 
oversight had dominated Jamaica during the mid-twentieth century, but into the 1960s 
following the island’s independence, London’s guarantees on financial support began to 
evaporate. Internationalizing U.S. finance capital, and, to a lesser extent, internationally 
geared Canadian finance capital, became increasingly present  (Ibid: 152-159). Besides the 
U.S. based Kaiser and Reynolds, Alcoa established Bauxite mining operations in Jamaica as 
well as in the Dominican Republic.  
 In 1972, the center-left People’s National Party (PNP) swept the nation’s elections, 
gaining a majority in Jamaica’s parliament. In order to fund social programs and facilitate 
national production, a major plank of the PNP’s political platform was to increase revenues 
from the bauxite sector. This meant higher taxes on mining operations and partial state 
ownership of the sector. Under Prime Minister Michael Manley, the PNP government 
acquired a sizable stake of local mining subsidiaries, with the government purchasing 51% 
of the local subsidiary of Kaiser and Reynolds, as well as 6% of Alcoa’s and 7% of Alcan’s 
operations. The government also repurchased most of the ore reserve lands owned by the 
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companies. Mining companies, in return, received forty-year mining leases. By 1974, 
Jamaica became the world's fourth largest producer and second biggest exporter of alumina.  
That same year, following the dramatic rise of worldwide oil prices, the state increased 
bauxite taxes through a production levy. In effect, the levy indexed the price of bauxite to 
the price at which the aluminum companies sold aluminum ingots.  
 The Manley administration developed new agencies to manage the state’s enlarged 
role in the industry. The Jamaica Bauxite Institute began operating in 1976 to monitor, 
regulate, conduct research and advise the government on all aspects of the industry. Yet 
local and international conditions and the structural contradictions therein made it extremely 
difficult for the PNP’s project to succeed. International capital and the U.S. strongly 
opposed statist developmental policies. To assuage its opponents, Manley’s government 
sought to position itself as non-aligned during the Cold War. Yet exaggerating  Jamaica’s 
relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union, hardline militarists in Washington sought to 
undermine Manley’s government. Evidence suggests (Blum, 2004: 263-267) that U.S. 
intelligence apparatuses and various business interests—including those connected with the 
mining industry—engaged in a campaign to destabilize Manley’s first administration. The 
defeat of the PNP’s initial platform was symbolized by its loss in the violence-marred 
elections held in late 1980. The smaller, Marxist oriented Workers Party of Jamaica (WPJ), 
which had played a role in pulling the PNP to the left during the 1970s, later collapsed. The 
hollowing out of Jamaica’s political landscape was made easier by the fact that the 
communist and socialist left within Jamaica’s labor movement had been marginalized and 
brutally crushed since the late 1930s (Post, 1978). 
Throughout the 1980s and 90s under the JLP and then under a reconstituted PNP, the 
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earlier statist mining policies were largely dismantled. Alongside an economic restructuring 
of Jamaica during the global era, policy and ideological differences have diminished over 
the years between the two major parties (Sprague, 2013). Foreign investment in mining has 
grown somewhat, which industry experts estimated resulted in increased output of 1.5 
million metric tons of Bauxite production per annum.  Over recent decades the Jamaican 
state’s macro-economic policies have increasingly run in line with the “Washington 
consensus” promoted by international financial institutions (IFIs), encouraging state 
budgetary austerity alongside borrowing to boost capital investment and local consumption. 
As observed by Johnston (2013), this has led to a multilateral debt trap, in which the 
country’s long-term economic development has stagnated and social inequality has 
increased. 
Neoliberal policies have reflected the withdrawal of the Jamaican state from its 
former role in domestic mining operations.iv In 1999, the government agreed to a further 
reduction of the bauxite levy. Since then, the levy has been eliminated altogether, bringing 
Jamaica in line with pro-industry conditions in many other parts of the world. Transnational 
capital clearly has held powerful influence over policymakers in Jamaica’s state apparatus, 
who have sought to accommodate global investors by opening up local markets and 
eliminating barriers to capital mobility. Barclay and Girvan document how Jamaica’s state 
apparatus has almost entirely dropped its previous mining policies, even abandoning 
taxation of the industry: 
 
Since the late 1970s, the Jamaican government has progressively changed its 
policy stance vis-à-vis the Transnational Corporations (TNCs) operating in its 
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bauxite industry from relatively confrontational to relatively accommodating. 
A controversial bauxite production levy was replaced by a fiscal regime 
based on corporate profits taxes and royalties. The changes were due to a 
steep decline in the government’s bargaining power in relation to the 
traditional TNCs players and to the new players in the global industry; 
manifested in a dramatic fall in Jamaica’s global bauxite and alumina market 
share and the perceived need to restore international competitiveness. Also 
playing a part were the deteriorating economic situation of the country and 
the changing ideological climate associated with the Washington Consensus. 
The policy changes, in the context of the global restructuring of the 
aluminum industry; resulted in new investment with increases in plant 
capacity and production; but aggregate returns from the industry have not 
grown significantly as per unit returns have declined; and the recent global 
economic slowdown has resulted in plant closures. (2008: 1) 
 
To be clear, mining has become a more globally competitive industry. By the early 
1970s, bauxite production in Australia had overtaken Jamaica, with some 27 million tons a 
year produced as opposed to Jamaica's 11 to 12 million tons. By 2010, bauxite mining in 
Jamaica was producing 9 million tons per anum, in comparison to 70 million tons produced 
in Australia and with the mining of bauxite expanding worldwide. In total, mining and 
quarrying contributed 8.6% to Jamaica’s GDP in 1995, with 98% of that coming from 
bauxite and alumina. Bauxite has remained among the country’s leading industries well into 
the twenty-first century. Alumina and bauxite have remained the two leading export 
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commodities, accounting for more than 50% of the total value of exports in 2000. Yet as 
bauxite mines in other regions have become more cost effective, since 2000 there has been a 
steep decline in Jamaican production. Even still a rise in the minerals’ value has resulted in 
continual private sector interest in maintaining operations.  
Bauxite mining (though in decline) appears set to continue for many more decades 
on the island. There are at present four bauxite mining and refining operations in Jamaica. 
Half of the mined bauxite is processed on the island in the four alumina refineries, which 
have a combined capacity of some 2.7 million tons a year. The alumina is exported mainly 
to Europe and North America, but in recent decades exports have expanded to other non-
traditional locations.  
 
Bauxite & Aluminum products as a total of Jamaican exports 
   
1972 1980 1991 2001 2010 
Aluminum oxide & hydroxide 38.7 57 43.8 51.8 28.7 
Bauxite & concentrates of alum 24.2 21.1 9.1 7.5 9.1 
Source: ECLAC-CEPALSTAT 
 
Whereas mining companies in the mid-twentieth century were closely identified with 
their home nation, in recent years, mining companies have become more transnationally 
oriented, operating through global chains of production and through financial systems 
functionally integrated across borders. For instance, the TNC United Company Rusal, now 
the largest alumina producer globally, recently acquired the Jamaica operations of 
WINDALCO and ALPART. The company with operations around the world, is 
headquartered in Moscow, but is incorporated on the island of Jersey, a British crown 
dependency and tax haven in the Channel Islands. The company initially formed in 2007 
through a merger of Glencore’s alumina assets and the Russian companies RUSAL and 
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SUAL. Major transnational capitalists hold large shares in the company, such as the 
American tycoon Nathaniel Rothschild and Chinese billionaire Robert Kuok (Kuok Hock 
Nien), while its hedge funds are managed by U.S. billionaire John Paulson and the Moscow-
based state bank Vneschekonombank (Gopalan, 2009). 
Jamaica’s mining industry, like mining operations around the world, has become 
integrated with transnational circuits of production and finance. In the 1980s and 1990s, as 
circuits of production and finance transnationalized through new organizational and 
technological advancements, corporations around the world shifted from a national or 
international orientation towards a transnational one. These companies no longer operate in 
Jamaica as an extension of U.S. state policies or subsidies; rather, they thrive in a globally 
competitive and integrated market. 
Transnational mining firms, like earlier multinational firms, have often operated 
through subsidiaries. In Jamaica these have included: Alumina Partners of Jamaica, Noranda 
Jamaica Bauxite Partners, URS Jamaica Ltd, Lydford Mining Co., and Windalco’s West 
Indies Alumina Company. As a case study, Alumina Partners operates a bauxite refinery in 
the southern part of Jamaica. As of 2007, the company exported 1.65 million tons of 
alumina overseas per year, and earned gross revenues of $1.3 billion. In 2011, however, 
Rusal bought out others in the company to assume a 100% stake.  Russal also has gained 
majority shareholder status in the Windalco West Indies Alumina Company. Windalco 
produces 1.2 million tons of alumina annually at its two plants, Kirkvine and Ewarton 
(pictured above). 
Another TNC, Noranda Aluminum, previously based out of Quebec, Canada, also 
operated bauxite mining in Jamaica. In 2006, Xstrata purchased Noranda. Headquartered in 
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Zug, Switzerland, Xstrata is registered in London, and holds operations in 19 countries 
across Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America and South America. Among the 
numerous shareholders of Xstrata, the largest is Glencore International PLC (with a stake of 
approximately 34%). In turn, Glencore, a transnational commodity trading and mining 
company, with shareholders from around the world, is headquartered in Baar, Switzerland 
but registered on the island of Jersey. The world's largest commodities trading company, 
Glencore, had a 2010 global market share of 60% in the internationally tradable zinc market, 
50% in the internationally tradable copper market, 9% in the internationally tradable grain 
market and 3% in the internationally tradable oil market. Glencore has production facilities 
around the world and supplies metals, minerals, crude oil, oil products, coal, natural gas and 
agricultural products to global customers in the automotive, power generation, steel 
production and food processing industries. 
A number of other transnational enterprises have large holdings in Xstrata. The 
Qatari sovereign wealth fund, Qatar Holding, has a 12% stake in Xstrata. Glencore also has 
ties with the U.S.-based Century Aluminum Co. and it has a 70.5% stake in one of the top 
three nickel producers based in Australia (Minara Resources Ltd), and a 8.8% share in Rusal. 
Another transnational mining firm, the Australian headquartered Ausjam Mining, began the 
first recorded gold-mining operation in Jamaica in 2000, in Pennants. Subsumed in a global 
whirlpool of finance capital, many long-standing industrial operations, such as mining in 
Jamaica, have actually continued into the contemporary era but as part of the global 
strategies and accumulation platforms of TNCs. 
 Local Jamaican elites have become deeply interconnected with the global economy 
through the sale of imports, export processing, tourism inputs, and financial integration. 
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Despite this local involvement, economic activity around mining has remained largely 
within the sphere of leading transnational conglomerates. Local subcontracting ties with the 
industry have remained primarily through port logistic services and transportation (Jamaican 
Ministry of Trade official, personal communication, 2014). While the operations of mining 
corporations have shifted over recent decades, one long-standing dynamic persists: the lack 
of local inputs. This can be seen also in the continued lack of technological transfers, with 
Jamaica still lacking local aluminum smelters.  
 As discussed further below, transnationally oriented state elites and technocrats 
operating through state apparatuses have played a significant role in ushering along TNC 
mining projects in recent decades. In Jamaica, officials from both major political parties, the 
JLP and the PNP, have promoted the dismantling of the state’s direct role in mining while 
undertaking policies conducive to transnational mining capital. In one ongoing project that 
encourages future TNC mining operations, the Jamaican state’s mining agency collaborates 
with the mining agency of the Government of the Czech Republic to identify local non-
metallic mineral deposits “for rapid economic development” as well as other projects 
focused on new and continuing mining operations. Yet, while attempts to promote mining in 
Jamaica continue, taxation levels are dropping and repatriation of local earnings continues 
unabated. It now appears that the last remaining “national goal” is to maintain a minimal 
level of low waged jobs in the sector so as not to exacerbate the high level of unemployment 
in the country.  In late 2014, the Jamaican state agreed to cease for two years the last 
remaining levies on companies active in mining bauxite within the country. With levies 
dropped and local operations almost completely privatized, the number of jobs (albeit 
shrinking over recent decades) appears to be one of the few “benefits” left for the local 
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population. As the host government and local business interests benefit now only marginally 
from the industry, the more important overarching concerns of elites and policymakers in 
Jamaica appear to be in maintaining a globally competitive, investor friendly climate.  
 
The Dominican Republic and Transnational Mining: The New El Dorado? 
By the late nineteenth century, the Dominican and Haitian states had passed mining 
laws, yet the industry remained essentially non-existent on the island (Aitkens, 1931: 1-2). 
With the U.S. occupations of the Domingo Republic (1916-1924) and Haiti (1915-1934), 
(Schmidt, 1995; Sprague, 2012), U.S. policymakers, and eventually, the regimes they put in 
place, assumed the task of expanding private property rights, improving road networks, 
managing the money supply, and fostering development of credit institutions. By 1930, the 
dictatorship of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo in the Dominican Republic had consolidated power 
through the local military and state, strengthened by U.S. largess. Yet suffering from 
fragmentation and economic fragility, few local mechanisms existed through which political 
negotiations and a legalistic distribution of power could occur. With a weak and repressed 
civil society, the Trujillo regime consolidated power, in turn reproducing exclusion and 
inequality. As foreign capital controlled the country’s most dynamic sectors, the regime 
monopolized the role of local counterpart to foreign capital. As Trujillo and his coterie 
owned many of the largest businesses in the country, slowing the formation of local 
productive capital (Espinal, 1986). Buying out some of the most profitable local monopolies, 
and excluding foreign capital, Trujillo promoted a particular brand of ISI policies. 
Not only did the island lack the infrastructure and social and political cohesion best 
suited for the mining industry’s development, international mining companies focused on 
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easier to reach mineral deposits in more developed countries.  With limited success, local 
officials enticed foreign capital to invest, offering sweetheart deals to potential foreign 
investors that required mines pay as little as 2% of the gross product to the public treasury.v 
During the decades after World War II, international corporate investment in the “imperial 
frontier” expanded. Though to a much lesser extent than in Jamaica, U.S. state policies 
helped the Alcoa mining corporation begin mining bauxite in the Dominican Republic by 
1959. 
Deepening international economic activity occurred alongside transformative 
political and social processes in the Dominican Republic. Soon after the death of Trujillo in 
1961, a short-lived democratically elected center-left government came to power under Juan 
Bosch. When a right-wing coup soon overthrew Bosch, though, the ensuing armed conflict 
between constitutionalist and putchist factions prompted U.S. policymakers to occupy the 
country and back the local conservative forces. Ultimately, the Trujillista leader Joaquín 
Balaguer came to power, strengthened by the force of U.S. bayonets. Eventually, the 
Balaguer regime offered space for foreign and local business, especially those linked to 
productive industry, construction and finance (Espinal, 1986), while continuing to repress 
labor and grassroots movements. 
The early 1970s saw the construction of large-scale dams on the island, such as the 
Péligre Dam in Haiti in 1971 and the Yaque del Norte in the Dominican Republic in 1973. 
These infrastructure projects were important steps for capitalist development, permitting the 
expansion of the electrical grids and incremental improvements to the overall quality of life. 
With new export processing initiatives, economic relations strengthened between certain 
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local and foreign capitalists, especially with the influx of private investment promoted by 
the U.S. state. 
A tightly managed democratic opening occurred in the late 1970s with the election of 
the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), the party founded by Bosch. Fractions of the 
business community, once excluded from the paternalistic system of business-government 
relations under Balaguer, built alliances and collaborated with PRD politicians. As the 
political system modernized and enshrined more basic rights, the socioeconomic conditions 
of the poor remained backward and labor’s power was minimal. Espinal explains: “despite 
the democratic opening, which has largely consisted of holding freer and more competitive 
elections and more protection of basic human and political rights, the working class 
continues to be highly excluded from power and a fair share of the wealth produced in 
society” (1986: 228). In turn, segments of the local bourgeoisie became increasingly linked 
with foreign investors, and helped to foster local conditions conducive to the expanding 
global economy. 
During this period, the mining industry began to expand in the Dominican Republic. 
One study explains: “Mining in particular took on a greater role, as that sector's share of 
exports grew from an insignificant level in 1970 to 38% by 1980” (Library of Congress, 
1986). As mining ramped up in the 1970s, shifting political dynamics led the PRD 
government to seek a greater role facilitating and taxing operations, in order to assure 
greater revenues for the state. By the early 1980s the Dominican state levied a 5% export tax, 
and charged a 40% annual income tax on the net profits of private mining operations (with, 
however, various exemptions).
vi 
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 In time, international pressure urged the state to drop its official ownership role in 
various industries, including mining. Neoliberal policies called for leveraging local assets, 
such as mineral resources, to entice investment from abroad. Policies began to percolate 
during the 1980s and 1990s, as the Dominican state relied on the mining expertise of 
corporations abroad while maintaining ownership and a partial role in management (S. A. 
Ramirez Beltne, personal communication, 2013). In the 1990s, as capitalist globalization 
intensified, a new administration under the rightist Partido Reformista Social Cristiano 
(PRSC), headed by Joaquin Balaguer, issued new mining decrees, bringing the country’s 
mining laws in step with pro-investment regimes such as in Mexico (Gobierno de Republica 
Dominicana, 1997), an important step toward deepening the confidence of capitalist 
investors in local mineral extraction. Under the subsequent Partido de la Liberación 
Dominicana (PLD) and PRD administrations, officials negotiated new contracts with 
transnational mining companies, though only some reached full-scale production By the late 
1990s and into the 2000s, structural dynamics developed, turning the nation into an easily 
accessible node for transnational capital. 
To understand the novel role of mining TNCs in the country, it is especially useful to 
look at the development of the Pueblo Viejo mine, founded in 1972 as a concession from the 
Dominican state. Between 1975 and 1999 the New York- and Honduras-based Rosario 
Mining Company, with support from the Dominican state authorities, initiated operations on 
what would become a vast 7.5 million square meter open-pit mine which contains gold, 
silver, zinc, and cooper. Open-pit mining is a surface mining technique for extracting rock or 
minerals through their removal from an open pit, rather than through a shaft into the ground. 
Grullón and Antares (2012) observe, “The operations of Rosario Dominicana were 
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disastrous in environmental, social and financial terms.” They add, “At least four rivers of 
the area were polluted with Acid Mine Drainage (AMD) and with discharges from the 
tailings of dams, one of which overflowed in 1979 during a hurricane; and more than 600 
families were displaced” to make way for the project. It is estimated that hundreds of 
millions of dollars would be required to clean up the environmental damage (Ibid: 27-28). 
 
Production of (selected) minerals in the Dominican Republic 
(Metric tons unless otherwise specified) 
 
 1990 1998 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Gold/kg 4,350 1,421 173 494 490 4,106 23,019 
Silver/kg 21,600 7,409 450 20,300 18,300 27,296 * 
Copper - - 11,500 9,000 11,700 11,737 * 
Nickel  28,700 40,300 500 - 1,143,000 1,301,694 * 
 
Sources: Wacaster, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013; Barrick Website, 2014;  
Goldcorp Website, 2014 (*= data not yet available). 
 
 Despite the mine’s closure at the turn of the century, production resumed nearly ten 
years later, with new operations greatly benefiting from advancing technology and 
techniques. In 2002, a Vancouver-based transnational mining company, Placer Dome, 
signed mining contracts with the Dominican government, including a 25-year lease 
(extendable to 75 years) for the Pueblo Viejo mining area (Austen, 2005). However, in 2006 
Placer Dome was acquired for $10.4 billion by another Canadian based transnational mining 
corporation, Barrick Gold, the largest gold mining company in the world.vii Placer Dome’s 
interests in the gold and silver mines of La Coipa and Pueblo Viejo were passed to Barrick 
Gold, potentially growing Barrick’s output of gold tremendously.viii  That same year, another 
transnational mining corporation, Goldcorp, acquired 40% of the Pueblo Viejo venture from 
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Barrick.ix Despite these corporate maneuvers, Barrick remained the sole operator, through its 
local subsidiary, the Pueblo Viejo Dominicana Corporation (PVDC). 
Consistent with its unparalleled presence in mining gold worldwide, Barrick Gold 
Corporation has investors from around the world. Headquartered in Toronto and founded by 
Canadian real estate magnate Peter Munk, it has four regional business units located in 
Australia, Africa, North America and South America, with mining and exploratory projects 
span the globe, from Papua New Guinea, to the United States, Canada, the Dominican 
Republic, Australia, Peru, Chile, Russia, South Africa, Pakistan, Colombia, Argentina and 
Tanzania.  Major investors in the company include Van Eck Associates Corp (a U.S. based 
investment firm with global coverage, including much of the “developing world”), the Bank 
of Montreal (one of the largest banks in Canada, with investments around the world), First 
Eagle Investment Management (a U.S. based investment management firm whose global 
fund has assets totaling almost $50.92 billion invested in 172 different holdings), Allianz 
Asset Management (a financial assets company based in Munich, Germany with $624.95 
billion in total assets and with investors from around the world), and the Bank of New York 
Mellon (the largest deposit bank in the world, with $27.9 trillion in worldwide assets under 
custody or administration). 
Barrick Gold’s mining operation at Pueblo Viejo began in 2011, with the extraction 
of gold and other minerals and production has grown since that time. According to Barrick 
and Goldcorp, the proven reserves of the Pueblo Viejo mine numbered 20 million ounces of 
gold, 117 million ounces of silver, and 424 million pounds of copper. All told, however, the 
total output of the mine will likely be much higher than this initial assessment.  
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Heightened contractor and subcontractor arrangements can also be seen in at Pueblo 
Viejo.  Whereas earlier state connected mining operations at Pueblo Viejo involved very few 
private subcontractors, this has changed in recent years. Barrick Gold Employee Nicomedes 
Acevedo explains, “We’ve had a huge expansion in the volume of relations with 
subcontractors. We’ve worked with around thirty subcontractors here in the Dominican 
Republic, but we have five main subcontractors that have around 3,000 permanent 
employees” (Nicomedes Acevedo, personal communication, 2013). One of the 
subcontractors operating at Barrick Gold’s Pueblo Viejo facilities is Fluor, employing not 
just Dominicans but also workers from Colombia, Peru, the Philippines, and other countries. 
Fluor, a FORTUNE 500 company with 60 office locations on 6 different continents, serves a 
variety of industries for engineering, procurement, construction, maintenance, and project 
management for “governments and clients in diverse industries around the world.”x “A 
global company,” as Fluor’s website describes, it boasts “… core strengths in strategic 
sourcing, material management, and contract management” that enable it to “effectively 
manage supplier and subcontractor information on a global basis for both . . . commercial 
and government clients.”xi   
Another globally active subcontractor at the Pueblo Viejo mine is Sodexo, a 
company that provides meals for labor and management. As with Fluor, investor shares in 
Sodexo are publicly traded in the New York Stock Exchange, among other exchanges. 
Headquartered in Paris, the TNC Sodexo is one of the largest employers in the world with 
380,000 employees, representing 130 nationalities, present on 34,000 sites in 80 countries. 
Reflecting the changing sociological dynamics of the workforce, Sodexo workers at Pueblo 
Viejo are overwhelmingly female. As Barrick officials explain, they take pride in their 
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increased use of female labor in comparison to past operations in which few women were 
employed. Changes in regards to gender dynamics have occurred alongside a heightened 
monetization of the lives of workers. Whereas in the past, for example, “workers ate lunches 
at the mine that their wives packed for them at home,” today workers all eat the same lunch, 
cooked on site by Sodexo employees and provided to workers in plastic containers. The 
standardization of the industry and the expanding role of subcontractors is reflected in these 
changing sociological dynamics. 
Many smaller local subcontractors active at Pueblo Viejo are based in towns nearby, 
exemplifying how a growing number of local businesses have direct, albeit limited, 
connections with transnational mining capital. One contractor, Presecon, is based in the 
small town of Cotui. With the company’s owners seeking to expand across the country, 
leveraging the global investment they have tapped into, its website states that it aspires to 
“become one of the most important and recognized nationwide, seeking to be the leader in 
the area of sub-contracting human resource services…”xii Another local subcontractor, 
Adesco, is also based in the nearby town of Couti and has approximately 80 local employees 
doing seasonal work reforesting former mining sites.xiii Another Cotui based subcontractor, 
Agencia Navarro, provides surveying resources and equipment—such as chain saws and 
compactors—providign transportation services for workers and management at the mine.xiv 
State elites and technocrats operating through Dominican state apparatuses have 
worked to stimulate the global mining industry. For instance, as companies seek mining 
rights, they must first gain concessions for extraction, which requires approval from the 
National Assembly. State officials in the Assembly and other government bodies have 
thereby served as vital conduits through which TNCs secure concessions. Industry insiders 
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regularly hold important government posts and vice versa (Dominican Today, 2012a).xv One 
social justice activist in the Dominican Republic, commenting on the Pueblo Viejo contract, 
writes, “This was actually a rubber stamp exercise by the neoliberal deputies, most of which 
were from the corrupt PLD of President Leonel Fernandez.  There were some votes against 
the contract, but few in comparison to the yes votes” (local anti-mining activist who 
requested anonymity, personal communication, 2013). Similar processes were undertaken 
during the preceding PRD administration of Hipólito Mejía, which oversaw the construction 
of a deep-water mega-port and facilitated the ramping up of the global mining industry 
(Gregory, 2006).  
Beyond Pueblo Viejo, Barrick is slated to open other operations in the country (such 
La Coipa). Furthermore, it is important to note that other mining companies are active on the 
island. Whereas Barrick owns 60% of the Pueblo Viejo, another company, Goldcorp, owns 
the rest.  This is also significant given that Goldcorp had its mining operations in Guatemala 
suspended by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in 2010, 
shuttering for a period its Marlin mine due to human rights violations and extensive 
environmental damage (Guatemala Times, 2010). In addition to these operations, nickel has 
been another prominent mineral mined in the Dominican Republic. From the 1970s, 
industrial scale nickel mining has taken place, a process known for its legacy of 
environmental damage. By the mid-2000s the Dominican Republic ranked eleventh in the 
world in nickel production (Wacaster, 2010). 
New mining operations are on the horizon, aimed largely at the mineral belt that 
stretches from northern Haiti down into the Dominican Republic. In mid-2012, the TNC 
GoldQuest Mining, operating in the western Dominican Republic, released results of a new 
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massive gold-copper exploratory operation (Ibid; Keen, 2012). Another transnational mining 
emporium based out of Canada, Everton Resources, INC, holds the concessions in the 
perimeter areas adjoining the Barrick Gold/Goldcorp Pueblo Viejo operation.xvi In addition, 
two other transnational companies, Novus Gold and Unigold, hold lucrative concessions in 
western areas of the Dominican Republic, closer to the border with Haiti, generally in the 
northwestern area of the country (Keen, 2012). One of these concessions is nearly 1,000 
square kilometers, including areas within the J. Armando Bermudez reserve (a protected 
tropical forest). In 2012, a mining TNC based out of Australia, Perilya Limited, acquired the 
exploitation and exploration rights to a number of copper, silver, and gold mines in the 
Maimón area of the Dominican Republic. The mining TNC, Xstrata Nickel, also continues 
to be active in the country. As one mining expert explains, the “…Dominican Republic is 
shaping up to be a new mining district that should not be underestimated” (Bassteam, 2012). 
On the other hand, the global growth of industrial mining has led to the temporary 
shuttering of some operations and the reopening of others. The transnational mining 
company, Xstrata Nickel (based in the UK), after shutting down its Falconbride Dominicana 
C operation, which accounted for much of the nickel mining in the country, has begun new 
nickel mining operations near Bonao (Wacaster, 2010). Another TNC, GlobeStar Mining 
Corp, in 2009 began producing copper, gold, and silver from open pit mining at its wholly 
owned Cerro de Maimón operations, also located near Bonao (Ibid). 
The overall importance of mining has fluctuated, especially as other economic 
sectors have grown in recent decades. Community and social movements in the Dominican 
Republic have repeatedly launched protests over the environmental damage and the high 
profits that transnational corporations make off of mineral extraction in the country (local 
!! 191!
anti-mining activist who requested anonymity, personal communication, 2013). Yet most 
indications suggest that the industry in the region will continue to expand. Incentives for 
continued growth include heightening values of minerals, growing investment in the 
industry worldwide, and the continued drive toward global competitiveness by 
transnationally oriented elites insulated from popular pressures. Over the next decade, the 
share of the Dominican Republic’s GDP from mining will likely surpass 3% (Bamrud, 
2012). Reports suggest that Barrick’s recently renegotiated Pueblo Viejo contract will pay 
out to the Dominican State $377 million from the $8 billion of gross revenue between 2012 
and 2016 (Herasme, 2014). 
Declared by one commentator as the “investment jewel of the Caribbean,” mining 
operations in the Dominican Republic are rapidly becoming a major spigot for transnational 
capitalist entry into the country. As will be discussed below, moreover, mining contracts 
pushed through after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti have been aimed at a similar outcome. 
Junior mining exploratory companies active in the Dominican Republic have seen their 
values rise, as have large mining TNCs such as Barrick. As one industry watcher explained, 
“Their new high-grade gold (and copper) discoveries in the Dominican Republic have 
caught the attention of investors, both retail and institutional” (Bassteam, 2012). Today, the 
Dominican Republic is the largest site of foreign direct investment in the Caribbean, as 
companies from around the world have set up shop, including companies based in the U.S., 
the E.U., Canada, Australia, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela (Pellerano, 2012). As the 
Dominican case illustrates, mining increasingly reflects the speculation, demands and 
capabilities of the global economy, rather than statist developmental projects or long-term 
state driven trade policies. 
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Haiti and the New Disaster Mining 
Mining has long remained underdeveloped in Haiti, as U.S. government researchers 
explained in the late 1940s (U.S. Tariff Commission, 1949: 4). Since the early twentieth 
century the island of Hispaniola was increasingly intervened in by the United States. 
Eventually with the end of the U.S. occupation in 1934, the military force armed and trained 
by the U.S. played an important role in the country, crushing labor movements and carrying 
out coup d'états. In addition, simmering beneath the surface was the persistent divide 
between the grandon (the rural elite landowning class) and the urban bourgeoisie. In 1959, 
the Cold War-era dictatorship of Francois ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier came to office, 
monopolizing power with the aid of the military and a nationwide paramilitary force created 
by the regime (and trained and armed early on by a U.S. Marine expedition).  Duvalier’s rule 
propped up a political system that maintained the country’s severe inequality and was 
continued under his son, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier. Foreign investment intensified 
under Jean-Claude, elites close to the regime profited tremendously. During the first four 
years of Papa Doc’s dictatorship, the Reynolds Mining Company, a U.S. corporation, held a 
monopoly on bauxite mining in the country, paying a mere 7% of its earnings to the Haitian 
state. Similarly, in the 1970s under “Baby Doc,” a small amount of copper mining was 
undertaken by a U.S. company.xvii  
By the last quarter of the twentieth century, supranational agencies and state agencies 
increasingly conducted mineral exploratory operations around the world, especially where 
local investors or governments were unable. In Haiti, for example, the UN Development 
Program carried out exploratory drilling in the northwest of the country in the 1970s. During 
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the 1980s, Germany’s Bundesanstalt fur Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe ran feasibility 
studies of mining in Haiti’s northeast. That same decade, the area was explored again by the 
UNDP and also surveyed by the French Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minière. In 
the 1990s, a Canadian exploratory mining venture also conducted drilling in Haiti’s north 
(Niles, 2012). For a number of reasons—lack of infrastructure, political instability, and a 
mineral market that did not yet justify the costs—the findings of these projects were not 
pursued at the time. Rural communities in Haiti’s north have also protested mining 
operations, viewing them as providing little to the local population (Sprague, 2006). 
With the end of the Duvalier dynasty in 1986, the failure of successive attempts by 
the military and elites to crush popular protests led to democratic elections at the behest of 
the U.S. and other powerful international interests. Whereas elites and their foreign backers 
attempted to manipulate the electoral process, their plans backfired when the popular-left 
government of former priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected with wide support. Yet only 
seven months into his term in office, in September of 1991, Aristide was overthrown by a 
military junta. The military regime, heavily involved in narcotics trafficking and death-
squad repression, quickly faced international isolation. Rooted in the country’s traditional 
power structure, the regime received support from those sectors of the elite and army who 
rejected the democratic transition. 
Attempting to gain foreign investors, the de facto regime granted some mining 
concessions (Prepetit, 2000),xviii but only after the restitution of the constitutional 
government in 1994 were new mineral exploratory operations begun.  In 1995, a Canadian 
mining company, St. Genevieve Resources, began prospecting in the north of the country 
(Ibid). The following year, the U.S. based company Newmont Mineral Exploration gained 
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prospecting licenses for areas of north and central Haiti (Ibid). A number of small-scale 
exploration operations continued on throughout the late-1990s and early-2000s (Wacaster, 
2010). However, renewed efforts to undermine Haiti’s government by sectors of the upper 
class, their allies abroad and former members of the disbanded military led to another coup 
d'état and ultimately a UN military occupation in 2004.xix Dominant groups working with 
and through various state and supranational agencies have since sought to press forward 
with the country’s economic restructuring, while blocking free and fair elections. 
Haiti’s fragility creates a risk that any new mining operations will result in few 
tangible benefits for the Haitian people, such as investment in the country’s public 
infrastructure. In mid-2005, new mining concessions were granted by the post-coup regime, 
such as with the mineral rights to the SOMINE area, leased through a Mining Convention 
(valid until 2020) for Majescor, a Canadian based transnational mining company. As one 
researcher explains, after the 2004 coup, “it did not take long for Haiti’s mountains to start 
to glitter. For example, an exploration of the Faille-B prospect in 2007 found a gold vein 
that averaged 42.7 grams of gold per ton of ore (g/t) over 6 meters, including values of 107.5 
g/t of gold over one meter” (Chery, 2012). Leopoldo Espaillat Nanita, former head of the 
Dominican Petroleum Refinery (REFIDOMSA) explains bluntly that: “there is a 
multinational conspiracy to illegally take the mineral resources of the Haitian people. Haiti’s 
mineral wealth is immense, with gold, valuable strategic metals such as iridium and other 
minerals as well” (Espacinsular, 2009). 
 
 
 
!! 195!
2011 Map of Eurasian Mineral  
mining permit zones in Haiti 
  
Source: Eurasian Minerals (2012) 
 
The immensity of this resource wealth came into view following the earthquake of 
2010, when a new wave of donor-facilitated exploratory operations began. Heightened 
penetration by global capital has thus gone hand in hand with disaster relief, deepening the 
country’s structural inequalities alongside so few immediate options for economic 
development. One commentator explains: 
 
Mining companies appear to know that now is likely the best time in years to 
move into Haiti: the country has a low royalty rate, there are peacekeepers 
stationed throughout the country, a giant free trade zone and new deep-water 
port are being built in the north, minimum wage is the lowest in the 
hemisphere, and all signs indicate that the new government will write 
business-friendly laws. (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2012a) 
 
!! 196!
With the ramping up of capitalist globalization and the earthquake of 2010, the 
mining industry began to show signs of major expansion in Haiti. Global corporations and 
their allies in governments have become adept at taking advantage of situations in which 
natural disasters have thrown societies and their political systems into disarray. In such 
situations, corporate planners have learned to skirt long-standing laws, renegotiate various 
contracts, and remake property relations (Klein, 2008). Economic development in post-
quake Haiti has been intentionally channeled through transnational capitalist chains of 
accumulation. One group of researchers found, “If geologists’ calculations are correct, 
Haiti’s northern mountains contain hundreds of millions of ounces of gold. With gold prices 
currently topping $1,600 an ounce, one estimate puts the eventual take at $20 billion” (Haiti 
Grassroots Watch, 2012b). 
Shifting political dynamics in the country, furthermore, are reflected in the recent 
push to create large mining zones across the country. Following the controversial and poorly 
attended presidential primary and runoff election win of Duvalierist ally Michel Martelly, 
the country’s rightwing bloc has had a political comeback (Weisbrot, 2011). The new 
rightwing government has violated the country’s constitutional process in order to set into 
motion new mining concessions  (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2012c). Here it is important to 
note the close ties between government officials with the industry. As one researcher 
explains: “Haiti’s new prime minister – Laurent Lamothe – is very pro-business. A 
telecommunications and real estate entrepreneur with companies in Africa and Latin 
America, he has pledged to push through business-friendly legislation in all sectors, 
including mining” (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2012a). In another case, former Haitian finance 
minister Ronald Baudin, instrumental in approving the Martelly government’s new mining 
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convention, became a consultant for the transnational mining firm Newmont immediately 
after leaving office. This was one of the companies for which he had helped to get the 
convention enacted while in office (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2012c). 
Two mining companies, Majescor and Eurasian/Newmont have looked to fast-track 
mining operations in the years following the earthquake. In April 2012, the 
Eurasian/Newmont venture and the Haitian government agreed for exploratory drilling to 
take place as a new mining convention was being ratified to permit the company’s new 
projects. Under a memorandum of understanding, the Savane La Place gold prospect is the 
first project slated for drilling. The convention will cover a huge amount of land, 1,350 
square kilometers (Ibid). Already allegations of government-mining collusion in illegality 
has surfaced.xx The Eurasian/Newmont operation, through its local partner Marien Mining, 
is believed to hold more mining licenses in Haiti than any other company, so much so that 
their holdings amount to one-tenth of the country’s landmass. Looking to stimulate mining 
operations after the earthquake, the World Bank’s private sector agency, the International 
Finance Corporation, has invested $5 million in the Eurasian/Newmont operation (Ibid). 
Another mining company, the Canada based transnational, Majescor, is pursuing 
mining at the copper-silver-gold rich mountain ridge in the north of the country.xxi 
Specializing in mineral surveys, Majescor’s investments could potentially lead to huge 
profits.xxii Majescor and its Haitian partners, hold licenses for at least 450 square kilometers. 
As one investigative report explains, “Taken together, foreign companies are sitting on 
research or exploration permits for one-third of Haiti’s north, 15% of the country’s territory” 
(Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2012b). The same report observes:  
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Majescor is ahead of its rivals, having recently moved to the “exploitation” 
phase for one if its licenses. But VCS and Newmont/Eurasian are close on its 
heels. All of the companies recognize Haiti’s potential. “Haiti is the sleeping 
giant of the Caribbean!” a Majescor partner said recently, while Eurasian 
president David Cole boasted on a radio show: “We control over 1,100 
square miles of real estate.” . . . Because in most locations the copper, silver 
and gold deposits are mostly spread out as tiny specks in the dirt and rock – 
what is sometimes called “invisible gold” – expensive pit mining will often 
be the only option, but Eurasian’s partner Newmont knows its pits. The gold 
giant opened the world’s first pit mine in Nevada in 1962 and later dug in 
Ghana, New Zealand, Indonesia, and other countries. (Ibid)xxiii 
 
Majescor operates in Haiti through a local affiliate, SOMINE (Society Minière du 
Nord-Est S.A.), which is 66.4% owned by Majescor, while the rest of the company is owned 
by Haitian business interests. In one example of the Haitian and diasporic elite involvement 
in local mining ventures, a former Haitian prime minister (Jean Max Bellerive) and a 
president of the Haitian Diaspora Federation (Joseph Baptiste) sit on the advisory committee 
of VCS Mining, a company based out of the U.S. that currently holds (with its partner Delta 
Mining) licenses for over 300 square kilometers in the north of Haiti. 
One clear indicator of how little the state and general population will gain from the 
mining can be seen in through the country’s new mining convention. Christian Aid 
researcher, Claire Kumar, observes that Haiti’s two previous conventions on mining 
appeared to have been positive, since they aimed to secure a 50/50 split of profits and put a 
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cap on expenses. Yet the problem with the new convention is that it places Haiti’s royalty 
rate at an extremely low 2.5% (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2012d; Kumar, 2009). 
Mining capital is focused on three main prospects in Hispaniola, at Douvray, 
Blondin and Faille B; all located in the mountains of the Massif du Nord Metallogenic (the 
northern mineralization belt) that stretches from Haiti’s north through to the southeast of the 
Dominican Republic. Major components of the post-earthquake development strategy in 
Haiti have been centered on drawing in global investors, a practice seen in the U.S. and 
World Bank facilitation of textile ventures, the new deep-water port, and the new mining 
developments discussed above. Policymakers and investors view Haiti as an emergency 
situation for which the solution is to deepen the country’s integration with the global 
economy. However, the political corollary to this economic restructuring, alongside the 
natural and man-made disasters that have occurred over recent decades, has been a UN 
occupation and a deepening political exclusion of the poor. Yet even the most well laid 
plans of policymakers have faced difficulties, with political instability continuing to slow the 
long-term development of mining in the country (Fox, 2015). Fragile economic, social, and 
political conditions will continue to pose significant difficulties for the future of mining 
operations in Haiti.xxiv 
 
Conclusion: Mining and Capitalist Globalization in the Caribbean  
The mining industry’s structure during the era of global capitalism has developed 
unevenly and in conjunction with novel transnational processes. The very nature in which 
landed property is economically realized has been modified: from statist oriented policies of 
development and international corporate models to a globalized industry of transnational 
!! 200!
capitalists, new labor regimes, and a host of subcontractors and exploratory firms. State 
interaction with the industry has changed from directing or maintaining partial control of 
local operations toward policies of global competitiveness and the seeking out of 
transnational capitalist investors. The newest rounds of mining in turn have benefited from 
major technological advancements, rising mineral prices, and the global scope of 
transnational corporations (in both finance and production). 
Whereas top dominant groups connected with the industry have profited 
tremendously, management has worked to push mineworkers into more globally 
standardized operations. They have sought to enforce flexibilized labor regimes, even as 
labor inputs overall have declined (Moody, 2007). In some parts of the region, such as in the 
Dominican Republic, there have been a number of anti-mining protests in recent years by 
labor and local community groups (Diaz, 2010). Criticism is also growing over the Haitian 
government’s role in pushing through mining contracts that violated the nation’s constitution. 
Meanwhile, the industry has come to utilize a rising number of subcontractors, from 
globally oriented corporations to small local contractors. Yet, these contracting relations, 
which are more intensive than in earlier decades, do not appear to be a major source of value 
for leading capitalists based in Caribbean nations or the wider Caribbean diaspora. In 
Jamaica, for instance, leading dominant groups of capital are profiting mostly through the 
service sector, finance, tourism, and through the sale of imported of goods (Sprague, 2015b). 
Meanwhile, transnational capitalists and global investors have maintained and expanded 
their dominance over mining. At times in recent decades, production in the Dominican 
Republic and Jamaica has received infusions of transnational capital. In Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic, a number of mining excavation firms and larger TNCs have proposed 
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new projects and received the backing of top state officials. Indeed, recently in Jamaica, 
mining corporations received a tax holiday so as to maintain and motivate further investment 
in the sector. 
From the 1980s and especially into the 1990s, Caribbean states undertook policies to 
contract out and privatize state mining operations, which by the twenty-first century resulted 
in local conditions highly conducive for exploratory firms and transnational mining 
conglomerates. Even as state apparatuses have increasingly disengaged from a direct role in 
mining, resource extraction remains a major “developmental strategy” for transnationally 
oriented policymakers in the Caribbean region and a major source of transnational capital. 
State apparatus and supranational agency officials are seeking now to jumpstart mining in 
more economically fragile areas, even if it means violating domestic constitutional law, as in 
Haiti. On both sides of the Dominican-Haitian border, resource extraction zones are being 
cordoned off for mining TNCs and exploration companies. A number of untapped mineral 
deposits remain in the region. Gold and silver are so highly valued and rare that some state 
policymakers, facing protests and demands from local populations, might renegotiate 
contracts for these most resource rich zones, such as has occurred recently in the Dominican 
Republic (Jimenez, 2013). In general, however, transnationally oriented state elites and 
technocrats , bypassing input from local communities and overlooking issues of 
sustainability, have promoted more accessible juridical and regulatory frameworks to entice 
transnational capitalist investors. Across the Caribbean, transnational corporations have 
come to dominate mining operations. Mining in the region will continue and in some 
locations intensify over the coming decades, whereas in some areas (such as in Haiti) local 
peculiarities will likely slow its expansion. It remains to be seen how local communities, 
!! 202!
labor and social movements, and environmentalist campaigns will impact the processes 
through which mines, as landed property, are economically realized. 
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Notes 
i As one industry report observes: “By the end of the second half of 2011, the mining 
and metals sector had successfully ridden the storm of global economic uncertainty, 
emerging financially stronger and poised for growth. Balance sheets are stronger, with many 
companies faced with the challenging but positive decision of how best to utilize their 
capital — the dilemma of buy, build or return is back on many boardroom tables” (Ernst & 
Young, 2012). 
ii Unable in this paper to discuss the ecological impact of industrial mining and the 
new contradictory protocols that have been developed to regulate environmental impacts, 
readers should view other studies that discuss this, for example: Moody, 2007. 
iii One former miner from the town of Maimón, who worked at Pueblo Viejo between 
1973 and 1993 when mining operations were owned by the state, spoke to me about his 
career and the changes that have taken place in the mining industry. In contrast to workers at 
the Pueblo Viejo mine now being paid directly by Barrick Gold, he explained how the 
Rosario Dominicana state enterprise directly paid their workers' salaries during the earlier 
period of the mine’s operations (S. A. Ramirez Beltne, personal communication, 2013). He 
explained further to me how workers, as they have come to work directly for TNCs, have 
faced more flexibilized duties, such as being required more often to adapt to fluctuations and 
changes in production. 
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iv Such as its 7% share in 2011 in the West Indies Alumina Co. (Wacaster, 2012). 
v In the case of mines situated on land owned by others, companies were required to 
pay an additional 2% to owners of the topsoil. Officially all land beneath topsoil was owned 
by the government, so mining companies (domestic or foreign) had to obtain a permit from 
the government to undertake mining operations and excavate. Laws on the ownership of 
land beneath topsoil can be traced back to the legal codes of the European monarchies that 
colonized the Caribbean (Aitkens, 1931: 2-3, 7). 
vi Dominican mining laws previously required that 10% of profits be distributed 
among the permanent employees and workers, and some very minimal laws existed in 
regards to water running through mining companies property. Thought it appears highly 
unlikely these laws were well enforced (General Secretariat of the Organization of American 
States, 1984: 20-22). 
             vii See Barrick Gold’s official website at: http://www.barrick.com. 
             viii Placer Dome at the time of being acquired was the world’s sixth largest producer 
of gold, with many of its most successful operations in Australia, South Africa, and North 
America. Prior to the merger, around 60% of Placer Dome’s production came from mines in 
North America. Other top gold mining TNCs include Newmont mining of Denver, and 
AngloGold Ashanti of Johannesburg. 
ix See Goldcorp’s official website at: http://www.goldcorp.com. 
x “A Letter to Suppliers and Contractors,” Fluor Website, Accessed July 2014. 
Available online at: http://www.fluor.com/services/procurement/supplier_ 
and_contractor_registry/pa ges/a_letter_to_suppliers_and_contractors.aspx. 
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xi “A Letter to Suppliers and Contractors,” Fluor Website, Accessed July 2014. 
Available online at: http://www.fluor.com/services/procurement/supplier_ 
and_contractor_registry/pa ges/a_letter_to_suppliers_and_contractors.aspx. 
xii  Presecon, “Quienes Somos?”, Accessed July 2013, Available online at: 
http://prese con.blogspot.com /p/que-es-presecon-vision-convertirnos-en.html. 
xiii Adesco stands for Agencia de Empleo y Servicios Cotuí. 
xiv Agencia Navarro S.R.L., Company’s Facebook website, accessed July 2013, 
available online at: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Agencia-Navarro-
SRL/136580319725075 
xv Illustrating well the revolving door between elites operating through government 
and global industry, former U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic (nominated by 
President George W. Bush), Hans Hertell, a Puerto Rican and member of the U.S. 
Republican party, while the sitting ambassador lobbied extensively for Barrick Gold and 
Goldcorp during the companies negotiations over Pueblo Viejo with the Dominican state. 
After he finished his ambassadorship in Santo Domingo, a law firm representing Barrick 
Gold in the Dominican Republic hired Hertell. 
xvi See the Everton Resources website here: http://www.evertonresources.com. 
xvii Also in the mid-1980s a marble quarry briefly operated. Ibid. 
xviii See for example Prepetit’s (2000) discussion on Société minière Citadelle’s silver 
deposit concessions in the Grand-Bois and Morne Bossa. 
xix It is also interesting to note that ancillary evidence suggests that at least one 
mining interest provided financial support to anti-democratic ex-army paramilitaries. In his 
investigation into Haiti’s 2004 coup, Hallward explained: “In Cap-Haïtien I spoke to people 
!! 205!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
who say they were party to meetings of leading local businessmen, for instance at the Hotel 
Saint Christophe, which served to raise funds on [Guy Philippe and the FLRN’s] behalf. I 
was also told that some international companies, for instance the Québec-based mining firm 
Saint Geneviève Resources (with gold-mining interests in northeastern Haiti), contributed 
money to [the paramilitaries] cause.” See: Hallward, 2007. 
xx The authors add that: “Eurasian and Newmont Mining, its partner and the world’s 
Number 2 gold producer, are also drilling illegally in one area – La Miel, in the northeast – 
in collusion with certain government members.” 
xxi Observing the property’s underdevelopment, Dady Chery explains: “The official 
story is that an abundance of copper had until recently obscured the fact that the area’s ore is 
also rich in silver and gold, and this was discovered from Majescor’s recent prospects of 
Douvray, Blondin and Faille-B. However, the story could just as well be that the mining 
executives were biding their time and waiting for a “stable” non-nationalistic government to 
take effect before initiating their projects.” See: Chery, “Poor little rich Haiti to be fleeced of 
Copper-Silver-Gold via caracol deep-water port.”  
xxii Chery (2012) explains: The SOMINE property is surrounded by other mining 
properties owned jointly by Majescor and much larger concerns like Eurasian Minerals and 
Newmont Mining. Once Majescor’s surveys are complete, it plans to find a big partner, like 
Eurasian, Newmont or Barrick (or some partnership of these like EMX-Newmont), to 
handle the extractive part of the project.  
xxiii  Haiti Grassroots Watch lists some of the recent allegations made against 
Newmont: “In Peru, Newmont runs one of the world’s largest open pit gold mines: the 251-
square kilometer Yanacocha mine. Not long ago, Newmont was accused of influence 
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peddling there when it was linked to former Peruvian spymaster Vladimiro Montesinos. 
After allegedly assisting Newmont negotiate favorable terms, a former US State Department 
employee ended up on the Newmont payroll. The company was also accused of mercury and 
cyanide spills.” 
xxiv  For my brief perspective on the current political and social struggles in 
Hispaniola and Jamaica, see my recent pieces (Sprague, 2013, 2014). 
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Conclusion 
Transnational Processes and the Restructuring of the Caribbean’s Political 
Economy 
  
 This dissertation focuses on the Caribbean region’s contradictory integration into 
global capitalism in recent decades, through its historical and contemporary 
particularities. I have explored the structural processes bound up with its transition to the 
new globalist stage of world capitalism by examining the transnationalization of four 
major economic sectors—tourism, export processing industry, mining, and the export of 
labor and reverse flow of remittances –as national economies have fragmented and 
integrated into new global circuits of accumulation. 
 At the core of this transition is the altering of production relations. Whereas earlier 
groups of social classes, class fractions, and social groups were rooted largely within 
nation-states and inter-state relations (made up, for instance, of national and international 
capitalists and domestic working classes), we now see the rise of transnational capitalists 
as well as workers whose labor power has been inserted into transnational chains of 
accumulation. Many policymakers and officials operating through state apparatuses, for 
their own legitimization and self-reproduction, have had a decisive role in shifting 
developmental patterns. Promoting the breakup of earlier ISI, nationally oriented, and 
traditional international economic systems (Robinson, 1996, 2003), state elites have 
helped to facilitate economic projects that are transnational in nature and less anchored to 
local peculiarities, supplanting previous models with projects of global competitiveness 
and transnational engagement. This historical process has entailed many contradictions, 
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such as: (1) social polarization, with transnational capitalists obtaining unimaginable 
levels of wealth while working and lower income peoples face new exploitive relations, 
and (2) a crisis of political legitimacy as state policymakers seek to maintain local 
legitimacy even as they deepen policies meant to benefit transnational capital. 
 
Globalization of the Caribbean: Summation of findings 
 This dissertation has been rooted in a historical materialist approach, as discussed 
in the introduction, but one that calls into question the state-centrism inherent in many 
interpretations of production relations.  Taking up a “global capitalism school” approach, 
and specifically the theory of transnational processes (Robinson, 2003: 10-27), this 
dissertation rests on the idea that global capitalism is a new stage in the ongoing 
evolution of world capitalism characterized by the transnational reorganization of 
production and finance and the transnationalization of class. This dissertation breaks from 
reams of studies focusing on the interstate system and nation-state competition as the 
core organizing principle of the world economy, and as the institutional framework 
through which global social forces operate. Rather than view social and material relations 
as boxed into territorialized nation-state and interstate frameworks, it is the “global 
capitalism school” argument that we need to consider how production relations are 
transnationalizing in the global era, as transnational capital subsumes laborers and 
societies into its logic. Deep structural shifts occurring in regions such as the Caribbean 
are cutting across traditional frontiers and barriers in novel ways. 
 The case studies in this dissertation have supported the proposition that we are 
moving from nationally and internationally oriented class relations toward transnationally 
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oriented class relations. I have shown how capital has reorganized accumulation in the 
region into new transnational circuits. For example, Chapter V explained how in the 
decades following the Second World War, companies domiciled in the U.S., owned by 
U.S. investors, and subsidized by the U.S. government, began mining operations in the 
Caribbean. Local state policymakers, especially during the 1970s, attempted often to 
manage and control portions of these operations. Yet with the onset of the global era, 
U.S. government subsidies for mining in the region ended and over time Caribbean 
governments were compelled to privatize their mining assets. This fragmentation of the 
earlier model gave way to the rise of transnational mining corporations in the region, who 
operate globally and are cross-invested with TNCs and transnational capitalists 
worldwide.   
 These changes have occurred not just through capital and the state recalibrating and 
establishing transnational forms of accumulation, but also through workers compelled to 
incorporate their labor power into transnational value chains.  Chapter II, for instance, 
discussed the problematic socio-economic transformation of the cruise ship industry over 
recent decades and in the context of the Caribbean region. The industry’s new era of 
cross-border integration and global competitiveness has occurred alongside new 
exploitative labor regimes, a standardization of the passenger experience, and new 
business strategies seeking to marginalize and finely manage local inputs. The owners 
and executives of major cruise companies have come to epitomize transnational 
capitalists—implicated functionally across borders in transnational production process, of 
finance, and of circuits of capital accumulation. Also looking at the transition from earlier 
international corporate models to a transnational oligopoly, Chapter V, examined 
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flexibilized labor and the rising role of subcontractors with regards to the mining industry 
in the region. 
 Chapter III explained how Caribbean migrant sending and receiving communities 
have become objectively linked in a new manner through transnational remittances. Yet, 
this objective relation takes place through circuits of capital that are controlled by TNCs. 
These corporations operate by appropriating in a new way a portion of the surplus labor 
of migrant workers. Here again we see a qualitative shift in the region's political 
economy: the replacement of national and international circuits of accumulations by 
global circuits of accumulation.  Previously, during the international phase of world 
capitalism, small levels of money transfers occurred through brick and mortar banks. This 
has now exploded into a transnational phenomenon. Moreover migration has come to 
serve as a mechanism for lower income communities to export their labor from 
“underdeveloped countries”, with the remittances they send home serving as part of a 
new developmental model linking local business interests, state elites, and wide swaths of 
the population in the region to transnational finance capital. 
 Chapter IV looked at the novel export processing model of the global era and 
emphasized how dynamic new production networks have come about in the region. This 
chapter demonstrated how capital is no longer motivated by or conducive to contributing 
to national economic development, national job creation, or transforming the productive 
powers of labor as a “national objective”, as argued by Karagiannis and 
Polychroniou  (2015). Instead, capital and state policymakers promote globalized 
production mechanisms through which the interests of labor and local communities are 
sidelined.  Even still, as I point out in Chapter IV, transnational capital and elites 
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promoting export processing in the Caribbean, face significant difficulties—as built 
economic environments in the region remain vastly underdeveloped in comparison to 
other areas more conducive to capitalist production and trade (such as in parts of East 
Asia and Latin America). 
 It has been my argument here, similar to that of Robinson (2002, 2003), Harris 
(2006), Liodakis (2010), and Watson (2013), that there has been a gradual disembedding 
of social classes, structures, and institutions from the nation-state context. My argument 
is not that national states, frontiers, uneven development, and built environments are 
unimportant.  Rather, I suggest that the social configuration of space is shifting as 
production relations become transnationalized.  With in-depth research on three countries 
(the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica) I illustrated the unevenness and 
particularities of this new configuration. This is not a uniform or complete process but it 
is a novel, dynamic, and contradictory one, riven with crises. Regions such as the 
Caribbean, and nations and particular areas within them, have accrued their own profiles 
in the global era, with their own special niches in the global economy. This dissertation 
suggests we need to reconsider political economy in light of a qualitative shift in social 
reproduction, but without disregarding continuities and differentiations. 
 The tensions and contradictions of global capitalism in the region are apparent, 
aggravating new class tensions as well as leading to state policies that are increasingly 
disconnected from the interests of local communities and locally oriented development. 
Another key contradiction is the trend toward growing social polarization, as wealth 
becomes concentrated in the hands of the global “1%”, a sector of global society that 
includes a small but rising number of Caribbean-born multi-millionaires. Yet the 
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nationally aggregated data we have for understanding social polarization, such as GDP, 
presents an indication of “national wealth”. The problem here is that this deemphasizes 
the interconnected nature of a nation’s population with the global economy. It does not 
take into account, for instance, the transnational spread of capital flows and many 
segments of the global investment portfolios of local and diasporic capitalists or foreign 
based capitalists active in the region. 
 Even still, nationally aggregated data is one of the few indicators we have to 
examine social polarization empirically. According to World Bank data, for instance, in 
the Dominican Republic as of 2013, the poorest quintile of the population had a 3.8% 
share of the nation’s GDP, whereas the richest quintile had 53.5% share (ECLAC, 2014). 
In Jamaica over a third of the population lives under the poverty line and in lower income 
neighborhoods of Kingston unemployment reaches between forty and sixty percent. The 
population of Haiti exhibits the highest inequality in the Americas and Caribbean, with 
6.3 million of the country’s 10 million people unable to meet their basic food needs 
(ONPES and World Bank, 2014). “Only 2 percent of the population consumes the 
equivalent of $10 a day which is the region’s income threshold for joining the middle 
class” (Ibid: 6). Looking at social polarization through the scope of nationally aggregated 
data ignores how these “national populations” have become entwined with the global 
economy. An accurate picture of global wealth, with, for example, the complex 
transnational spread of investments and use of tax havens by the transnational capitalist 
class (TCC), would emphasize even more so the dramatic nature of inequality, skewed in 
favor of the planet’s top quintile. In addition to the many studies on the TCC that I have 
cited in this dissertation, recent studies of the wealth and power of the “super class” show 
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the extreme concentration of capital among the highest echelons of global society 
(Rothkopf, 2009). 
 Another major contradiction associated with capitalist globalization is the crisis of 
legitimacy, which in part stems from the abandonment by state managers of national 
development as they seek transnational integration. Their growing detachment from 
locally oriented development has been made possible as a restructuring of the world 
economy has occurred alongside political restructuring. Emphasizing economic 
development through incorporation with global capital, state functionaries increasingly 
have come to work to transfer state resources from “program oriented ministries (social 
services, education, labor, etc.) to central banks, treasuries and finance and economic 
ministries, and the foreign ministry” (Robinson 2001: 186). Over recent decades, more 
and more state elites have shared in this overarching project, which is ultimately in the 
interest of the TCC.  While state functionaries still engage in long established functions 
(taxation, public works, etc.), at the same time their own social reproduction has come to 
depend upon transnational, rather than national or international, circuits of capitalist 
accumulation (Robinson, 20014). Increasingly, state technocrats believe that to develop 
they must insert their national states and institutions into global circuits of accumulation 
(Robinson 2010; Dominguez 1996). They need access to capital, and capital is in the 
hands of the TCC. However, state elites must still appeal to their home audiences. They 
still interact with a variety of locally based communities. Because of this, even as ties 
with the TCC deepen, national rhetoric and national state policies occur that are in 
apparent contradiction with TCC interests. In this problematic manner, state officials 
attempt to maintain national political legitimacy while deepening practices of a global 
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nature. 
  
Future Research 
 The Caribbean and regions around the world are now entangled in the novel 
production relations of capitalist globalization.  Beyond the case studies in this 
dissertation, what other economic sectors in the Caribbean do we need to examine in light 
of the new class relations?  Future research could look at banking, real-estate, and import 
sales industries. Each of these are major sites of transnational penetration, undergoing 
major changes in the global phase of world capitalism, and of prime import for the lives 
of many people.  Studies of these sectors through the “global capitalism school” approach 
would greatly enrich our understanding of the structural features of transnationalization 
in the region. An ongoing research agenda into global capitalism in the Caribbean should 
look also at additional data on capital flows and inequality.  
 While I am unable to discuss it here, research also needs to examine the connection 
of transnational capitalism to environmental crisis and in the context of the Caribbean. 
Though this dissertation does not have the space for the proper study of the political, 
labor, and social movements and their struggles in the Caribbean during the transition to 
globalization, examining these in detail would prove imperative for further understanding 
of the phenomena examined in this dissertation. These research topics are central for 
understanding a way out of the crises of legitimization, social polarization and other 
crises facing human civilization and the planet, and for thinking about what can be and 
what needs to be done. Ultimately, class struggle, along with democratic socialist, 
environmentalist, feminist, and anti-racist struggles bring forward the role of human 
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agency in the context of the global era, and lead us to consider how global consciousness 
can be brought about. It forces us to consider the linkages and forms of solidarity 
between working and popular classes that need to come about. Just as the TCC has 
increasingly come to see itself as a self-conscious class, how too can working and 
popular classes achieve a transnational or global class-consciousness? 
 In this dissertation I have applied the theory of transnational processes to the 
Caribbean in an original way, and in so doing help to advance the theory. My empirical 
study is of course open to distinct interpretations. My case studies have been largely 
based on a structural analysis but have also engaged in a relational analysis of historical 
processes. I have found that bringing these forms of analysis together useful for 
understanding the underlying causality of the processes we are examining. While a 
number of critical political economy studies have examined nations in the Caribbean, no 
broad studies of the region’s macro socio-economic structure as of yet have utilized the 
theory of transnational processes. Here, I have aimed to look critically at how 
transnational dynamics have formed and taken root in the region. !
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